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INTRODUCTION 
Belgium in the 1930s was no different from the rest of Europe. It was in a crisis 
-- f.iJlancial, political, 'aq.d, as it appeared to some, social. Unemployment reached a peak 
for- the decade in 1934 (with 183,0001 out of a population of about 8,092,0002). Yet.iJl the 
first half of the 1930s, the government had no working policy for either inflation or 
unemplQyment.3 Furthermore, the nature of Belgian politics at the time made 
Parliament ineffectual. Since the First World War, Belgium had been run by the Union 
Nationale, a coalition of the three strongest parties in the nation, the Catholics, the 
Socialists, and the Liberals (.iJl the November, 1919 elections, the results in the 
Parliamentary House were 71 seats, 70 seats, and 34 seats, respectively).4 Although 
such a union guaranteed that a plurality of Belgian opinion would be heard, and ' 
protected against anyone party -- and ideology -- unfairly superseding others, it also 
made the process of change very slow. For instead of being able to work on proposals 
for policies, the party representatives spent most of their time concentrating on 
compromising with each other. Enacting new legislation was a trying process. As a 
result, it seemed to some Belgians that the government was not doing its job. 
The younger generation of Belgians who had just reached the voting age of 
twenty-one were particularly aggravate,d by this sta1~ and sluggish political system. 
Many of them wanted to ' have a voice'in politics beyond their ballot, and were'\mpatient 
, I 
1 Jean-Michel Etienne, Le Mouv-ement rexiste jusgu'en 1940 (Paris, Librairie Armand 
Colin, 1968), p. 58. 
2Population figures only available for 1930. B.R. Mitchell, European Historical 
Statistics: 1750-1970 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 19. 
3Inaction on the financial crisis ended in March, 1935, when economist and banker 
Paul Van Zeeland was appointed Prime Minister and given special powers to rectify the 
situation through a rigorous program of devaluation ' 
4Roger E. De Smet, Rene Evalenko, and William Fraeys, Collection de Science poUtigue: 
Atlas des Elections Belges 1919-1954 (Brux" Institut de Sociologie Solvay. Universite 
Libre de Bruxel1es, 1958), p. H. 
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to effect change within their country. Some sought out political youth groups, such as 
the Socialist youth, while others turned to more socially and religiously active groups, 
such as Catholic action . The Belgian Rexist movement emerged out of the latter. 
The future Rexists were a group Qf university and secondary school students 
who wanted to bring moral and religious reform to their nation. The proselytizing 
aspect of Catholic action appealed to them because it offered them the chance to 
actively bring reform to society around them, and to immediately measure their results. 
At the same time, they realized that Qnly through politics, only through entering the 
pplitical arena could they accomplish the societal reforms they wanted on a grand 
scale. The history of the Rexist movement is the history of its attempting to bring 
Catholic activism for moral and religious reform to Belgium through political channels. 
It is also the history of the Belgian form 9f fascism. For in the process of its political 
developement, Rex would be swayed by an ideology which was growing fast in all of 
Europe, and which seemed ·to offer an answer for some of the other Europeans who 
were searching for a way to reform their society: fascism. Because of Belgiums' 
historical and geographical situation. and because of the political tensions unfolding in 
Europe in the 1930s, the evolution of fascism in Rex would be important. 
Belgium was a geographical and political crossing. Bordering on three of the 
most important European powers in. the 1930s. it was the keystone of German. French, 
and English political relations. In the First World War, it was through Belgium that the 
- , 
Germans had entered France. 'In the eyes Of the Belgians and.- indeed, of most of the 
rest of Europe, if a second were to come, the aggressor would undoubtedly again attack 
through Belgium. If at that time Belgium were more fascist than democratic, if 
Degrelle had won a parliamentary majority and established a fascist regime in alliance 
with Hitlerian Germany, democratic France and England would be especially 
! 
endangered. "Belgium is a frontier country in a double sense," wrote Harold Callender 
of The New York Times. 
iii 
She is a bastion on the frontier of democracy and of Western 
civilization. Hence her part in the struggle between fascism and free 
government has, like her foreign policy, an importance far greater 
than her geographical area might suggest.5 
The development of Rex into a political group would be watched not only from within 
the nation, but also from without. 
Luckily, Belgium's pre-war fascism was only a flirtation, and quickly died-out. 
The failure of Rex to stay alive on its own was due mostly to its own failure to be 
realistic. Caught in the glories of its first political successes in 1936, Rex never stopped 
to consider whether, once in politics, it might have to change its tactics. It refused to 
realize that to keep its supporters it would have to have some concrete results to show ' 
them. Having been thoroughly educated in the techniques of propaganda by Mgr. 
Picard, the leader of Belgian Catholic action, Rex did not see the need to go beyond it. 
This thesis will be an exploration of Rexist history with the intent to prove that it was 
Rex's inability to move beyond propaganda which caused its downfall before the war. 
In explaining the evolution of the Rexist movement, I have divided its pre-war 
history into a pre-phase followed by four distinct phases. The pre-phase covers the 
period before Leon Degrelle, founder of the Rex movement, became head of the Catholic 
action publishing house, Les Editions Rex. Once Degrelle became the publishing house 
editor, Rex entered its first phase. It remained in this phase, developing considerably 
as a movement to protect the Church, uiltil it became too political for the Church, and 
was forced ~ break off its ties~ith Belgian Catholic action in Ja.nu~, 193"!. l"t1 its 
second phase, Rex continued to politicize itself through its press, aad still acted to 
protect the Church, though not through Catholic action, but by influencing the 
Catholic Party directly. Rex's third phase began decisively on November 2,1935 with 
the coup de Courtrai. at which point Rex openly declared itself political for the first 
time: Rex would no longer try to bring reform to Belgian society by working through 
'The New York Times, Mar. 7,1937, section VIn, p. 13. 
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the Catholic Party; instead, it would form its own party. Rex's purpose in its third and 
most important phase was no longer to protect the Church. but to protect Catholic 
morality in general. and to fight corruption in financial and government circles. In 
this third phase. Rex launched continual attacks on the three established parties 
(Catholics, Socialists. and Liberals), and supposedly engaged in traditional politics by 
becoming a political party represented in Parliament. The fourth and final pre-war 
phase of Rexist history began with Degrelle's total failure in the 1937 elections and 
lasted until the German invasion of Belgium on May 10,19-40. During this last phase, 
Rex would lose almost all of its support and would turn more and more towards Hitlerian 
and Mussolinian fascism as the only way to regain power -- or so it thought. 
, In order to preserve continuity, I have divided my chapters less along 
chronological guidelines than along guidelines of important issues. Chapter one 
narrates the chronology of the movement to the beginning of phase three. Chapter 
two discusses Rexist ideology, an understanding of which is necessary to be' able to 
explore the third and fourth phases of the movement, described in the third chapter. 
Chapter four elaborates on Degrelle's biography. and on his role as a leader, orator. and 
writer. And chapter five discusses the Rexist press. the most important vehicle of 
Rexist propaganda and the very basis of Rexism. 
I must add a note on historiography before I begin with my narration. Few 
historians have written on Rex. and eve~ fever have done a careful-analysis of the 
~ 
importance oJ Rex. Because De'grelle is sti11living today and is very wi11i~g to be 
interviewed. most modern works on Rex are long interviews written up in 'book form. 
These. however. are frequently inaccurate and disorganized. Although I have tried in 
this thesis to use a wide variety of sources. I have relied heavily on Jean-Michel 
Etienne's work. because his is the only comprehensive historical treatment of pre-war 




ChroJlo.o,y: Rex before ParliLllloJlt 
L' Avant-Garde and the great Louvain farces 
The origins (or pre-phase) of Rex can be traced back to the student newspaper 
at Louvain university, L'Avant-Garde, and to the group of writers that formed around 
its chief editor, Leon Degrelle. The student newspaper must have been just like any 
other newspaper, except that its journalists had a special affinity for joke-making and 
pranks. These were always rather harmless and the main intent of them was to have 
fun and to get attention. Indeed, Degrelle's groupies ~ained a considerable reputation 
for these fuces, some of which ue, even today, still remembered. 
One graduate told me about how Degrelleand his friends once fooled the entire, 
town of Louvain by dressing up as workmen and pretending to be doing road-work. 
They managed to set up a road block and to divert traffic away from the major street for 
an entire day, until they decided that the joke had lasted long enough and that it vas 
time to leave} A more famous prank is the "Proces Dumas." 
For seve.ral veek in 1927, L' Ayant-Garde ran a serial entitled "La. barbe 
ensanglantee" and signed "Alexandre Dumas, petit-fils."2 Wanting to bring some fresh 
attention to the student newspaper, Degrelle and his friends decided to make' use of the 
story's pseUdonym. They fabricated a suit brought against them by the inheritors of 
A1e~dre Dumas for defamation of the great novelist's name. To do this, they drew up a ' 
fake letter from the,inheritors~ lawyer, !lenri Torres -- who happened to be one of 
' \ 
Paris' most reknovnlawyers -- and printed jt in the next isSue of L' Avant-Gar,. They 
• I 
then found a Belgian lawyer, a M. Cleyman~, to r~present M. Torres in court in'Louvain. 
(Claymans vas all too honored to be associated vith the great Parisian lawyer's name to 
investigate the matter fully.) They even convinced alov-Ievel court official (whose 
1 As told to me by a student of Louva.in university who graduated in the 1950s. He is 
proof that Degrelle stories have indeed gone dovn in university history. 
2 Jean Ladriere and Robert Pfeiffer, L'Aventure rexiste (Bruxelles, Pierre de M6yere, 
ed., 1%6), p. 18. These authors date the event in 1932. This, hovever, is impossible, 
since Degrelle leftL'Avant-Garde already in 1928. Jean-Michel Etienne (see note 3), a 
most reliable source, gives no date. My date is only a guess, therefore. 
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name they. had literally picked out at random from the phone book!) to deliver a 
summons notice to the offices of the students paper. What with all the student press 
coverage and excellent preparation of the L' Avant-Gardists. the suit caused a great 
sensation. All of Louvain turned out for the trial and the judge deemed the case so 
important that he postponed judment for eight days. The great prank had yorked even 
better than expected. In fact, it yas becoming a little too real to be safe. The students 
finally decided to put an end to it and the'next issueofL'Avant-Garde revealed the joke . 
. Surprisingly, perhaps, everybody took it in good humor -- even the great Torres, yho 
Yrote a witty response to the paper.3 
The experience at L' AYant-Garde taught the future Rexists not only YritiJig 
and journalistic skills, but also propaganda and attention-getting methods. as well as 
leadership techniques. The atmosphere must have been like that of a gang: 
participants in the journalism and in the pranks (yhich, as in the Dumas case. were 
often one and the same) were part of a tight group. And this group ,was lead by a strong 
leader. Indeed; L'Avant-Garde and its various extra-curricular activities offered 
Degrelle his first opportunity at real1eadership. Within such a small and c1ose-.knit 
community, he yas able to develop his rhetoric and tactics without feeling threatened 
by greater forces. It is nevertheless rather remarkable hoy much attention he ~ 
able to bring to himself and his student friends. L' AVant-Garde was also the fostering 
ground for Degrelle to gather his future'Rexistes de la premiere heure, the disciples 
who would follow him and work with him to form the new Rex movement. "'\. 
Yet yhile still at L'Avant-Garde. much had to be learned. Pranks and comical 
articles yere not enough to keep a band of youths together for long. i'hey needed 
direction, guidance. This, they received from the Association Catho!igue de 1a Jeunesse 
3Ladriere and Pfeiffer. p. 18-21; and Jean-Michel Etienne, Le Mouvement rexiste 
jusQy'en 1940 (Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 1968), note 5, p. 11. 
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BeIge and its leader, Monseigneur Picard. It is important, therefore. to take a brief look 
at this organjzation and at its philosophies. 
The ACm and Mgr. Picard: buiJdin& blocks of the Rexist movement 
The actual. formal movement of Rex originated in the Association Catholigue de 
la Jeuness BeIge (ACjB) and drew most of its ideas from what it had learned there. The 
ACjB was a Catholic action group; that is. it was a Catholic Church organizationvhich 
existed to spread the vord. so to speak. In a Catholiccount.ry like Belgium. there vas 
little converting which needed to be done. The ACjB's task. therefore, vas more to 
spread awareness of a Catholic ideology and to bring more people into its fold. It vas 
also an institution for the young. -a place where they could meet, discuss and work 
together for the Catholic cause. Mgr. Louis Picard, head of the ACjB as the Rex 
movement was forming, defined the institution as a link between ACjBists -- lay 
apostles of Christ living io: the temporal world -- and Church leaders.4 The ACjB. like 
other Catholic action groups, wanted a state based on Christian principles. 
Elle U'ACjBJ entend exercer une influence sur toute la vie et sur 
toutes les institutions saciales, sur la famille. sur la profession. sur 
fEtat lui-m6me .... Ca.r il y a une conception chretienne de toutes 
choses, et de toute activite, et l'Action Catholique ou plus exactement 
l'Eglise par fAction Catholique veut travailler de tout son pouvoir a 
l'application et a la realisation de cette conception chretienne.5 
In his book. La. doctrine Catho1igu~ de L'Etat. Picard describes in d¢tail what a 
state governed by a Catholic party would be like. First of all. State and Church'Ve 
J 
distinctly separated. God created two societies. a temporal one in the Staie and a 
spiritual one in the Church. which must remain autonomous. Yet. autonomy does not 
cancel out collabo.ration. Indeed. each plays a crucial role in human society. While the 
State exercises economic and legal control over its citttens. the Church holds full power 





over religious and moral matters. Both must work together to form a political economy 
and, as they interact, both must respect each other's realm of authority. For a state 
economy following only economic laws is doomed to liberalism, and one subject only to 
moral laws is theocratic -- both enemies of a Catholic state. The Catholic State receives 
its power not from the people but from God himself. Rebellion against society's 
institutions and leaders, therefore, means rebellion against God. Such a state, then, is 
authoritarian and must guide and control its citizens, for the science of politics is too 
complicated for the individ~al to venture into alone: "La conception catholique de l'Etat 
implique donc l'autorite incontestable des pouvoirs publics.6 .... L'autorite forte remise 
en honneur par Ie fascisme et rhiU~risme n'est pas en tan.t que telle oppo~e ala 
doctrine catholique."? Indeed, not only can the Christian idea of national life and 
political institutions be realized in democracy and parliamentarianism, but it survives 
even in authoritarian and dictatorial systems, for it will soften their sometimes harsh 
actions and deter dangers that they might bring to the nation's citizens. The role of the 
-statesman, then, is to guide and protect the citizens. Guide them in acting for the 
common good -- and, thus, the supernatural good of the souls -- and protect them from 
particular individuals and groups (clans, classes, private societies) which might work 
against the common good. He must unify and stimulate their activities and those of 
their associations. and he must keep order and security. Above all, the statesman must 
be free from personal ambitions and interests within the society. 
A CathoH-c state would be tolerant of all religions: "Les catholiques con~tu~s en 
parti n'o.o.t qu'une ambition: gouverner sagement Ie pays tout en assurant Ie respect et 
la liberte de la religion."S Picard's definition of tolerance, however, does not include 
propaganda. Non-Catholic believers, therefore, may live freely in a Catholic state, but 
only if they keep quiet about their faith (or non-faith) and don't take any open actions 
6Picard, p. 16 
7Picard, p. 19 
8Picard, p. 118 
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to enlarge their following. Such a narrow understanding of tolerance fits in perfectly 
with Picard's anti-liberal and authoritarian type of state. 
In the social field, the Catholic State would enforce traditional types of laws: the 
religious marriage sacrament would become official; the sanctity of the family and 
other traditional Catholic mores would be implemented; birth control and divorce -- a 
-
sacriligious breaking of the marriage sacrament -- would be forbidden; financial 
support would be available for parents who wished to send their children to private 
(i.e. Catholic) schools and for the Catholic schools themselves; and the media would be 
censored against stepping out of the strictly-laid, Catholic moral grounds. In education. 
the State must fully collaborate with the Church, for it is the Church which ultimately 
controls a child's education (the parents are susceptible to Church laws) and a child 
must be educated in the Christian doctrine. Collaboration here consists of protecting 
both the family and the Church as they educate the child, as well as protecting the 
child from unfit parents.9, 
Finally, in the realm of economics, besides Church-State collaboration to ensure 
good economic and moral policy-making, Picard prescribes a corporative State. Cross-
class professional associations would act as intermediaries between people and State and 
ensure a close relationship between the two.10 On an international scale, nations 
should work with each other econoniically -- this, as an expression of "la fraternite 
humaineque nous enseigne et nous inc~lque l'Evangilique'."l1 Writing in the earl; 
, "\ 
'30s, Picard criticizes the present economic organization which, he says, makes work 
seem as if it is produced only for the producer and not for society as a whole. 
90f course " Picard does not say what the state should do in the event of an unfit priest. 
Could such a creature even exist? One can assume that, if it did, the state would have to 
get rid of him also. 
1 OCorporatism vas not a new invention. It had been around in the dialogues of 
important religious leaders for several years. Picard notes that Pope Pius XI called 
corporatism an essential element of social organjzation "comforme a la nature des 
chases." Picard, p. 43 
11 Picard, p. '110 
5 
Corporatism would return the professional system to a healthy state. where work 
supported the common good. 
This elaborate philosopy was actually not so innovative. Picard essentially 
ouUined a traditional Cath~lic state which takes responsibility for all aspects of its 
citizens' lives by controlling ~oth their public and private affairs. It is this type of 
society that the early Rexists first envisioned. It is out of such a background that they 
would develop their Rexist ideology. 
But if the ACJB organization itself offered a base for the Rexist movement. its 
leader. Monseigneur Picard, also exercized a lot of i.nfluence. Mgr. Picard was residing 
at Louvaln when Degrelle and his future Rexist compatriots were attendi.ng the 
university. The chaplai.n soon heard about Degrelle's exploits at the L'Av8.nt-Qarde 
student newspaper and engaged him to. write for the ACJB's student journal, Cahiers de 
la Jeuness Catholique, i.n 1927. Degrelle became a regular at the ACJB house and 
beginning i.n 1928. he and his coUeagues of L'Avant-Garde consulted frequenUy with 
Mgr. Picard. Picard was a leader for them and someone with experience in leadership. 
He gave them direction. a cause to work for: the Catholic cause. He taught them 
publishi.ng s.kills and modern techniques of propaganda and action: he showed them 
how crucial it was to win over the masses to one's side in any endeavor for societal 
change.12 Fi.nally, in 1928, he convinced them to leave L'Avant-Garde and devote 
themselves solely to Catholic action. · 
Christus-Rex: the com.ing together of pastime and ideal 
ACjB action had always been based on the press, its own press, called ~ 
Editions Rex because of a cult for the Christ-king which was becoming more and more 
12Jacques Saint-Germain, La BataiUe de Rex (Paris, __ . 1937), p. 67 
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popular among student in the mid to late '20s.13 By 1930. however. Mgr. Picard had 
grander visions for his movement and established a full-scale publishing house for the 
ACJB. The new institutionwas located in an ACJB building at 52 rue Vital-Decoster. 
Louvain. and used the insignia of Christus Rex: three large letters spelling out "Rex." 
i1lterlaced and attached to a crown whose last point was a cross. (See plate 1) The new 
LeS Editions Rex was in charge of the propaganda wing of the ACJB and its aim was to: 
... repandre dans Ie pays des publications de nature a faire rayonner 
Ie Christ dans Ie's foyers. Le programme ewt vaste et comprenait 
non seulement la propagation de la Huerature spedfiquement 
doctrinaJe. mais aussi de la litterature profane a caractere chretien 
ou'moralisateur. 14 
In October 1930. Degrelle was appointed its ne", director. and Rex entered what I have 
caUed its nm phase.1 , 
When he came. he brought with him his tight group of faithful disciples from 
L' AY&Qt-Garde. To them, working at Los Editions Rex -vas a new chance to coordi1late 
hobby -- So to speak -- and ideal. AU of them had a passion for iinaginwve and 
provocative ",riting. <The French ",riter, Saint-Germain, described them as " .. .1a jeune 
equipe. dont chaque membre cachait au plus profond de lui-m6me un ecrivain 
i1lgenieux ou un poete sensible ... ")16 They had been able to turn this passion into 
~bstance at L' Avant-Garde" yet one can imagi1le th~ the atmosphere at the ACJB was 
13The celebration of Christ-king was initiated by Pope Pius XI in his "Quas Pr~as" 
encyclical of. 1925. The last Sunday of October was devoted to aU sorts of festivif'ies in 
the name of the Christ-king. [Usmard legros, Un Homme. un chef.'Laon Degrelle 
<Bruxelles, Editions Rex, 1938), p. 107.] 
14Legros, p. 108. 
15Etienne, p.l4. I have noticed some discrepancies among historians of Rex as to 
whether or not Degrelle took: on the leadership of a newly-established publishing 
house or simply a renewed one. Etienne claims Rex editions were founded in 1926 and 
were overhawled in 1930, when Degrelle came in. Hoyois' account, on the other hand. 
implies that it was only in 1929 that Mgr. Picard decided to found a publishing house, to 
which. shorOy thereafter. he appointed Degrelle. Because Etienne's wort: is the most 
recent of the tva and has gained considerable repute as a careful piece of research. I 
shall abide by his dates here. and throughout the thesis. 
16Saint-Germain, p. S9 
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quite different from that at the university. They now devoted their attention to much 
more serious actions which, though they included writing, allowed them neither the 
freedom of imagination, nor the possibility as before of working tightly together in an 
autonomous group. Les Editions Rex brought the old gang together again. It gave them 
a focus. It allowed them to use their old writing and propaganda skills in combination 
with their strong Catholicism to express a new and developing passion, learned mostly 
through the guidance of Mgr. Picard at the ACJB: the proliferation of a Christian ideal. 
For it seemed to them that society around them had fallen into an abyss of immorality 
which could only be saved if everyone abided by the basic concepts of Christian mores. 
DegreUe ben~fiued'from the transfer to Les Editions Rex just as much as his old 
friends did. In his new leadership position, he too could bring together his enthusiasm 
for journalism (and for getting people's attention through provocative journalism) and 
his new-found aim. inille, converting the public to Christian morality. In addition, ill 
Editions Rex finally offered him real leadership opportunity. Granted, as chief editor of 
L'Avant-Garde he had exercized a certain amount of control over his colleagues, yet 
because he was a student and because the paper was only one of several student 
newspapers at the university, the amount of time he could devote to it and the 
influence he could hold over the Catholic community in general was limited. NoW' he 
had an entir~publishing house at his disposal and could put into practice what he 
believed in :-- or so he thought. 
~ 
It is obvious from th~ development of the editing house in these first few years 
. that his control over the institution was quite firm.1? It is also obvious, in retrospect, 
that he used his position to .further his personal ambitions of getting involved in 
paiities vet it ;$ baed fo pinpoint _exactly when DeareUs's pglitical i5pirations began to 
take over his Catholic ones. Did he, at first, only want to be a leader of the Catholic 
1 ?Because of the importance of the development of the Rexist press, I have decided to 
accord it a separate section of its own. All future references to the press in this 
chapter, therefore, will be elaborated upon in the chapter on Rexist press. (See below) 
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youth movement? Was it only after having tasted the power of leadership at the ACjB 
that he expanded his sphere of reference -- talked about reaching il1. Catholics and III 
Belgians? Perhaps such grand hopes had always been in his mind and the stints at 
L'AYant-Garde and the ACjB were only conscious stepping stones to something more 
challengitig and glorifying. Anybody who has .kno~n Degrel1e or has studied him 
knows of the story of how, when his father asked him what he would lite to become 
when he grew up, fifteen year old Degrelle unhesitantly answered "Premier 
Ministre."18 Of course, sucb. stories may only be stories and one cannot accord them 
undue significance, yet, ~e or not, the very fact that it has become part of .tl.i§ story 
tells us about the impression he gave. By 1930 Degrelle was bent on changing the 
world; he wanted to be a leader: "SitOt entre dans la place [Les £ditions Rex}, Degrelle 
decide que '~a va changer'."19 From editor of a successful, but nevertheless small 
student newspaper, he had gone on to become director of the publishing house of one 
. of the Belgian Catholic Church's most hnportant institutions. Thiscertai.nly was a leap 
fot'Vard and one which brought much power and prestige vith it. Was Degrelle 
looting for this? As director of Les £ditions Rex he could control all literature that 
issued out of the house. This meant, then, that everything that vent out held his 
approval. With this nev andpoverful tool in hand, Degrelle's vision of himself as a 
changer of the world through Catholicism and politics began to tate over his vision of 
'. ,
himself as changer of the vorld through Catholicism alone. He wanted to bring 
. . "'\ 
attention to himself and to LesEditions Rex .. 
18f:tienne, p.10 
19£tienne, p.l <f 
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The first chance for this came up when he was assigned to take over the 
propaganda for the Catholic party in the November, 1932 legislative elections.20 The 
opportunity had come for Degrelle to get his hands into something he had always 
wanted to do, and it was an opportunity which would bring attention to his excellent 
propagand8. track-record. Thus, he could use the occasion as proof of his s.kills and as a 
way of getting himself on the forefront: his name and t4e name of Les £ditions Rex 
would be distributed all over the country, as would be his successes. Degrelle was good 
at his task and his hard work payed off. The Catholic party carried 38."% of the vote, 
up from 3'.37% in 192931 and g~ed 3 seats, for a total of 79.22 In additon, Degrelle's 
name was no longer unfamiliar within Catholic circles. He was beginning to break out 
of isolation. 
But Degrelle .t.o.ew that. only a varied and exCiting press could reach all the 
Catholic masses and could bring growth in size and importance to Les Editions Rex. 
Between Fall, 1932 and Spring, 1933. therefore, he bought out Soirees from the other 
editors. and launched four new periodicals, m Vlan. Foyer, and Crois.23 The second of 
these was purely political and thus marked a first break with the strictly non-political -
- indeed. anti-political-- attitude that. the AClB and Mgr. Picard had enforced so far. Yet 
the chaplai.o. had consented to the revue (though with the qualification that it limit 
. . 
itself to ChristiaJl discourse on political" affairs and never enter into politics, per se), 
and Degrelle seemed to be getting his way.24 
I 
20Legros. p. n 1. Historians differ on whether he was given this task or whether he 
fought to get it. Legros says that. the Catholic Party at. first refused to allow Degrelle to 
take on the propaganda. and that it was only after the youthful leader's insistan'ce that 
they finally agreed. [Legros. p. 111-112] Etienne, on the other hand, declares that the 
Catholic Party never hesitated in asking Degrelle to take on the job. particularly in 
light of his propagandistic successes so far. [Etienne, p. 15] 
21Roger E. De Smet, Rene Evalenko, William Fraeys, Collection de Science Poiitigue: 
Atlas des Elections Belges 1919=1951 (Bruxelles. Institut de Sociologie Solvay, Universit.e 
Libre de Bruxelles, 1958) p. 10. 
22Legros,p.ll1-112. 
23Etienne, p.1,. (See separate chapter on Rexist press, below.> 
24Etienne, p. 16 
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The politizaijon of Rex: a movement emerges 
If the publication of YlJA. marked the beginning of a self-imposed politization 
of Les Editions Rex. it also marked the first climax in the development of Rex as a 
movement -- the second phase of Rex. "Rex devenait donc une sorte de soul6vement des 
jeunes, soulevement en general sympathique aux a.lnes qui suivaient avec interit les 
phases de revolution rexiste."25 Degrelle had already expanded beyond the boundaries 
set by the ACjB for the publishing house -- the journals, pamphlets and books vere 
geared tovard-a broader public nov -- and, 
imbu d'une immense confiance en lui-m6me, i1 se tenait pour un 
6t.rea part et ne cachait pas a. 58S amis qu·it se sentait appel6 a. de 
gran'des choses. S'il entendait se livre I' a. l'apostolat chretien. toute 
tutelle d'un comite d' Action catholique ou d'un -personnage m6me 
des plus sympathiques lui 6wt intolerable.26 
Degrelle vanted to be his ovn boss and ~ailted to enter full swing into political 
journalism. 
Separatism and politization, hovever, would soon lead to disagreement vith the 
ACjB. For, as Mgr. Picard emphasized in La Doctrine Catholigue de fEtat. Belgian 
Catholic action vas adament about the separation of religious and political affairs. 
T-ension increased, therefore, as Degrelle led Les Editions Rex into a political press. 
Money problems also set in, for Degrelle'had tried ~ do too much too fast. The editions' 
deficit 'Vas rising and the secretary general of Belgian Catholic action deemeih. 
prudent to disassociate itself from the publishing house. Luckily, DegreUe vas able to 
collect enough funds to buy Les Editions Rex.2? Under the agreements made on July 31, 
2'Legros. p. 116. 
26Giovanni Hoyois, "Mgr. Picard et Leon DegreUe," in Revue ienerale beIge (Nov. 1959), 
p.85. 
2?Jt seems he received most of the money (about 700,000 FB) from his parents-in-law. 
rich industrialists in northern France. The Lemays would support him frequently in 
the early development of the movement. [Daye, p. 66; and Etienne, p.84.J 
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1933, he now leased the building from the ACJB, while continuing to publish for it. As 
proprietor of Les Editions Rex, Degrelle vas able to steer the publications more and 
more towards the political field. By 1933, "Rex n'etait deja plus un mouvement 
litt6raire:'28 Ylim. became overUy political and more and more books on political 
subjects were published. 
Indeed, Mgr. Picard's earlier confidence in Degrelle's good vishes soon 
dwindled. DegreUe appeared to be leading his" groupies" away from the ACJB: 
D'un modeste service d'edition, Rex passait au rang d'un mouvement 
deciare ... Degrelle soulevait une jeunesse unitaire, en lui infusant 
une immelnlse ambition": ceUe de realiser dans la vie sociale, et 
d'abord dans l'arene politique, !'ideal spirituel qui avait fait 
flamboyer des jeunes hommes en masses compactes dans Ies congres 
de l'A.C.j.B.29 
Degrelle's press had also begun a series of attacks on, first. socialists and freemasons, 
and, then, actual leaders of the Catholic Party -- starting with the Prime Minister 
himself, M. Henri jaspar. The situation vas becoming very awkward for Mgr. Picard. 
"Though the Catholic Party was technically not a Church institution, it vas still 
connected -with it and supported by it. The fact that the ACJB, an institution of the 
Church. 'Was closely connected -with the very source of this harsh criticism did not 
bring good light to the organization. In December, 1933. the secretary general of 
Belgian Catholic action called upon Les Editions Rex to end pUblication of ~ to 
choose between-politics and the support of the secretary general. and to draw up a: 
reasonable and balanced budget. SO Rex editions' only response -Was to launch ~ev 
attack, this time on the vice-president of the ACJB himself, Helbig de Balzac!S1 This 
latest scandal proved too much for both the secretary general and Mgr. Picard, and, in 
late january, 1934, the ACJB officially separated itself from Les Editions Rex. Degrelle 
28Legros, p. 116. 
29Hoyois, p. 85. 
30Etienne, p. 21. 
31F:tienne, p.2l. 
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remained undaunted by the split, however, especially since his friendship with Mgr. 
Picard was not affected. (Picard published his book on the Catholic state with Les 
Editions Rex after the split.) In fact, it seems that the separation was ordered only to 
enforce the traditional view that Catholic action and political action were truly 
incompatible. It did not mean a condemnation of Rex editions' activities.32 
Indeed, a most important example of continued politization was the fusion, on 
March 22, 193<f of YlK and BR into a new politico-literary weekly. The new periodical, 
however, also markedthe onset of renewed financial difficulties, for Degrelle saw no 
limits to .the expansion of the publishing house. "Sa confiance en sOl 6tait sans limite, 
et sans limite son ambition. Comme directeur de Rex il d6ploya une telle m6galomanie 
et lan~a un si grand nombre de p6riodiques ... que l'entreprise en arriva au bord de 1a 
faiUite."3! Though Rex managed to pay for itself, the other journals operated at great 
cost to Les Editions Rex. The publishing house was forced to abandon both fQnr. and 
~. But DegreUe refused to give up either his cherished political bi-monthly, or his 
successful Catholic literary revue. So he simply combined them. The fusion of the too 
was, in fact, a stroke of genius, especially since he managed to convince his readership 
that he was now offering them one of the pair free -- though at a higher price!34 
Nevertheless, the fusion did not solve Rex's severe financial problems. In May, 
Les Editions Rex was evicted from the AC~ building because it was not paying rent. 
The editions' total debt constituted 1.'00,000 Belgian Francs (FB) in liabititi~s ~d about 
J 
600.000 in assets.3' The revenues from publications could ~ever come close to covering 
this sum. Something had to be done fast. DegreUe at first founded a Fonds de combat. 
and sent out pleas for money through his press.36 (Such pleas appeared continually 
32Etienne, p. 21. 
33Stengers, p.27. 
34Etien.o.e, p .22. 
35Etie.o.ne, p.23. 
36Etie.o.ne, p .22. 
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throughout Rexist press history.) Yet voluntary donations w.ould never be enough. So 
he decided to replace Les Editions Rex by a Nouyelle societe la presse de Rex which took 
on the old asset debts, to a sum total of 1.100,000 FB. With the help of his shrewd lawyer, 
M. Dubois-Clavier, he was able to convince all of Rex editions' creditors to accept 
immediate payment of -to% of the debt (thus preventing property seizure), and the 
Premontres d'Averbode, Rex editions' printer, to collect their partin shares of the new 
Presses de Rex.3? Luckily for the Presses de Rex, the condition for such a deal was that 
the Premontres would have a say in the internal affairs of the new societe. They placed 
their representatives in the administrative council of the Presses, and forced a realistic 
budget upon them. As a result, and because of the increased profits from the weekly 
hL Les Presses de Rex was put back in the black.38 
Started on a new career, so to speak, Degrelle accelerated his political activities. 
Since 1933, he had begun malting speeches to small gatherings of supporters.39 The 
frequency and propagandistic quality of these increased quickly after the break from 
the ACjB, though they did not go unnoticed by the Church. The Charleroi case is 
exemplary. In late summer, 1934, Degrelle began planning for a great gathering of 
Relist forces to take place at Charleroi on October 21. The event would gather some ,000 
to 7000 Catholic youths in a sort of press conference, wh.ere Degrelle would set out his 
goals for the movement. He had already. begun a great propaganda campaign for the 
. , 
meeting in September. October 21 would be memorable asa "journee de propa&jUlde, 
• r 
journe'e de conqu&tes, journee de rayonnement et journee triomphale pour REX ... "40 
Advertisements in R.a asked Rexists to spend their time at Charleroi distributing 
3i'Etienne, p.22-23. 
38£tienne, p.23. Rex":Ylan had meanwhile become simply Rex. though it remained a 
politico-literary revue. 
39Etienne, p.23. 
40"Charleroi est mort. Vive Charleroi I," in ~ no. 40, Oct. 12,1934, p.16. 
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100,000 copies of Ru. in order to "6clairer et reconforter les cathoHques" after the 
break with the ACjB:41 (See also Plate 2) 
La bataille de Charleroi 
Le 21 Octobre 
tous nos lecteul"S, tous nos amis 
se feront apOtres, militants et propagandistes de REX 
(instructions a la page 16) 
100.000 REPANDEZ REX 100.00042 
FAITES LIRE REX 
The day was. guaranteed to be a sensational affair. Brought to Charleroi station. on 
special trains, the. participants would be accompanied by march music as they 
processed "en un ordre impeccable" toward the church where mass vas.to be held.43 
After the service, they would be lead to the tent for the great banquet: 
L'ordre Ie plus 6nergique sera assure par cinq cents commissaires 
rexistes responsables chacun de db congressistes. Meme repartition 
a. table. Un homme de confiAAce sera place tous leS dix sieges et aura 
la charge de la tenue, du service et. de l'enthousiasme (sicJ.l .. ~ Le 
banquet sera extrimement pittoresque. Jass {siel, musiques entral-
nantes alterneront avec des discoul"S enflammees, courts et ordonnes. 
Ven quatre heures et demie, Leon Degrelle monte sur une tribune de 
plusieurs metres de hauteur, au milieu des drapeaux ecla.ta.nts, haran-
guera l'immense foule a.la lueur des phares.44 
Sensing the danger of such an event, however, the bishop of Tournai, Mgr. Rasneur. 
did not authorize the mass. Degrelle's reaction was clever. Instead of denouncing the 
bishop's declaration and going on with the event as planned, he cancelled the whote 
thing and proclaimed October 21 a. day of-prayer for Rex. 
Nous ~mmes ici-bas pour servir Ie catholicisme. Pour servir 
utilement. it faut obair. Les ev6ques sont nos maItres et nos guides. 
Nous avan~ons dans Ie sens qu'its nous indiquent, sans discuter, 
comme des soldats .. ..1 Leurs arguments nous ont convaincus. Nous . . 
41 "Charleroi est ~ort. Vive Charleroi!." in Ra. no. 40. Oct. 12.1934. p.16. 
42R.u., no.40. Oct. 12.1934. p. 24. 
43Soides. Sept. 28. 1934, as quoted in Etienne. p. 24. 
44Reading this description, one can understand vhy Hoyois calls the event "un banquet 
tintamarresque. avec exhibition spectaculaire de sa personne, ala maniere des parades 
de Mussolini et d'Hitler." (p. 86) I shall discuss the possible influences of both these 
leaders on the Rexist movement in a later chapter. 
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no us sommes rendus avec joie a, leurs avis et a, leurs desirs.4' 
From then on, he continued in the same article, Rexist press would be oriented towards 
Catholic action and would broach political subjects only if they had religious relevance. 
Degrelle certainly was a cunning politician, even. if he hadn't officially entered 
politics yet. The A~JB and the Belgian Catholic action were quickly appeased and 
Degrelle cOtJld go on in his activities unhampered. 
Though a failure, the Charleroi meeting is an interesting preview. of Rex 19 
come. The group of Catholic youths who were part of Les Presses de Rex now formed 
only the core of a much larger band of adherents. Beginning with the split from the 
ACJB. the publishing house had transformed itself into a regular movement, calling 
itself simply~. Degrelle had naturally taken on the leadership of the movement, as 
he had that of the publishing house, since he was its founder. As director of movement 
and publishing house, he did all he could to enlarge the supportofboth these 
institutions, Le. he embarked on wave after wave of imaginative propaganda that drew 
more and more Rexists into the fold. 
After the appeasement at Charleroi had settled a bit, DegreUe quickly started up 
his various scandal attacks again. Between November and December, 1934, in. devoted 
many of its pages to attacking a certain M. Moreau. Moreau was an ex-abbot who had 
consented to giving a series of eighty.1ectures in support of the Socialist Party at 
various of its "maisons du peuple."46 In the process, however, he was attackin .... the 
good name of the Church. Degtelle took it upon himself. to rectify the situation. He set 
out on the track. of the ex-abbot and, at each of the meetings, waited for an opportune 
moment to openly denounce Moreau. The tactic worked. Within a short time, the ex-
abbot was forced to abandon his speaking tour. The Rexist leader of course used the 
occasion to proclaim. himself single protector of the Church and to point out the 
4'Uon Degrelle, "Au Service de rEglise," m 0.0.40, Oct. 12, 1934, p. 2. 
46Etienne, p' 26 
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repeated failure of the Catholic Party to take a stance on Church issues. In fact. after 
the Moreau affair. his attacks on the Party became more frequent. culminating in the 
famous coup de CoUrtrai. 
On November 2, 193', the conservative branch of the Union Catholique. the 
F6d6ration des Cerdes catholigues.led by M. Paul Segers, minister of state. held a. 
meet.iJlg at Courtrai. On the eve of the reunion, and without previous warning. Degrelle 
sent out telegrams to all local Renst groups and ordered them to come to the meet.iJlg, 
bringing with them some bread and a blanket. "pour une aventure que leur plairait:"41 
Duly o~eyiJlg their leader. about three hundred young Rexists arrived, quietly and 
unrecognized infiltrated the hall at Courtrai and waited for a signal from De_relle. 
Some time into the meet.iJlg.a voice shouted out from the back "Degrelle ala Tribune," 
aild was echoed by several hundred other voices.48 M. Segers and other Catholic Party 
leaders could not prevent Degrelle from spea.king to the audience and, after one or tva 
more speeches. ceded him the stand. As soon as he had reached the platform, Degrelle 
started into a tirade of accusations against Segers and his Party. while his supporters 
unveiled their Rexist insignia, blocked the entrances to the hall so that no one could 
leave and loudly applauded the Rexist leader. The meet.iJlg ended in chaos. though the 
Rexist troops nevertheless managed to escape arrest.49 Degrelle had fuUy succeeded in 
getting the country's attention. and in the weeks that followed; the people eagerly read 
'. 
about scandal after scandal that the now admittedly political movement unfoldejl. 
J 
Courtrai more than made up for the failure at Charleroi. Whereas Rex had 
worked according to Party lines before November 2.193', Courtrai marked a new period 
for the movement: what I have called the third phase of Rex. Rex would now act upon 
the Catholic Party to change it: "La.lutte allait se faire contre lui [the Party], et i11ui 
41Legros,p. 123-~. 
48Ladriere and Pfeiffer, p. 31. 
491 use the word "troops" figuratively. here. There were no military forces in pre-war 
Rex. 
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faudrait se soumettre ou se demettre."'O The Catholic Party, Degrelle cried out at the 
meeti.ng, was not only corrupt, but also disunified and characterized by a vacuum of 
leadership. Under his directorship, the Catholic youth of Belgium would rejuvinate the 
Party and would return it to its former respectability.'l The coup de Courtrai was 
indeed a coup. It launched the Rex movement into a decidedly political career and onto 
the forefront of the public scene. It also provoked a further (though. as we shall see. 
not as yet a final) condemnation from the Church authorities. On November 20, 1935, 
the cardinal of Malines. Mgr. Van Roey. defied all Catholic priests from taking part in 
Rexist meetings of any sort. asks that Rn. no longer be sold at church entrances. and 
called upon teachers to keep students away from any Rexist activities.'Z As before. 
Degrelle took no heed of the declaration. for he had decided to enter politics no matter 
what anybody said. On May 24. 1936. legislative elections were to be held. He planned to 
form a political party before then and to. thus. perform another coup that would finally 
give him full control over his count1}r -- though within all legal outlines, of course. 
50Saint-Germain, p. 95. 
5lSaint-Germain, p. 92. 
52Legros, p. 130. Legros gives Nov. 28 as the date, whHe Etienne gives Nov. 20 . As 




By Winter, 1935, then, Rex had become an official political movement. But what 
was it saying to its supporters? What utopiac promises:was it making? Like any other 
serious movement. Rex had an ideology and treatises to explicate this ideology. 
Although it did change over time, these changes were only minor, and Rex's rhetoric 
remained basically the same during the pre-war period. 
Rex defined by Rex: 
Rex _saw itself very much as p~t of a historical continuum. It was meant to 
, . 
come about because its historical precedents and its historical context made its 
formation iD.evitable. Belgium had sunk into a mire of vice, of greed, selfishness, and 
corruption. If nothing was done fast, the country would break apart into a myriad of 
enemy factions or, worse, would fall into the hands of the Communists, emblems of all 
evil.l But a few like-minded young people had realized the desperateness of the 
situation and had spontaneously come together to save their people and country. "Les 
promoteurs de Rex se sont rassembles sponta.n.ement parce qu'ayantre~u une formation 
identique et vivant dans un meme monde its se trouvaient d'accord sur l'essentiel et 
pouvaient, a. travers Rex, exprimer leurs identiques revendications primordiales." 2 
Rex defined itself as a revolution against the forces which were pulling Belgium 
down.3 Fr~m its earliest stages, when sij:il ~onnected with the ACJB, Rex opposed itself 
to the established political' and religious institutions of Belgium. It was determrlned to-
, 
be something new -- though it glorified the past and took its cues from history for its 
lDegrelle, preface to Denis, Bases doctrinales de Rex. p. 3. 
2Streel, p. 7. 
3"Nous nous rendons parfaitement compte qu'i! s'agit 130 d'une revolution COMPLETE," 
wrote Degrelle, when describing Rex's aims. ["Rex monte a Bruxelles," in Rex, Mr, 22, 
1935, p . 32.1 
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changes for the future _-4 something which would reverse the pattern of immorality 
that was taking over Belgium. Rex's revolution was first and foremost a social one. for 
it was believed that politics and economics were subservient to the social laws of 
society. What was needed was a return to morality. and to Christian morality in 
particular. This could not come about through simple changes in institutions: the 
whole mentality of the country had to be reformed. The treatises of Rexist philosophers 
always began by defining Rex before they devised a detailed program of the proposed 
Rexist state, because philosophy was more important to them than program.' Rex was a 
movement and the Rexist revolution was a revolution of youth, of unity, and of soul. 
Rex's revolution was sentimental (appealing to the people's sentimentality about their 
family, their community, their country), spiritual, mystical and, above all. moral. 
Rex as a movement: 
Rex saw itself as flexible. as adapting to whatever c.i!cumstances befell it. When 
the philosopher oIRex. Jose Stree1,6 wrote "REX n'est pas une faction. ni un parti, .01 un 
groupement d'interets. ni une secte philosophique. C'est un mouvement," he was using 
the word in both its senses: movement as social motion and movement as physical 
motion and change over time. For. unlike traditional parties and sects. which were 
4See. for instance. Rex. Renaissance de la Patrie (Brux .. Rex Editions. 1940), a ~ 
photographic essay about the movement. It is devided into three parts: the first section 
romanticizes Belgium's history. her heroism. her coura3e in the face of invasion. her 
magnificent art; the second section documents contemporary Belgium. filled with 
poverty. misery. and loss of hope; the final part pictures Rexists and Rexist leaders 
assembled at numerous meetings. with smiles on their faces again and clean clothes on 
their backs. as in the good old days: Rex has obviously changed the world for them. as it 
will for the rest of Belgium. 
'For this chapter. 1 have especially used as references: Leon Degrelle. Revolutions des 
ames (Paris, Les Editions de France. 1938), and La Message de Rex (Brux., Rex Editions, 
1936); Jean Denis, Bases doctrinales de Rex (Brux., Rex Editions, 1936), Principes rexistes 
(Brux., Rex Editions, 1936), and La Ligne generale (Hrux., Rex Editions, [1935-377]); Jose 
Streel, positions rexistes (Brux., Rex Editions, 1935). 
6See biographical note on Streel, below, in chapter of Rexist press. 
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only "sterile parce que c'est immobile,"? Rex was constantly evolvin.g and always 
active. "Rex est ... surtout action," Streel contin.ued.8 A good Rexist, therefore, was not 
only deeply religious and a believer in the Catholic creed and the holin.ess of the 
Eucharist. but he was also an enlightener, a saviour, a militant and audacious apostle of 
his faith.9 He was totally devoted to the collective whole'of the movement. for real 
devotion ta Rex meant repudiation of the "I" in oneself for the "we" in the movement, 1 0 
"REX a appris a des centaines, des milliers d'hommes a ne plus vivre pour eux, mais 
POUR UN IDEAL COLLECTIF, a consentir pour lui, al'avance, taus les sacrifices, toutes les 
humiliations, tous les herolsmes."l1 Devotion entailed utter and total obedience to the 
leaders of the movement. "Autorite et obeissance, organisation methodique, travail 
incessant, devouement total, si c'est cela que vous voulez, venez a REX" cried Degrelle.12 
Rex movement of the young: 
Rex's youthfulness cut across all generational l1nes. No matter how old 
individual members were, the movement-itself was still characterized by youth, by "son 
rythme, ... son allegresse qui eclate dans toute son action, meme aux moments les plus 
douloureux, ... ceUe faim de vivre, ... ce goOt de faction, ... ce desir de transformations 
profondes qui exige un detachement du monde dans lequel on vit."13 
. Rex movement of unity: 
. ~ 
Though. based in the Catholic religion, Rex claimed to ignore religious 
boundaries, as it did those of class and culture. Rex wanted a unified country which 
?Jose Streel, p . 8. 
a Jose Streel, p. 11. 
9Josse Allin, 'pretre, "Le Rexiste," in Btl. Jan . 4,1935, p. 24. 
10Degrelle, Le Message de Rex, p. 5-6. 
11 De grelle, Le Message de Rex. p. 6. 
12DegreHe, "Rex monte a. Bruxel1es," in Rex, Mr. 22,1935, p. 32. 
13Streel, p . 17. 
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would include all equally, whether believers or non-believers, workers, peasants, or of 
the middle-class, Flemish, Walloon, or German. 
"Revolution des Ames:" 
Unity was to be achieved by viewing every being and every t.p.ing in its 
essence. in its Ame.Rex believed that a return to a belief in Ame. would bring back to 
the Belgians a faith in themselves as a people, in Belgium as a fatherland. and in life 
altogether. Since everything had Ame. everything was important and Rex revelled in 
every detail of life: in love and marriage, motherhood and childhood, death and birth, 
country and city, town and cathedral. 
By appeali.ng to the root of human beings -- their soul -- Rex would unite all 
people in peace. Rex's revolution would pring out the "Ames" in the people, for this had 
been lost to them. 
La, est la vraie revolution: apporter un peu de lumiere dans ces esprits, . 
Ie redressement dans ces Ames; moins douter de soi; dompter l'imparfait; 
se reI ever vers Ie meilleur, et vers Ie beau, et vers les autres; respirer 
enfin son Ame .14 
Rex's revolution was spiritual and mystical. then . The soul was a cure-all and a1:1' 
inner force which led one through all trials. The soul was an inner force which would 
enable all kinds of feats of courage. 
L'essentiel est d'avoir; au fond.de ·~on coeur, une grande force qui 
rechauffe et qui pousse en avant, qui renoue les nerfs defies, qui 
fait baUre a. grands cou~s Ie sang las, qui met dans lesyeux pesants "\, 
de sonimeil.le feu qui brOle et qui conquiert .... Alors, plus rien ne 
coOte, la douleur meme devient une joie, car'elle est un moyen de 
plus d'elever son don, de purifier son sacrifice.15 
The Rexist state; 
14Degrelle, Revolution des ames. ([Paris ?L Les Editions de France, 1938), p. 155 . 
l'Degrelle, Revolution des Ames. p. 6. 
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Rex negates the concept of the individual and replaces it by that of 1a personne 
humaine. The human persons which make up Rerist society are organized into three 
.natural communities, the community of the family, the community of work, and the 
community of the nation. These are hierarchically superimposed one upon another, 
each being an outgrowth of the former. Within this framework, the role of the Rexist 
state is to supervize, to "diriger, surveiller, stimuler, contenir" these communities.16 
Most of the actual planning and organizing is left to organizations within each 
profession.1? 
The community of the family: 
The family in a Rexist society is a being itself, with an !me and rights of its own . 
Children are the defining element of a family -- a married couple without children is 
more olan intrigue against the State's well-being than anything else, as is divorce, 
Which, at any rate, is illegal -- and the State must recognize that the ideal family is a 
large family, and must promote its growth through rigorous propaganda campaigns 
and favorable laws. <Rexist philosophers do not consider infertility or medical 
problems which might prevent child-bearing, and do not discuss adoption.) The State, 
for instance, should make sure that every family has a house of its own, with a 
reasonably-sized yard for c-hlldren to play in, and a large kitchen-living room to 
enable the middle-class mother who canriot afford a maid to watch her children while 
- - ~ 
she cooks.1S The State should also make sure that a father's salary be proportional to 
how many children he had. And a family vote must be established so that every parent 
16Denis, Principes rexistes. p, 121. 
1 "1 shall elaborate on these in my discussion of Rexist corporatism, below. 
18Denis, Principes rexistes, p. 198-200. Denis does not specify who should fund the 
building, nor does he' take into account, as he criticizes cramped apartment buildings. 
that Belgium is one of the most populated countries in Europe yet also one of the 
smallest, and that a great part of her land is productive farmland. Where is the space 
for all these single family, garden-surrounded houses to come from? 
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of a famille nombreuse (four or more children) receives an extra voice. Since having 
children is the primary duty of a husband and wife towards the society, contraceptive 
products are, of course, illegal in a Rexist state. Furthermore, the woman who 
undergoes an abortion deserves capital punishment, for, not only has she murdered a 
human being, but she has also committed a crime against the society of which she is a 
member (by depleting it of a citizen and by committing an immoral -- and therefore 
detrimental to the common good -- act). 
In a Rexist society, the State's main purpose is to maintain morality, for morality 
is what ensures the pure existence of la personne humaine. Since the family is the root 
of all other communities, and since its morality is the baSis of sOcietal morality, it is the 
family which defines the duties and laws of society as a whole. ' The State's main 
purpose, therefore, is to protect the family against the evils of society, evils which are 
found in the street, in publicity, pornography, entertainment, prostitution, and even 
in the wQrlql1ace. 
A child's innocense must be protected from anything that is odious in any way, 
whether it be a turned over garbage can or nudity in pUblicity or film.19 In fact, 
anything sexually explicit should not be allowed, for the morality of society is at stake. 
To eradicate pornography, the worst kind of sexual explicitness, the State must 
collaborate with the professional organizations of those specific spheres which 
dispense the evil, Book ~d magazine sellers must decide what makes ,tJornography on 
" "'\. 
paper (this being very simple; since "tout ~omme normal s'en rend tres bien compte"), 
~d the S~te must seize all outlawed works and punish all recidivists.20 In the film 
industry, a State controlling commission made up of experts from the field must oversee 
censorship, but recognized cinematographic organizations must be in actual charge of 
19C1eaning up the streets of garbage and offensive publicity should be the job of La 
Ligue des Fami11es Nombreuses. since it is children who are most in danger of 
corruption from these evils. [Denis, Principesrexistes. p. 1161. 
20Denis, Principes rexistes. p. 121. 
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what to allow and what not to allow -- following the guidelines of pornography, films 
with admission limited to those eighteen and over, and family films (for all ages). 
Prostitution, a danger to the morality of all of society, cannot be directly 
elliminated. However, since it results from male-female inequality and a loss of female 
dignity, it can be attacked indirectly. Male privileges in regards to sexual offenses 
must be taken away, and a woman must be supported by law in her complaints of sexual 
abuse of any kind. In addition, the eradication of pornography in all spheres of the 
public voice would eliminate a dangerous hindrance to a woman's sense of self-respect. 
Lastly, every effort should be made to reinforce the family, which is the initiator of all 
morality, and to provide some kind familial atmosphere for homeless girls. 21 In the 
work place, too, a woman's dignity must be protected -- this, by strict separation of 
sexes wherever possible. Female and male workers' changing facilities must be at 
opposite ends and in totally disconnected parts of the ·building. If men and women must 
work together, women's dress must follow strict rules of modesty, a separate entrance · 
i.nd staircase must be provided for them, and the common work area must be open to 
the critical gazes of passers-by.22 
The Rexist woman: 
In its contract with society, the Rexist state's primary function is to protect the 
weak: women and children.23 Thus,. though Rexist rhetoric makes man and woman 
equal, this, to us, is an old-fashioned type" of equality. The Rexist woman is'deified as 
queen-mother of the household, while the Rexist man is her chivalrous guardian. 
Nevertheless, the Rexist woman has some suprising privileges. Not only is she 
respected before the law, but she has the right to vote. "Si on conserve Ie suffrage 
21 Denis, Principes rexistes. p. 1·-H-45. Denis is not specific about what what sort of 
replacement for the family should be provided. 
22Denis, Principes rexistes, p. 148. 
23Denis, Principes rexistes. p. 147. 
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universe!, nous voulons que la mere ait une voix comme Ie pere, parce que nous 
voulons temoigner notre respect ala mere. C'est la mere qui sauvera Ie pays."24 She 
does not, however, have the right to run for political office (at least not for national 
ofnce),2' because neither does she have the physical strength or courage to withstand 
the treacherous in-fighting that goes on in Parliament, nor does she have the material 
possibilities of knowing the needs of all different kinds of constituents. 26 "Oui, je 
l'arfirme, une part active ne peut!tre prise par les filles d'Eve, sans entamer fortement 
leur personnalite, leur coeur et meme leur devoir."2? A woman's duty is to her' 
children and to her family. Thus, though limited work opportunities for women do 
exist -- "ouvriere, employee, vendeuse," if unskilled, other jobs, if more skilled;29 once 
she is pregnant, a woman must leave her job immediately.29 This will cause her no 
financial burden, since her husband's salary begins to rise after the third child is 
born. (Money for the raises comes from reductions in salaries of bachelors and 
childless couples.>30 
Though restrained in her emotions (she must have "un visage calme.at 
souriant" and must never show her troubles),31 and though always concerned about 
24Degrelle, speech atCourtrai, Nov. 2,1935, as quoted by Legros, p. 126-27. 
25Rex did seem to a:110w women to enter politics on a loealleve!, at times. See, for 
instance, the local newspaper Rex-belles which lists Jeanne Brasseur, a middle-aged 
widow and tavern-owner, as a candidates for the·1938 elections. Perhaps the fact that 
she was a widow made her candidacy acc,eptable, since she probably had grown 
children and, therefore, fewer family obligations. [Rex-belles, Oct., 1938, p. 21. 
26 Annie Loicq, "Les femmes e~ la politi que, " in Rex, Dec. 14, 1934, p. 18: Loicq dtles not 
specify what these possibilities are that women lack and, presumably, men possess. In 
addition. she speaks of different classes of constituents. when Rex is negating the very 
idea of classes. 
27 Annie Loieq, "Les femmes et la poHtique," in Rex. Dec. 14.1934, p.18. 
28"La femme et Ie foyer," in Le Pays reel, Jan. 8,1939, p. 6. 
29Female supervisors are installed in every factory in a Rexist state. They act as a 
liaison between management and female workers, and keep close tabs on the health of 
their female workers. especially watching for pregnancies. [jeanne Tournier. "La 
famille, 1a femme ... et l'enfant [sic): surintendante d'usines," in Rex. Ju . 4.1937. p . 281. 
30Denis, p. 98. 
31 "De simples gestes ... qui vous feront almer [siel," in Le Pays reel. Jan . 15,1939, p. 6. 
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propriety. the Rexist woman is feminine. The fact that she had to dress modestly in the 
work place does not mean that she should not wear flattering clothes. As 
advertisements in the Rexist women's magazine, Votre Bonheur,32 and in the special 
sections for women in Rexist newspapers -- "La femme et Ie foyer" in Le Pays reeL for 
instance -- prove, clothes exist which can be feminine yet practical, which allow a 
woman to bathe her child in the morning and look presentable in town in the 
afternoon.33 
The Rexist woman's femininity, then, is maternal. and her true calling is 
motherhood. f~r. after all. "quatre a. six maternit.es sont indispensables a. une femme 
normale pour eviter certains desordres [!]"34 Consequently, her true place is in the 
home. Yet within the domestic sphere she has quite a lot of power. She is "gardienne 
du foyer."teacher or Catholic morality to the young. and. since children will bring 
their values with them to the society as they become adults. preserver of societal 
morality.35 Her vote. therefore. is a vote for the family; it is to make sure that 
representatives get elected to Parliament who will enact pro-family legislation. 
Likewise. while the husband ultimately controls the family's finances. the wife 
controls all daily household expenditures. And were the husband to be absent from. the 
family or to die. the wife would take over his familial duties; that is. she would gain 
ultimate control over all the funds of the community of the family, and, would act as 
representative for the family whenever'necessary.36 
Such is the community 'of the family. At final view, ~xcept fo~ the 'unu'?ual 
aspect of female suffrage. it is basically a traditional Catholic family . Female 
32As advertized in the "La femme et Ie foyer" section ofLe Pays reel. Ap. 2,1939. p. 6. 
33Rexist press carried drawings and fashion notes on these easy-to-make dresses. along 
with al1 sorts of articles on tips for personal care, child upbringing, and cooking for 
the family. 
34Denis. Pri~cipes rexistes. p. 206, One wonders where M got his medical information I 
3'Annis Loicq, "Les femmes et la politique," in Ru.. Dec. 14.1934, p. 18. 
36Denis. Principes rexistes, p.193. 
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deification as protectoress of the family and of morality and the focus on children was 
nothing new in the Catholic world. Equal but separate spheres for men and women was 
a phenomenon Which, if beginning to fade in the early twentieth century, was 
certainly prevalent in the nineteenth century. Its use by the movement is one 
example of Rex turning to history for its plans for the future. Rex might have called 
itself a revolution, but this revolution was more retrograde than new. 
The community of work and corporatism: 
If the community Of the family is the innermost ring of the three-ringed Rexist 
. society, the community of work defines the middle ring. "L'entreprise est la cellule 
6conomique comme la fami11e est cellule sociale."~? Moreover, if the family is the 
domain of the woman, the work place is that of the man, since this is where he spends 
most of his time. Although within the entre prise workers each have their .own tasks--
metiers -- they are united in producing "la m6mereuvre."38 And just as the family has 
a life and rights of its own. so the community of work has boundaries and privileges 
which must be maintained and protected by the State. Because the State is really only a 
supervisor, a liaison for negotiations with the work world must exist. In the 
community of work, corporative organizations take oQ. this function. 
Rex defines corporatism as "tout simple~ent une do-ctrine recherchant une 
organisation economique nouvelle dan;'laquelle,contrairement a. ce qui se passe da~s 
Ie 1iberalism~, Ie capital sera subordonn8 au travail:;39 As ~xtensions of the ai}eady 
existing pre-corporatist "organisations professionnelles de toute espece,"40 (a concept 
which enforces Rex's theory that it evolved as part of a historical continuum) 
3?Streel, Positions rexistes. p. 26. 
38Streel.Positions r~xistes, p, 27. 
39Saint-Germain, p. 208 . The author refers here to hypercapitaiisme. or financial 
capitalism, inherent, apparently. in liberalism, and which puts money (an abstract 
concept) before work (the product of des personnes humaines) . 




corporative corporations41 vill reestablish "la hierarchie sodale ... la dignite et .. . la 
responsablilite personnelle."42 They vill bring order and solidarity to industry 
without hindering persona1liberties. For. in a corporatist system. while organization 
ensures that what is produced is for the social good. each worker can still work for his 
own immediate benefit. Corporatism thus combines "fonction sociate" and 
"personnalisme."43 Corporations perform another public function by acting as 
qualification judges. They only bestow the title of practitioner of a metier (as opposed 
to unskilled work) on those who are worthy of it. thus saving society from inept 
professionals, and orily on native Belgians. thus removing the threat of take-over by 
, 
foreigners.44 In addition. they make sure that preparation for entering a profession is 
thorough. by demanding lengthy apprenticeships and "stages" in the specific field of 
worK.45 
Corporative professional organizations. as self-contained communities, are 
highly structured. Local sections are represented by larger and larger groups in a 
hierarchy of sub-groups. Though initiated after the elections of 1936, Rex's 
Confederation Agricole Rexiste (C.A.RJ will serve as a good example of this 
hierarchy.46 
Rex's aim. in establishing such an agricultural organization, as defined by 
Amand Geradin already before the elections, was fourfold.4? Rex: wanted, first, to help 
farmers become proprietors by providi~g low-interest loans payable over an ~x:tended 
""\ 
period of time, and .by ex:emptihg buyers of smaJ.I properties and farmers with loans 
41 These are not to be confused vith business corporations. 
42Denis; La Ligne gE!1lerale, p. 42. 
43Denis, La Ligne generale, p. 38. 
44Denis. La Ligne generale, p. 73. 
4509n1s. La Ligne generale, p . 73. 
46The example is tak~!1l from the "Statuts de la confederation agricole rexiste" published 
in m, Oct. 23,1936, p. 22. 
41"!1 faut sauveI' l'agriculture." in m Jan . 31. 1936, p . 13. 
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, 
from having to pay certain taxes. Second. Rex wanted to protect its farmers against 
foreign competitors and big trusts by encouraging higher local production through 
the use of modern materials and methods (these to be made available. again. through 
credit). Third. all of these services must be controUed and implemented by a 
corporative organization. And finaUy, the savings of farmers must be protected by a 
"regime .repressif," i.e. one which will make it an offense to exact unnecessary taxes 
from the peasantry. These were the aims. Since Rex never came fully to power. it is 
. . 
impossible to know whether they wo'uld have been effective . But since the movement 
didn't seem to concern itself much with that side of things. it went full steam ahead and 
formed its agricultural corporation, 
C.A.R.'s hierarchy consists of a Section Centrale. a Conseil Suoerieur. several 
Section d'Arrondissement. and man)" Section Cantonale. each with its own leaders and 
functions. DegreUe chooses the directors of the Section Centrale and approves the 
nomination of lower officials. The Section Centrale acts as a liaison with other Rexist 
organizations. specifically the Confederation rexiste du travail (formed on July 19. 
1936)48 and the Front populaire of Rex (the organization in charge of movement 
propaganda; see below. chapter on Rexist press and propaganda), as well as with the 
Belgian Parliament in general. for which it must research various agricultural issues 
and present relevant legislation. Within the agricultural corporation. it collects all 
dues, controls·the treasur~es of allC.A.R.'Sub-group.s, and creates and organizes all the 
services offered to C.A.R. members. It edits its own agricultural newspaper an~keeps 
tabs on pertinent articles in other Rexist newspapers. It also publishes agricultural 
and recreational journals for its members, and organizes educational congresses when 
needed. 
48The Confederation was set up as a general organization to protect workers' rights. 
improve the intellectual. moral, and social standards of worker populations. and to 
imbue workers with a sense of solidarity as they work for the general good. [Saint-
Germain. p. 1721. 
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Seven of the directors of the Section Centrale are chosen by that body and 
approved by Degrelle to form the Conseil Superieur. They are Rexist Parliamentarians 
expert in agricultural matters and meet once a J;1lonth to discuss topics selected by the 
Section Centrale. though they too may make suggestions. The council is a consultant 
orga.njzation within the corporation. It ~oes the leg-work for research needed to be 
I 
done by the Section Centrale. examines and makes suggestions on proposed agricultural 
reforms, and acts as a mediator between different agricultural interests. 
The third body. the Section d' Arrondissement, is the equivalent of the Section 
Centrale at a lower level. It is made up of representatives of all the cantons within the 
arrondissement. Its leaders are chosen by all representatives and are approved by the 
director of the arrondissement council (his own nomination approved by Degrelle) and 
by the Sectlon Centrale. They meet on their own once a month and make reports to 
their superiors once every three months. They conduct research on local agricultural 
problems and suggest appropriate reforms to the Section Centrale. 
Finally, under them fall the Section Cantonale from all over the country. Every 
Rexist farmer is a member of his Section Cantonale. The body appoints a President, one 
or two Vice-Presidents. a treasurer. and a secretary, all of whom are first approved by 
both the Section d'Arrondissement director and the Section Centrale. These leaders 
meet every two weeks. while the entire body must only come together once a year. The 
committee's functions are those of the arrondissement on a smaller scale. In addition . . . 
members must recruit other members, propigate Rexis~ press and thought, an? 
encourage use of Rexist services. They must also organize themselves into recreational , -
and sport groups for entertainment. Though subject to the Section d'Arrondissement. 
they may appeal directly to the Section Centrale with problems. 
Corporative organizations, then, group together workers and leaders of one 
profession. They are hierarchically structured and geographically decentralized, 
although individual farmers may appeal directly to the corporative directors . (One can 
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imagine, however, that he would be sent back to his local committee before his 
concerns would be acted upon.> Their functions are social within the movement. and 
political outside of the movement. They create a self-contained community for their 
member farmers, and act as their representatives before the nation's Parliament and 
Executive. In the context of political checks and balances, they are a check on 
Executive authority. 
The community of the nation: 
Corporative bodies are a crucial part of the overall structure of the nation. They 
are one of three Systems which- make up the State, Parliament and the Executive being 
the other two. Rexist society is, as defined by Rex, liberal-authoritarian. It takes the 
element of order-- consented to by the people because it is for the common good --
from dictatorship, but continues to allow for individual initiative, as in a liberal 
society.49 Control doesn't mean nationalization: "L'Etat do it m6me contrOler la f~i1le 
et chaque personne en particulier, mais il ne dolt pas les nationaliser."50 This, 
especially, in light of the fact that nationalization is a Socialist and Communist concept 
and, as such, completely antithetical to Rex. (Of course. there is an awfully fine line 
between control for the common good and control for the sake of control. Re~ist 
philosophy is vague enough to avoid commenting on this dail'gerJ 
The only person who seems to be 'able to walk the tight-rope between 
-dictatorship and "good" control is a king, for a king is the representative of aU ")he 
49Saint-Germain. p. 209. 
'0Denls, La Liane g(merale. p. 91 . 
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people, an emblem of an e~tire nation and, therefore, of unity.,1 The contract between 
king and people is a natural one, founded on patriotism and mutual love. 
Le Roi c'est l'element d'unite, de continuite splendide. Celui qui 
dans les moments difficiles, quand une decision d'importance dolt 
etre prise, peut et doit poser a. son peuple la question de confiance 
~us forme de question d'atta.chement et d'amour.52 
Monarchical power emanates from the people, for "la puissance appartient au peuple et 
Ie pouvoir appartient au Roi."'3 The king can take large liberties in his actions and is 
in fact responsible for h~sh punishment when necessary. but he is not all-powerful 
and is not in direct control of every function of the State. With the advice of private 
industrial corporations: he appoints-various corporative councils to represent the 
community of work before the State. (Note that since the king in a Rexist society 
chooses the corporative councils, the very bodies which will counter his power, he 
must always be benevolent and must never harbor wishes of personal aggrandisement 
-- a very utopian and rare situation.) The king also chooses ministers to advise him on 
different political issues. These career politicians (as opposed to specialists in the area 
of a department who have little or no political experience) must have an affinity for 
good behaviour and for exemplary composure: "Ie ministre doit etre un homme qui 
physiquement en impose a. son entourage.",4 Though balanced out by the corporative 
councils, the king and hisministers nevertheless sit above them in the hierar.chy of 
the State. One of the most important powers of the king and his ministers is to decide 
which questi!>ns are beyond tb,e competence of corporative councils and must'""'ee 
resolved by referendum. (Referendum is also. of course. a way of giving voice to the 
51Rex's monarchism came from Charles Maurras and his Action francaise movement. 
Though Maurras himself was condemned by the Church in 1926. his theories continued 
to strongly influence many Belgian students after that date. including those who later 
formed Rex. The exact relationship between Action francaise and Rexist ideology is 
unfortunately beyond the limitations of this thesis, and would be a fascinating topic for 
a later article. 
'2 J. Carlier. "Vers 1a 'reforme de l'Etat," in Rex, Aug. 21, 1936, p. H. 
'3Denis, Bases doctrinale de Rex, p. 29 . 
'4Denis, Princioes rexistes, p. 55-56 . 
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whole population at once.) Neither the king, nor his ministers, nor even Parliament, 
however, initiate legislation: it is the corporative councils at the State level (those 
appointed by the king) which draw up the laws. 
In following with Rexist emphasis on hierarchy, legislation becomes official 
only after having ascended through many levels of selection. Proposals for legislation 
are submitted to the councils by the corporative association of the profession 
concerned. The corporative councils then screen the proposals and prepare first drafts 
of laws. Their version is in turn passed on up to a Conseil d'Etat, " ... sarte de commission 
juridique superieurei charge de la toilette juridique du proret et de sa coordination avec 
la legislation existante."55 Only once it has been successfully subjected to the scrutiny 
of this committee can a proposed law be ratified by Parliament and implemented by the 
appropriate ministry. 
The Parliament in a Rexist state, then, is rather minor. Although it is a body 
elected by absolute universal suffrage and is, therefore, directly representative of the 
people, it has been greatly reduced in number and in function. Its only roles are to 
pass.budgets, ratify laws, and control the general politics of the State by acting as a 
check on the Executive.56 
Punishment of crimes is left to a separate judiciary body. The role of this 
"Justice humaine"57 is pedagogical:.to teach the populace, through example. about the 
consequences of illegality .. Capital puni~hment ought frequently to be used. for it is 
"une simple operation chirugi'Cale" which cleanses s~ciety of an unne~essa.ry 1vil.58 
55J. Carlier, "Vers la reforme de fEtat," in Ra. Aug. 21. 1936. p. 13. 
56Car10s Leruitte, "Pour un corporatisme liberateur," in Ra Feb. 28, 1936, p. 13. 
Leruitte writes that corporation leaders should not be members of Parliament. for this 
would be spreading politics into non-political realms (as the politico-financiers had 
done). The Status de fa Confederation Agricole Rexiste. however, specifically mentions 
that the seven members of the Conseil Superieur are Parliamentarians interested in 
agricultural matters. [See abovel. Such contradictions are frequent in Rexist 
philosophy. 
'7Denis, Principes rexistes, p. 62. 
'SDenis, Principes rexistes, p. 62. 
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In gene.ra1"chaque verdict [doit depasserl toujours par sa valeur exemplaire et 
preventive les individualites qui font leur objet."59 The judiciary, too, has its own 
corporative organization, a Chambre judiciaire with representatives from all levels of 
the nation's magistrature as well as from the assemblies of lawyers, attorneys, clerks, 
etc.60 Like any other professional corporation, the Chambre ;udiciaire has full control 
of its own workings and remains totally independent of whatever regime is in power --
thereby preventing blackmail or corruption of one of the most important law-
enforcing bodies of the Rexist nation. 
This diversification of duties and assigning of tasks to expert committees allows 
the Rexist government -- the king and his ministers -- to concentrate on more all- . 
encompassing issues. The government must sustain the unity of all classes, religions, 
and cultures within the nation. It must engage in a foreign policy always favorable to 
national interests. It must promote tourism from within through education, and from 
without through propaganda. It mu~, especially, uphold "une BONNE ADMINISTRATION, 
econome, expeditive, disciplinee, tout entiere devouee au bien commun."61 For the 
government represents the State, the common good of the State, and the national unity 
of the State. And on a broader scale, the government also represents the nation. 62 As 
such it is, in essence, the emblem of patriotism. 
Rexist patriotism harkens back to the past, specifically to the revolotion of 1830, 
when all of Belgium, no ma.tter what claSs, religion, or culture, came together to fight 
for independence. (Rex, of course, only sees the united part of the tevolution ind 
ignores the fact that it was sparked by a resurgence of the liberalism begun in the 
French revolution, an event which Ret categorically condemns.) It is the State's role, 
59Denis, Principes rexistes, p. 62. 
60Denis, Principes rexistes, p. 67. 
61Denis, Bases doctrinales de Rex, p. 30-31. 
62Here, I am defining the State as the bureaucratic and political structure within the 
nation, which is the larger, more abstract entity which holds not only the State but also 
the concept of patriotism and, if existent, nationalism. 
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or rather, the role of the military and of community groups supervized by the State, to 
im.bue patriotism -- appreciation of the value of submitting to order and authority to 
'uphold the common good -- in the hearts of young Belgians.63 Both men and women 
must devote one year of their early adult life to community service: men, in army 
training, women, in community help (notice the traditional gender roles). For all 
citizens must, at some point in their lives, experience commonality by being reduced to 
"un strict commun d~nominateur."64 That is, they must realize that everyone is a 
personne humaine and has an ame. This concept of commonality does not, however, 
preclude the natural hierarchies defined in Rexist philosophy, e.g. the system of 
professional corporations, where each committee answers to the professional 
assoc1ation(s) above it. While being reduced to total equality with co-trainees teaches 
appreciation of the" common" part of the common good, hierarchical order is the only 
way to assure that citizens and citizen-groups will work for the "good" of the common 
good. In their one year of service, then, young Belgians learn 
... ce que c'est vraiment la discipline, ce que c'est que 1a hierarchie, 
ce que c'est materiellement que la responsabilite d'un grade, ce que 
c'est que la so1idarit~, simplement humaine, ce que c'est que l'esprit 
de corps.65 
Rexist patriotism also appeals to the sentimentality of all Belgians, young and 
old. There is an "EquiHbre myst~rieux entre un sol et nos forces secretes fhumaines]''' 
'writes Degrelle.66 Ju~ as every being, ~ving or non-living, has an !me. so the love of 
every a.me is necessary for true patriotism, for "C'est cela aussi, la pierre. Ie fe'$.et ia , . 
toile transfigures par Ie genie de notre peuple qu'il faut regarder, pour retrouver la 
63The military is autonomous in a Rexlst society and is solely responsible for national 
defense . Parliament and other government bodies have little if no say in military 
matters. 
64Denis, Principes rexistes, p. 70. 
6'Denis, Principes rexistes, p. 70. 
66Degrel1e, Revolution des a.mes. p. 13. 
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Patrie .. ."6? Rexist patriotism. therefore. binds all Belgians. no matter what class. 
religion. or culture. into one whole. Yet it does this. it affirms. without hindering the 
individual developments of different peoples. In Rexist society. there is cultural 
autonomy within political unity. 
Cultural federalism is Rex's answer to cultural individuality and need for self-
expression. Cultural federalism gives Flanders and Wallonie (and. to some extent. the 
German-speaking areas in the east) the autonomy they want. without threatening the 
splitting up of the nation into different states. In cultural federalism. each language 
group has its own ministry of education. of culture. and of other specifically 
indigenous areas of interest. All official transactions are performed in the original 
language of the- area (flemish in the north. French in the south. German in a small 
part of the east). except for Brussels. where both French and Flemish should be used. 
Children in schools learn only their native language. for. Rex argues. a worker in the 
south of Belgium has no opportunity to speak with someone from the north anyway.68 
The State must encourage each culture to propagate itself, though only within the set 
boundaries of its geography. Once established in this system. Rexists insist, the Flemish 
will soon realize the magnificence of national unity and will discard their thoughts of 
separatism and of political. as well as cultural. autonomy.69 
Rexist philosophers hesitated to call their partriotism nationalism -- in fear. it 
seems, of being compared to the contemporary Fascist and National-Socialist forms of 
~ 
nationalism. ' Legros dared to use the term but carefully qualified it: "Si 1'on veut. c'est 
du nationalisme. parce que c'est une ideologie de la patrie. non au sens pejoratif du mot 
6i'Degrel1e. Revolution des Ames. p. 107. 
68This philosophy ignores the possibility of mobility and assumes that everybody stays 
in place . It is based on the ideology of the everlasting and never-changing Rexlst 
community. one in which everyone wishes to remain, 
69Saint-Germain. p. 206. This is a questionable assertion. especially in light of the 1936 
VNV-Rex agreement which failed precisely because the Flemish nationalists. VNV. 
came to the conclusion that Rex would not support it in its efforts to form its own 
Flemish state. (See the second chapter on chronology. following) . 
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[probably an allusion to dictatorial German and Italian types of nationalism] mais avec 
une juste notion de la hierarchie des valeurs." 70 Rex was aware of this comparison 
and constantly asserted its originality. The Rexist professional corporative association, 
for example, "ne sera rien comparable au fantOme de corporatisme cree en Italie ou en 
Allemagne; Belges nous sommes, Belges nous resterons ... "?1 Rex always denied being 
dictatorial and did not allow any kind of violence in its political action (even Rexist 
security forces were forbidden fro.m carrying self-defensive weapons).?2 Aware of 
being accused of HiUerian or MussoHnian kind of dictatorship; it made special effortS to 
deny the charges: "Nous ne sommes ni en Alle.magne, ni en Russie. ni en Italie, ni au 
Mexique .... Nous ne voulons pas de dictature, ni avouee, ni camouflee. L~ peuple, 
souverain, doit choisit ses mandataires en toute Hberte."73 Though order, cleanliness 
("propete," in the general and specific sense of the word), and authority govern Rexist 
society, they do not and will not lead to dictatorship.74 (On the other hand, there is a 
fine line between the two which Rexist philosophy does not ad.mit. If order and 
authority can exist separately from dictatorship in theory, in practice they rarely do.> 
Yet Degrelle and the Rexist movement were nevertheless fascinated by both the 
HiUerian and the Mussolinian State and did, in fact, keep up relations -- even if 
clandestine -- with both regimes. A briefstudy of these relations, as well as those 
between Rex and Spain follows. 
70Legros, p. 232. 
71 Carlos Leruitte, "Le Rasse.mbIe.ment populaire de Liege Ie 9 fevrier 1936," in ~ Jan: 
31, 1936, p.l). 
?2Since the war and his experience as an SS officer, Degrelle has lauded both Hitler and 
fascism, the first as a genious and the second as a saving ideology whose influence still 
reigns today (though he doesn't specify) . IDegrelle, Hitler pour 1000 MS. p. 2271. 
13Raphael Sindic, "Pour une democratie libre et propre!" in Rex, Jan. 31, 1936, p. 18 . Of 
course. Rexist writers find the trick useful and themselves accuse their enemies of 
espousing totalitarian tactics, e.g. "Chronique du totalitarisme: un totalitarisme 
anonyme et sans grandeur" on Pri.me Minister Van Zeeland and his cabinet, in m 
Ju. 4, 1937, p. 7. 
74Daye, p. 20. 
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Rex and the Third Reich: 
Hiller came to power in January, 1933, when Rex was not yet a real movement 
and Degrelle was still worlting for the AClB. There could not have been an immediate 
impact on Rex, therefore, but there could have been a long term impact. By the time 
Rex had become a movement and, later, a political party, it had had time to observe the 
new regime in Germany and to absorb or reject elements from Nazi ideology and 
practice.' As will be discussed in the next chapter, Degrelle himself was fascinated by 
the way HiUer 'came to power through a "legal" coup d'etat. Though it is really only 
during and after the war that Degrelle openly expressed his admiration (or even 
passion) for the Fuhrer, in the development stages of the movement some influences 
were alS9 felt. 
Through the efforts of the Reich delegation to Brussels, a few Rexist leaders did 
actually come into can, tact with Nazi leaders before 1940. Only a few months after 
HiUer's coming to power, Degrelle and two of his journwst colleagues were invited by 
the delegation to visit Germany and to write a feature article on the new regime in the 
Rex editions journal Soirees. In Berlin between April 29 and May 3,1933, the three 
journalists met with M. Braun von Stumm, press counselor to the Reich ministry of 
foreign affairs, who undoubtedly gave them the tour and anwered the appropriate 
_ questions.?5 Though there doesn't see~-to be any evidence that Degrelle openly 
"\ 
applauded the Nazi regime in these early years, the fact that the German delegation 
took the initiative in organizing the excursion proves that Degrelle must have, at least, 
given the impression of thinking favorably of the system. Yet. in 1933 Rex as a 
movement did not exist. and the Reich regime saw mUe point in supporting a lone 
journalist like Degrelle who, even if sympathetic, had no power. Only onc.e Rex had 
i'5Emile Krier, "Le Rexisme et l'Al1emagne 1933-1940: une documentation," in Cahiers 
d'histoire de la seconde guerre mondiale (Bruxel1es, CREHSG, 1978:5),p. 178. 
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declared itself political and had started publishing Le Pays reel would the Reich renew 
its ovations towards Degrelle. 
Though these advances were purposely restrained in order not to thwart Rex's 
possibilities for power by angering the Belgian government too much, the German 
government did welcome prominent Rexist leaders intO its country. On August 12, 1936, 
the Brussels industrialist and financial consultant to Degrelle, Gustave Wyns, met with 
von Stumm and other propaganda officials to discuss the sale (at an "among friends" 
price) of German printing machines to Rex -- in which effort he failed. In late 
Summer-early fall of that same year, the Rexist senator Xavier de Hemricourt de 
Grunne made a visit to Germany to observe their educational system. The reason why 
the only government official he met with was a Dr. Holthofer, press director for the 
mining association of Essen, remains unc1ear.?6 Pierre Daye, another Rexist 
Parliamentarian, was Hitler's guest of honor for the Parteitag in 1936, and later 
(begining December 8,1936) led a series of conferences in Berlin on "Rex et revolution 
de la politique beIge."?? -
But it is Degrelle's trip of September, 1936 which received the most publicity at 
home. Between September 2:; and 26 Degrelle, his wife, Gustave Wyns and his wife, and 
Pierre Daye met in Berlin with Otto Abetz, director of French and Belgian affairs in the 
office of Dienststelle Ribbentrop (later the foreign ministry), von Ribbentrop, and, 
finally, Hitler himself.?8 Discussion foc~Sed mostly on Belgo-German affairs, 
. "\ 
specifically a,bout setting up a meeting between Hitler and Belgian King Leopold to 
-
arrange the giving back of the German-speaking Eupen-Malmedy region to 
16Krier, p. 182. 
??Krier, p. 183. 
?8Degrelle at first denied having made the visit to Berchtesgarten, but then, under 
pressure from press attacks withi.n Belgium, he admitted to it. The admission was 
undoubtedly one of the reasons for his downfall in 1937. (See next chapter). 
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Germany.i'9 The Rexist group also.came away with 250,000 RM,80 a sum which could be 
used only within Germany -- not a problem for Rex, since Gustave Wyns entertained 
close relations with Otto Abetz and with Dr. Max Winkler, director of the press supply 
association, Cautio, under the Reich ministry of Propaganda, and directed both as to 
how he wished the money to be disposed of.81 Later that fall; DegreUe met with 
Goebbels, though it is unclear what the exact intention of the visit was. 
Reich support for Rex was only intensely sustained between 1936 and 1937,·that 
is, during the years when Rex was thriving and looked like a profitable aUy for the 
Nazi regime.82 After the failure of DegreUe in the 1937 elections and after the 
dissolution of the accord between Rex and the flemish nationalists, Reich monetary and 
political support drastically diminished. DegreHe's capabilities as the Belgian politician 
of the future were doubted, and when DegreUe once again visited Germany in early 
1938, he met with no important officials.83 Only the war would return Nazi support to 
Rex m full force. 
Rex, then, was backed politically and financially by the Nazi regime. 84 What 
about ideologically? There were obvious similarities between Rexism and Nazism. Both 
wanted order and were authoritarian (if not dictatorial), both were anti-Communist, 
both were populis~ (claiming all act..ions were for the common good), and both were 
19Krier, p. 184. The fact that Hitler suddenly made Degrelle an official represe1tative 
of the monarchy is puzzling. Did he really think that the .king would concur with 
DegreUe's plans, let alone listen to his advice? At least in this instance, Hitler lacked a 
flair for etiquette in foreign affairs. 
eODegrelle still denies ever having had financial relations of any sort with the Reich. 
[Charlier, p. 174]. 
81 Krier, p. 181 & p. 186. Under pressure from Gustave Wyns, Wi.nk1er also raised for Rex 
some 30,000 to 35,000 RM among private friends in 1936-37. [Krier, p. 1861. 
82See next chapter for the chronology of these events. 
83Krier, p. 192. 
84Dr. Winkler seems to have been able to collect among private circles some 30,000 to 
35,000 RM extra for Rex. [Krier, p. 1861. 
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corporatist. But the race factor vas not an element in pre-war Rexist ideology, whUe 
the Catholic Church ~. 
Though Rex did talk. a lot about the supposed Judeo-Communist plot underway in 
Belgium, it did not have a systematic program of anti-semitism comparable to the Nazi's, 
and was not expressed until the late '30s. Rex's anti-semitism was more economic than 
racial. Rexists believed that the State should have an official policy of anti-semitism in 
order to protect Belgian workers and to prevent spontaneous and violent anti-semitic 
accurances. 
11 y aura un antisemistisme d'Etat raisonnable, humaiil et juste ou 
ily aura un antisemitisme incontrolable, capable des pires exces .... 
Ce n'est pas parce qu'on aime ou qu'on n'aime pas les jUlls qu'U faut 
s'occuper d'eux; c'est parce qu'lls risquent de provoquer des pertur-
bations economiques, sociales etmorales, prejudiciables au Bien 
Commun.85 
Of course, anti-semitism is anti-semitism, no matter for what reason. Yet; in talking 
about ideology and ideological influences, distinctions have to be made. The fact that 
Rex waited so'long to formulate its ideas on anti-semitism seems to imply that it did not 
initially consider anti-semitism an issue, and only drew up a proposal because it felt 
pressured by the contemporary situation (specifically, anti-semitic policies in 
Germany) to come up with an opinion. 
Whereas Nazism opposed established religions, Rex was founded by one --.. 
Roman Catholicism -- and, though separa:ted from the establishment of the Church, still 
operated within the 'context of its ideology. From the very beginning, Rexist a$ic:1es , 
denounced Reich policies tovards the Church, and attacks continued up until the 
war.86 It was' only during, the war that Rexist anti-semitism became more overt. 81 
85 Jose Streel. "Antisemitisme d'Etat," in Le Pays ree1.1an. 31. 1939, p. 6. 
86Etienne, p. 111. 
81Discussion on this subiect is beyond the limitations of this thesis. I await with 
anticipation to read what Mr. Convay has to say about this issue in his soon-to-be-
published dissertation on Rex during the var. 
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" 
These two factors especially, as well as the threat of invasion by the 
increasingly powerful Reich, separated Rexism from Nazism. This is not to say that 
Degrelle and Rex were not greatly influenced by the'regime, They were, But one 
cannot go the next step to say that pre-war Rex was simply Belgian Nazism, 
Rex and Mussolini's Italy: 
Neither can one say that Rex was the Belgian twin of MussoHni's Fascism. As 
with Nazism, there were ideological, political, and financial relations between Rex and 
Fascist Italy, In fact, Rex felt more of a correspondence with Italy than with GerPlany, 
These can easily be explained by the simple fact that MussoHni was less of a threat than 
Hitler was. Degrelle himself admits that "le Duce n'avaint pas la moindre idee d'une 
expansion aux depens de la Belgique .... Mussolini ne s'interessait qu'a la Mediterranee 
et a l'Mrique .... Iilternationalement,la collaborariotn italo-belge etait sans 
problemes."88 Italy was also Latin, and since France had lost its favor with the Rexists 
with the advent of the leftist Front Populaire and the pact with the USSR, Italo-Belgian 
latinity could be seen as a barrier against a German cultural invasion ,89 Furthermore, 
as a Catholic, Mussolini was respected among.qu.ite a few Catholic circles in Belgium, 
and very important for Degrelle was the fact that the Duce had good relations with, if 
not actu~lly controlled, the Vatican. Mussolini was able, it seems, to prevent a 
_ condemnation by the Pope of Rex, as requested by.the Cardinal Van Roey in December, 
"'\, 
88Charlier, p', 178. 
89£tienne, p. I H. The idea of a cultural threat was probably fairly sincere since, 
though friendly with the ReiCh, Rex still wanted to keep its political and cultural 
autonomy, (During and after the war, Degrelle repeatedly justified his relations with 
Hitler as a way of assuring Belgian autonomy within a New Order Europe,) PUZZling 
about this theory, outlined by Jose Streel in an article in Ru on AprilS, 1938 is that it 
excluded the non-Latin, Flemish Belgians whom Rex so much wanted as allies, and 
thereby made Rex appear more like a Walloon movement than a Belgian one, True, 
Streel wrote the article in 1938, after the failure of the pact with the Flemish 
nationalists (see next chapter), but it is doubtful that the idea of brotherhood in latinity 
was a new theory, It is more likely that Streel simply overlooked the inconsistency 
with Rexist ideology -- easy to fall into, since Rex really was more Walloon than 
Flemish . ' 
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1936.90 In his interview with Jean-Michel Charlier, Degrelle describes the event in 
dramatic detail: how he telephoned the Duce immediately upon hearing about the plan 
(how he heard, he does not teU us), how Mussolini told him to come directly to Rome, 
how the former then settled the affair by simply ordering the Vatican not to act upon 
this rumor, how Degrelle was then escorted to the Vatican. in Mussolini's private 
!imosine, and how nobody ever found out about the trip because Degrelle was flown to 
France by an Italian military plane and then made his way to Belgium secretly. 91 No 
matter whether this account is accurate or not, it seems that the Duce cared enough 
about having Degrelle as an ally to protect hiin. 
Formal relations between the two leaders began directly after Rex's success in 
1936. with an invitation to Degrelle from Mussolini. DegreUe claims to have spent "une 
huitaine de jours passionnants. presque familiaux. puisqu'il m'a annonce lui-meme la 
naissance de ma rille Anne. a. qui fai donne Ie prenom de sa derniere fiUe a. lui." Eight 
days is an unusually long time for an importantpolitica1leader like Mussolini to spend 
with a "brand-new" political leader like Degrelle. and one wonders where all of the 
fatherliness associated with DegreUe went. if he deemed it more important to visit the 
Duce than to be near his wife at the imminent time of birth .92 At any rate, however 
formal or close. a friendship between the two was established from 1936 on: "j'avais 
aussit6t trouvee.n Mussolini un ami veritable qui m'a toujo·urs conseille. guide, 
m'offrant spontanement de mepreter de'l'argent." affirms Degrelle.93 As will be 
, ~ 
disclJssed in a. later chapter, Mussolini al1ow~d Deg-relle to make some speeches on Turin 
radio in January, 1937, after the Rexist leader was denied radio-time in Belgium. 
Between 1936 and 1937 (that is. ~hen Rex was at its height) Rex also received much 
90Charlier. p. 176. 
91Charlier, p. 177-78. 
920f course, it was still not the custom for the husband to be on-hand at a birth itself in 
1936, but, nevertheless. one might expect such a professed father as Degrelle to at least 
stay in the same country where his wife was. 
93Charlier, p. 175. 
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financial support from the Italian Fascists -- about 2'0.000 FB per month. or a total of 19 
million FB.94 Mussolini seems to have been somewhat of an advisor to Degrelle on how 
to manage relations with Hitler. as well. and, hating the Germans. according to 
Degrelle. forwarned the Rexist leader against their powers -- warnings which. as seen. 
Degrelle ignored. The friendship was most likely reinforced by the alliance between 
Germany and Italy which began to develop in September, 1937 when Mussolini visited 
HiUer in Germany. and became concrete in the pact on May 22.1939.95 For. uRex 
wanted to keep on good terms with HiUerian Germany. it would have to stay especially 
friendly 'with the Reich's major ally. 
Rex and Spain: 
As for the other Latin country with sympathies towards Rex, relations seem to 
have been 10v-key. Degrelle supported franco and saw in him one of the great 
conquerors of Communism. After aten-day 'visit with the Spanish leader in February, 
1939. for instance. he wrote an article-1n Le Pays reel entitled "Larin des Rouges."96 In 
1937-38 he used the Spanish civil war to bring accusations against the Belgian 
government for its military support to the Republicans. Degrelle claims to have been 
named "no. I de la Phalange de l'exterieur" by the Phalangist leader Jose Antonio Primo 
de Rivera in 1934.91 but, though some Rexists were part of the French Fascist Drieu La 
Rochelle's forces in the Bale~ric islands:98 there were no organized Rexist troops in 
, ' . ~ 
94Degrelle's.assertion that the' money vas spontaneously offered seems exaggerated. 
Intermediaries like the Count Galeazzo Ciano probably repeatedly asked Mussolini on 
the Rexist leader's behalf, The figure of 250,000 FB per month is one noted in Ciano's 
agenda of August, 1931'. The second figure is that of Count de Grunne who wrote of two 
million FB per month over a period from August, 1936 to April, 1937. [Krier, p. 183-84J. 
95Robert Demoulin, "La Pre sse liegeoise et la politique italienne du 25 septembre 1937 a 
la signature du pacte d'acier du 22 mai 1939," in Michel Dumoulin and Jacques 
Willequet, Aspect des relations de la Belgique. du Grao.d-Duche de Luxembourg et des 
Pays-Pas avec !'Italie: 1925-1940 (Bruxelles, Istituto italiano di cultura, 1983). p. 125 . 
96£tieno.e, p. 116. . . 
9?Degrelle, Hitler pour 1000 ans , p. 64. 
98£tieno.e, p. 116. 
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Spain. (Rex didn't have an armed brigade of any sort until the SS-WaUonie in WWIU 
There is no evidence that Rex received financial support from Franco either. 
Relations, then, were rather distant before the war. 99 
Conclusion: 
What can one say about Rexist ideology and other Fascist ideology? It is evident 
that Degrelle and other Rexist leaders were fascinated by Nazism and Italian Fascism, 
and that they did have contact with the propounders of these doctrines. But whether 
the Rexists, or at least Degrelle, had an in depth knowledge of either ideology is 
questionable. First of all, DegreUe (and probably other Rexists as welD did not read 
either German or Italian before the war. Then again, not many people read Mein 
Kampf anyway, and since Rex insiste9 that its ideology was new and, in the beginning, 
denied having relations with the Nazis, there was no compelling reason to study Nazi or 
Italian Fascist writings. Like everybody else, Rex learned about the two regimes 
through the press and through observation. It had a fairly peripheral understanding 
of the ideologies and COUld, therefore, borrow from them without much thought as to 
what the implications of a certain section were, or whether the particular ideology 
made any sense for Belgium. 
Rex was attracted by 'the trappings of Nazism and Italian Fascism -- by the 
a~thority, the order, the hierarchy, and"aU the dramatic stagings whiCh symbolized 
"'\. 
these aspects (a podium for DegreUe, for instance, with other leaders behind him on a 
lower step and the crowd far below them both, suggesting a hierarchy of authority) . 1 O? 
Rex then tried to incorporate this paraphernalia into its own ideology, all the while 
insisting that it was original. yet not making much effort to disguise the acts which 
99Not so after the war. Franco welcomed a wounded Degrelle who was trying to escape 
the allies in 1945, gave him a false passport. and probably supported him financially . 
Degrelle stiHlives in Spain. 
100See chapter on De grelle , section on him as orator, below, 
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were distincUy Nazi and/or Italian Fascist. The Rexist arm gesture, for instance, was an 
.arm thrust forward with a hand open and facing downward. Rex described it as a "geste 
du bras tendu dans Ie signe du serment et ... Ia main ouverte dans Ie signe de la 
fraternite."101 Rex was trying to make the gesture uniquely Christian and Rexist, but it 
was obviously drawn direcUy from the Nazi salute. 
Thus, I would argue, Rexist ideology learned much from Nazi and Italian Fascist 
ideology. But it learned not in an academic way, but more through osmosis, as it were. 
through observation and casual borrowing of their dramatics and rhetoric. Perhaps 
one of the reasons for Rex's failure (and there are several) was because it did not take 
the time to consider the real basis of all the external appearances of Nazism and Italian 
Fascism. and did not make the effort to truly adapt their ideology to the Belgian 
situation. 
. ' . 





ChroaololY: ReI in Parliament 
Having outlined Rexist ideology, I now continue with the narration of events. 
The first chapter discussed Rex in its pre-phase (when still but a group of students at 
L'Ayant-Garde and then at the ACjBl, Rex in its first phase (from when Degrelle took 
over Rex editions to when the group broke with the ACjBl, and Rex in its second phase 
_(from the break with Catholic action up to the coup de CourtraD. Courtrai marked the 
beginning of the third and most important phase of Rex: when it turned from being a 
non-political protector of the Church to becomin.g a political attacker on_ ~e Catholic 
Party, a guardian against corruption, and a defender of mo.ra1ity. In this phase, Rex 
would break off from the Catholic Party for good and would f.arm its own political 
movement-party.1 Elements of this phase would last throughout the rest of Rexist 
history, butthe glories of Rex would end with De grelle , s electoral failure in 1937. 
Phase four, then, is the period spanning 1937 to the German invasion on May 10, 1940 --
the perio4 of Rex's downfall. 
In preparation for the elections: the scandals: 
The decision to enter formal politics was a very rushed one. The success of 
Courtrai lead directly into a massive, pre-election propaganda campaign against 
Catholics, first, and against other established parties, later. One may well wonder at this 
sudden declaration of politicization. It SQ,ems unlikely that Degrelle would have been so 
- foolish as to ~ntentionally postpone political preparation until the last moment. Of 
course, it is true that he managed to take the country by storm with his amazing 
propagandistic talents. Yet six months was really a very limited time in which to 
inform the public at large (not just already loyal Rexists) about a totally new political 
party. The decision must have been a last minute one, then, prompted by the success at 
1 I refer to Rex in Parliament as a movement-party in defference to Rexist rhetoric. 
which rejected the very institution of political party as societally separatist and 
i.nsisted that Rex before 1936 and after 1936 was the same, that it was simply acting 
within another sphere, a political one. 
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Courtrai and Degrelle's own impatient ambitions for the movement. For Degrelle EM 
taking a tremendous risk and he must have been extraordinarily self-confident and 
visionary to make the attempt. If Rex had lost the elections or received much less than 
it did. it would have been ignored as simply one of the many other extremist parties 
whi~h were gaining ground in mid 1930s Belgium. But the Rexist leader did have a 
fondness for the grand and. once he had set his mind on something, he could rarely be 
dissuaded from it. By December. 193'. he was quite sure about wanting to make his 
movement into a movement-party. Rather a show-off as he was. he was determined to 
use every personal skill he had to make his movement succeed. 
Since propaganda through scandal-raising seemed to be his and the movement's 
forte, Rex soon launched into a series of vigorous attacks upon the Establishment. 
Though many of these cases exposed genuine problems with the operation of the 
nation, their purpose vas, most definitely. to draw attention to the movement and 
gather supporters. Judging from the results of the elections. the technique was quite 
successful. 
On November 11. 193'. Degrelle organized a huge gathering in direct response 
to Courtrai. It was to be the first of a long succession of meetings attac.k.ing politko-
financiers. politicians who. beside their necessary political ties. held immoral 
-
affiliations with the financial quarter.2 Degrelle. as usual, planned the event very . . 
well. Hls very choice of the day was clever; for. being Armistice Day, almost all· 
. ..~ 
Belgians would have a holiday 'and would be more inclined to attend the meeting 
(though it was, in any case, held in the evening). In addition. th~ Rexist leader had had 
the meeting very well publicized and on the said day the Brussels Palais des Sports was 
stock full. "Le succes etait complet. Rex et son Chef recueiUaient une ovation inconnue 
21.0 1934. En had published a few short notices about politico-financiers in F.rance, as 
this one: "THIVRIER. depute sociaIiste, possede deux chateaux a Montassiege (Allier) et 
un troisieme chateau ala Motte-Beuvron." [lila politi que au ra1ent1: Place aux pauvres." 
in Rex-Vlan , M.r. 30, 1934 . .00.12, p. 11 J. 
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en Belgique jusqu'alors pour un mouvement politique," wrote Legros optimistically.3 
The audiences paid an entrance fee (probably between S FB and 10 FB) and the total sum 
collected apparently covered the 100,000 FB budget allotted for the occasion by Degrelle, 
with a surplus of 7000 FB, as well!4 Though it is virtually impossible to estimate how 
many Rexists were won over on this one day, one can assume -- in view of the heat 
surrounding the Courtrai affair, and judging from the increasing popularity of Rexist 
mee,tings -- that Degrelle's dramatic and emotional performance certainly worked its 
charms on a fair amount of the attending petit peugle. 
Degrelle must have been urged on by this success, for he continued to expose 
scandal after scandal. The distinction between political man and financial man was one 
that all Rexists adamantly upheld. 
Le politique et Ie financier sond deux hommes differents: s'ils se 
confondent, celui-ci a toutes chances de temporter sur celui-l3,: la 
sincerite des idees disparait et, 1a faiblesse humaine aidant, des 
compromissions tentatrices risquent de faires succomber bien des 
bonnes volontes .. 5 
Alongside the whole campaign against politico-financiers. the campaign against big 
capitalistS. in general. followed logically. Jean Denis called "l'homme d'affaire" the 
most repugnant bandit of his era.; a man who. undoubtedly. also had political dealings 
and who regularly usurped industrialists and "Ie petit peuple travailleur" for his own 
profit.6 Such men ought to be dealt with: harshly: "Hyenes puantes et tepugnants 
" 
chacals. Et va us savez Ie moyen dont on se d6barra.sse des hyenes et des chac~"? 
3Usmard Legros, Un Homme. un chef. Leon Degrelle (Bruxelles. Editions Rex. 1938). p. 
129. • 
4Degrelle made this claim in his interviews with M. Charlier. However. he also 
confused this meeting with a series of six meetings he held in 1937 -- Les Six Tours de 
Rex: so one must be wary of his assertions. [Jean-Michel Charlier, Leon Degrelle : 
Persiste et signe: interviews recuei11ies pour la television francaise par ... (Paris. 
Editions Jean Picollec. 1985). p. 104. (See note 27 for dollar equivalents). 
'Jacques Saint-Gemain. La Batai11e de Rex (Paris. __ .1937). p. 33-34. 
6 Jean Denis. La Ligne generale (Bruxelles, Editions Rex, [1935-19377]), p. 83. 
7Denis. p.84. 
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Early in 1936. Rex began attacks against Socialist party "banksters." as the 
vrongdoers soon came to be caUed. By january 31. 1936, Rex vas carrying long articles 
vith bold headlines like "Le brigandage des politiciens socialistes un scandale: les 3000 
millions de la banque du travail. Des pires moeurs de banKsters a la capitulation devant 
la Haute-Firiance."8 It called on yorkers of all classes, poor but free, strong in their 
truth and belief in the justice of their cause, to demand immediate changes.9 "11s 
doivent balayer les preJuges ... " which meant, litera.1.1y, that they were supposed to go 
out and symbolically sweep away corruption by sweeping the streets in front of 
Parliamentl~ 0 (See plate 3 in appendix.> Rex continued its attacks against the Socialist 
party for several months. summoning grass roots action through mUltiple 
advertisements and articles on the subject in its newspapers. 
At the sam,e time, it moved into more specific attacks on the Catholic party and 
its affiliates. On February 21. 1936. on the front page of Rex. DegreUe disclosed his next 
important discovery of corruption -- the agricultural organization, Boere"nbond.11 
Here, he accused the Boerenbond of usurping its control over farmers' savings by 
using the money for totally non-agricultural and. indeed, scandalous purposes.12 In 
particular. he accused it of having figured out a devious plan, so that it could borrow 
money from the Banque National at 3 % interest, but then seU it back at 6 % interest, 
thereby taking in a considerable profit.13 The campaign succeeded ~n alienating a 
' . 
\ 
8Degrelle. in Rex. Jan. 31. 1936, no.', p. 1. 
9Degrelle. in Rex. jan. 31. 1936: no. S. p, 7. 
10DegreUe, in Rex. jan. 31. 1936. no. S. p. 2. 
llSaint-Germain, p . 20-22. This was a kind of nation-wide corporative agricultural-
assistance organization formed in the early 20th century by the Abbe Mellaerts. under 
the auspices of the Catholic party. The Boerenbond assisted peasant-farmers and small 
landlords in all sorts of agriculture-related issues and, besides acting as a bank for 
their savings. established special services. such as agriculture-case courts, for its 
members. The fact that from its inception it held strong ties with the Catholic party 
was undoubtedly infl,uencial in Rex's decision to act against it. 
1208gre11e, "MM. Rapport. Brusse1mans et van Dievoet sont servis. Voici des documents 
terribles sur Ie Boerenbond," in Rex, Feb . 21. 1936 . .0.0.8, p.1.3 &. S. 
13Saint-Germain, p. 124-127. 
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considerable part of the peasantry from the Catholic party, many of whom w~nt over to 
Rex. 14 
The Boerenbond affair was part of a long string of attaclcs against the Catholic 
party, attacks which had begun, in essence, with the coup de Coutlrai. As the weeks 
went by, Rex's language became more and more violent in its attacks. The February 7, 
1936 issue ofBu., for instance, carried an extensive, full-page, bold-lettered battie cry, 
as it were, against the party: 
L'offensive des. pourris [term used for the banksters] contre Rex 
bat son plein: bombardements a coup de droits de reponse dans nos 
journaux, bombardements a coup de proces, Segers, Balthazar, 
Philips; bombardementsacoups de sale tees anonymes! Ils voudraient 
nous terroriser ounOU5 affamer! Nous les attendons et nous les 
defionslll S'ils veulent la bataille, ils l'aurontl S'ils ne 1a. veulent pas, 
ils l'auront quand m6me! Us sont les enllemis du peuple. Us ont bu 
son sang, exploite son travail, insulte sa misere. L'heure est venue 
ou Us vont payer! BELGES! Rassemblons nous lous arlour de REX 
pour la bataille deseperee des honn6tes gens contre la dictature des 
politiciens-bansters! 11s nons ant ecrase pendant 10 ansI Ca suffit! 
Prenons nos balais, nos fouets, et nos fourches! Chassons-lesl Pour 
un pays libre et propre, pour nous $8.uver. pour blUr I'Etat Nouveau. 
uni55Ons-nousl15 
If Rex's intention was to alienate the Catholic party. it certainly achieved its goal. On 
February 21. Minister of the Interior and President of the Union Catholique. M. Hubert 
Pie.r1ot. forbade all collaboration of party members with Rex.16 In its usual manner. 
Rex responded by simply turning the situation around to make it look (in its own press, 
that is) as if it had taken the initiative. Jean Denis declared." in the next issue of Rex, 
that the mov~ment had stayed within the party only for purposes of aggrandizmg it; 
but, once the Catholic party had rejected Rex's advances, the latter had no reason to 
remain 10yal.1? A final and official break was in order. therefore, wrote Degrelle: "REX 
14Saint-Germain. p.l28. 
I'DegreHe. in ~ Feb. 7.1936. no . 6. p. 4. 
16Legros. p.133. 
1 '7Denis, "Faut-i1liquider Ie parti catholique," in Rex, Feb. 28,1936. no. 9. p. 8. 
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de son cOte NE VOlT PAS LA POSSIBILITE DE S'ENTENDRE AVEC I.E PARTI CATHOLIQUE 
[sicJ."18 
The split and the general ambiguity surrounding the growing Rex movement 
was especially weH represented by l'affaire Segers. Sometime in late Winter-early 
Spring of the year, Degrelle had published an inflammatory pamphlet against the 
Catholic leader, appropriatedly entitled "Jaccuse M. Segers. Jaccuse M. Segers d'~tre 
un cumulard, un bankster, un pillard d'epargne eta un liche." Understandably 
enraged, the accused filed a case against DegreHe for defamation of character. 
However, this only resulted in his ouster from the party and a court plea in Degrelle's 
favor on May 8/19 
One may well wonder why the court gave such an important victory to the 
Rexists. Couldn't they have forseen its implications? They were obviously performing 
their jobin the expected, unbiased way, but one might have expected that, considering 
the circumstance,s, they would have decided that a motion in support of Segers, 
however wrong. might have been a crutia11y important political move. The conclusion 
that emerges seems to be that the real threat of Rex had not yet dawned on all Belgians. 
Either they supported, in relief, what the movement was doing -- the country X.M full 
of corruption, after all-- or they simply did not believe that Rex could achieve any 
kind of leadership position in the political scene. At any rate, the court decision' being 
handed down barely two weeks before the May 24 elections had a great impact on voter 
. ~ 
turn-out in favor of Rex. If Rex had gotten dd of Segers, it 'Would get rid of other 
incitors of political vices, it would clean up that body of law-makers.20 
18Degrelle, "REX luttera seul aux elections prochaines," in Rex, Feb. 28, 1936, no. 9, 
p. 16-17. 
19Legr05, p. 151. The case vas tried before the tribunal court of Bruxelles. 
20Jean-Michel Etienne, Le Mouvement celiste jusqu'en 1910 (Paris, Librairie Armand 
Colin,'1968), p. 62. 
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Specific election propaganda: 
The scandals uncovered by Rex were made public not only in Rex. but. starting 
0.0. May 3. also in a new daily, Le Pays reel. In March, 1935, Mgr. Picard had already 
'predicted that, should Degrelle realize his dream and begin publishing a daily 
newspaper, "personne au monde ne peut prevoir a quai 111'emploiera."21 The daily 
added to the weekly Rex. allowed Degrelle to literally bombard readers with 
propagadistic material. And, since Rexist press had been carrying Rexist propaganda 
from the outset, the election campaign merely required an intensification of past 
processes.a2 Degrelle wrote artic1es exposing scandals 0.0. front and back of~ and 
throughout Le Pays del and Action rexiste. a special campaign paper appearing only 
during the pre-election period.2S 1..0. addition, propagandistic phraSes would appear i:n 
bold letters and enc10sed in thick-lined boxes at random throughout the various 
publications. They would say things like "REX dit la Verite!"24 (obviously a reference to 
the lying occuring at top government levels),oor "Rex ou Moscou" (for, in spring 1936, 
Rex accused almost all of its enemies of beUlg figureheads of the Communinist regime 
in th°e USSR).25 Rexist newspapers presented their candidates, as well. and often with 
photographs in addition to short biographies 0..0. their accomplishments as private 
persons and as Rexists.26 Propaganda ploys extended into non-press areas as well. Rex 
started producing litUe insignia and gadgets that were disti.ncUy Rexist -- carried its 
name, usually. The January 31 issue of Rn. advertised a whole series of such items: Rex 
~ -------------------- , 
21 Mgr. Picard in a letter, dated March 13, 1935, to his Cardinal, Mgr. Van Roey, quoted in 
Giovanni Hoyois, "Monseigneur Picard et Leon Degrelle," Revue gtneralebel&e, Nov. 
1959, p. 87. 
22Legros, p. 1.f6 . 
23Legros, p. H8. 
24Rn., Feb. 21, 1936, .0.0. 8. p. 8. 
a'Robert Brasi11ach, Leon Degrelle et l'avenir de Rex (Paris, Librairie PIon, 1936), 
p.499. 
26See, for example, the short article by Roger Dessart, Chef de REX-Huy, nominating 
Amand Geradin for the Huy-Waremme position, in "Prelude a la campagne electorale." 
in ~ Feb. 7,1936, no. 6, p. 13. 
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insignia for 2.'0 FB, Rex "fanion" (small flag) for 3.00 FB, Rex arm badges and Rex 
stamps (these last, in packages of 1000) also for 3.00 FB, Rex blotters (100 at once) for 
10.00 FB, and Rex card-game for 2.00 FB.2? With such an assortment of useful objects, 
and with such reasonable prices, one can imagine that the sales were many in this 
period of rising Rexist popularity. 
Degrelle also increased the number of speaking rounds he made. travelling 
from province to province. proclaiming the Relist revolution. The meetings were 
always advertized and reviewed in great detail in Rexist press. They all followed the 
same, basic format of befote. some more orgahized and elaborate than others. On 
January 31. for instance. Rex published the schedule for a weekend-long reunion to be 
held at Liege. On Saturday February 8, at 7:30 pm. the cadres actifs and Front Populaire 
would come together to hear reports from local Relist groups of Huy-Waremme, 
Verviers and Liege. An hour later, Degrelle would speak at a general meeting and 
would ceremoniously hand over the Rexist flag to a representative of the Ougree-
Sclessin section (probably some kind of welcoming ritual for a newly formed group). 
At 8:00 am Sunday morning all would convene at the Cathedral to hear a mass for peace 
and in remembrance of those dead at war. This would be fol1owed by. first, a meeting 
on the "Doctrine et Programme de Rex" at 9:30 am, then a "dIner democratique [sic]" at 
1 :00 pm. accompanied by the "creation du chant du Front Populaire de Rex," and. 
(mally. after a pause, a "Me~ting monstJ.e avec Carlos Leruitte [Rexist leade.r] et LEON 
"'\. 
DEGRELLE:" 2.8 The grand scald o! this meeting is reminescent of the one that.was 
supposed to take place at Charleroi in 1934. Due to lack of tiPle. however, Degrelle gave 
most of his speaches in the context of evening meetings only tw'o- or three-hour long. 
The campaign in Flanders, which started after the one in the French-speaking part of 
the country, was characterized by this type of meeting. Perhaps this was deliberately 
21Rex, Jan. 31. 1936, no . 5, p. 7. 1 FB = S .03384 (1936) ... S .267 = 26.7 ¢ (1984) 
28Carlos LeruiUe, "Le Rassemblement populaire de Liege Ie 9 fevrier 1936," in Rex, 
Jan. 31. 1936, no. 5, p. 15. The towns listed are all within the privince of Liege . 
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planned this way because Degrelle did not speak Flemish. though it seems more likely 
that pressing time was the real factor involved.29 At any rate. Degrelle's enthusiasm 
was in no way hampered by the circumstances. On January 31. 4000 people came to 
hear him in Antwerp; on February 3. 1200 came to hear him in Brugge. Rexist accounts 
of the first meeting claimed that despite continued disruption by Communist 
infiltrators and prolonged police non-action against them. "il .o'en est pas un sans 
doute qui ne sen tit au gmenter son respect pour cette force jeune et saine. reflechie 
mais ecrasante, qu'estREX" (note the forcefullanguage).30 
Degrelle's personal eagerness and the Rexist press' para1lelling enthusiasm and 
over-confidence in reportin'g the various propaganda events evidently won over a lot 
of voters. whether discontented with the present regime, in search'of an all-
encompassing doctrin~. or simply easily persuaded by colorful rhetoric. Writing 
shortly before the elections, Raphael Sindic foresaw that " ... tous les hesitants 
viendront a. no us et avec eux. nombre de socialistes et quantile de liberaux" (and 
Catholics).31 Though an exaggeration. the statement does describe. in a broad sense. 
the playing out of the events in Spring 1936. Degrelle and his followers performed 
really rather extraordinary feats of propaganda in the six months that lapsed between 
Courtrai and the May elections. feats which resulted in a vi1:tual repeat of the earlier 
£2.!UL this time not only against the, Catholic party, but against the whole country, 
\. 
29These speeches in Flanders were presumably in French, (I have not come across any 
references to translators or interpreters being on hand.) Of course. it is possible that 
Degrelle learned a speech in Flemish for the occasion; yet this seems unlikely, since his 
style was based so much on spontaneity, It is no wonder, then. that Rexist support was 
weak in the north --,besides the fact that the Flemish, if extremist, were separatist-
extremists. in line with groups like the VNV (see below on the Rex-VNV pact). 
30"Leon Degrelle parle a Anvers," in &tL Feb. 7, 1936, no. 6, p. 5. 
31Raphael Sindic, Rex deYant l'opinion catholiQue (Bruxelles, Eds. Rex, 1936), p, 34. 
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The elections of 1936: 
The Rexist party won 11. .. 9 % of the national vote on May 24. 1936.32 Out of 
2.362,4~H eligible votes counted. it received 271."91. Out of ZOZ deputes seats in the 
Parliament house. Rex won 21 seats (in addition to twelve seats in the senate). The 
greatest number of representatives concentrated in one area were in the Brabant and 
Liege provinces. returning 6 and:5 seats. respectively. Other provinces returned 
between 1 and 3 seats. (See plates" and , for map and chart.> Similarly. the capitals ot 
the two important provinces. Brussels and Li6ge. each voted in the most deputes within 
the province. with :5 and 3. respectively. These reSults are not surprising. since the two 
towns were centers of worker and middle class population. In comparison to the other 
parties. Rex did quite well. It received the most votes of all the dissident extremist 
parties (Communist and Flemish Nationalist) and just one percent less than the Liberal 
party. which came in with 12AO% . It drew its votes especially from the Catholic party. 
but considerably. also. from both the Socialist and the Liberal parties.33 Though Rexist 
success was understandably greater in Wallonie and Brussels. the 7 % (out of 1001. 
regional voting percentage). i.e. over 72.000 votes. it obtained in Flanders must not be 
overlooked. especially since this represented half of Vlaam.sch Nationaal Verbond 
(VNV) returns ui the region.34 In addition. what 21 representative~ meant for Rex was 
more than what it meant for other. more popular parties. because the counting system 
used (the Hondt system) assigned more ~ats per votes counted to stronger parties; thus. 
. , 
the Catholic party was given ohe seat !or less than 11.000 votes. while Rex had to obtain 
about 1.3.000 seats to be eligible for one seat.35 That is. 21 deputes represented more 
32Voting is obligatory in Belgium. About 901. of the population votes. The statistics are 
taken from Roger E. De Smet. Rene Evalenko & William Fraeys. Collection de Science 
Politigue: Atlas des Elections Belges 1919-195 .. CBruxelles. Institut de Sociologie Solvay. 
Universite Libre de Bruxelles. 1958). p. 10 & p. 1+-15; and from Etienne. p. 53-56. 
33 ' Etienne. p. 57. 
34Etienne. p. 58 . 
3'Etienne. p. 53-5". 
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votes for Rex than it did for the established parties. (1 Rexist seat equaled 1.18 Catholic 
party seats. for instance.) 
Where did these votes come from? Who voted for Rex. anyway? Dividing the 
results by linguistic region. Flanders. as mentioned above. brought 7% of its votes to 
Rex. Wallonie. 1'.1%. and Brussels (officially bilingual). 18.5%.36 Looking at them from 
the class point of view. and though specific statistics are not available. one can 
generalize that Rexist supporters were as before the elections mostly merchants. small 
artisans. professionals. petits bourgeois. and farmers. with a few aristocrats as wel1. 31 
The linguistic and'class composition of the Rexist movement didn't really change after 
the elections; it was essentially more of the same. It was the age factor which redefined 
Rex in 1936. Because most Rexists were still too young to enter Parliament in 1936. 
Degrelle had to go scrounge around for aIde! supporters to represent the movement-
party. Having been a mouyement de gOneration before 1936. it now became a 
-movement of split generations. with older. more mature Rexists as leaders or 
Parliamentarians and younger Rexists grouped into shock troops of various sorts. The 
dichotomy WOUld. later on, cause internal problems within the movement. as Degrelle 
found he had to assert more and more authority on his sometimes disorderly and 
unserious forces. 
The sudden switch to official politics must. indeed, have caused confusion for 
" 
many of the younger Rexists who had joiO.ed in a vision of adventure and utopian. anti-
~ 
establishment change. For. waSn't running for elections. even if separate from'the 
Catholic party. and even as an official non-traditional-party movement-party. 
nevertheless joining the enemy? Wasn't it deceiving the very revolutionary base of 
36£tienne. p. 57. 
31Leg1'os. p. 166. There is no evidence that many clergy belonged to Rex. especially 
after Rex entered politics. I did. however. come across an article on "Les Rexistes," in 
BuJan. ~, 1935 (p . 24) by a "Josse Allin. pretre." (See chapter two, note 10,) Alzin was 
not a regular journalist of Rexist press had, whatever his connection with the 
movement, it must have been an exception . 
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Rex? How much adventure would there be in a stuffy old Parliament, especially ~ince 
they. the young blood. would have no control over what happened within? It is evident 
that, once entered into traditional politics. Rex was forced to become more traditional 
itself, and Degrelle was forced to exert more authority -- paternal, perhaps -- over the 
young lyc6e or university students vho still constituted a large part of his following . 
Though it had always been hierarchically organized, I would argue that, once in 
offic~al politics, the hierarchy vas accentuated even more. Perhaps this was one of the 
reasons why Rex started to lose impact dras~cally' in 1937. and why many qf the 
Rexistes ~e la premiere heure left. beginning in late 1936. 
Reasons for Rex's success: 
Ironically, anti-Rexist propaganda helpe~ Rex almost as much as its own 
propaganda, for it informed the entire country about the threat. It wasn't only regular 
and chance readers of Rexist press and posters who knew about Rex, everybody knew 
about it. On the one hand, the attacks upon the movement dissuaded many who might 
have been attracted to its flashiness and idealism, especially once it was categorized as 
dictatorial. On the other hand, the publicity must have drawn a fair amount of curious 
and potential'supporters to Rexist meetings and press. Those not so stable in their 
beliefs might then· have been seduced by Rexist dramatics and rhetoric. 
Anti-Rexists appr.oache4 Rex with'Rexist tactics; that is, through accusa~ory and 
. ""!a-
angry speeches and through the press. All opposing factions were united in accusing 
Degrelle and Rex of being a "danger fasciste et dictatorial."38 The Catholic party, in 
particular, having the most axes to grind with the dissenters because of the brutal 
politico-financier scandal episodes, retorted with equally harsh charges: "Le but 
veritable du mouvement rexiste est l'aneantissement du parti cathoUque.le 
58Legros. p. 149. 
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renversement des institutions et l'instauration de la dictature."39 Legros claims that 
the established parties' intense concentration on an anti-Rexist campaign was at the 
expense of their own political programs. Once they realized that they had no programs 
to fall back on as comparison-propaganda to Rex, they reverted to insult as a campaign 
ploy, Which, says Legros, were "symptOmes evidents de 1a defaite."40 What Legros 
chooses to ignore, being biased and an affirmed Rexist himself, is that the parties had 
every right to return like insult for like insult. (Politics by the 1930s was no different 
from today: in the heat of the campaign. one tends to exaggerate and become 
aggressive.) The three big parties may not have iterated specific programs, yet 
everybody knew what they were. for they had been in use for years. As for the Rexists. 
they were not so good at setting forth programs themselves, their campaign being 
based more on pointing to problems in the present system than on proposing solutions. 
However. the combined efforts of all traditional parties against Rex proves that it ~ a 
threat, and a serious one. 
Specifically anti-Rexist press often copied Rexist press format. .lYQu. for 
instance. was identical to ~ and concentrated on personal attacks on Degrelle and 
other prominent Rexists. It was founded by Catholic activists of the Uege area. a Rexist 
stronghold. and ran weekly from March 26,1936 to June 11, 1936.41 Anti-Rex. another 
election-period anti-Rexist weekly. was published from March 26. 1936 to May 29,1936. 
" . 
More long-term and post-electioilopposition papers included the Communist La Voix du 
. . . , 
Peuple.42 Antidote (a weekly ~ defense of public liberties. based in Liege. ~nning 
from Sept. 13. 1936 to Dec. 17.1936). and Vigilance (bi-monthly, published by a group of 
39Saint-Germain. p. 100. Their choice of words was more controlled than Rex's, of 
course. 
40Legros, p. 150. 
41 Information on anti-Rexist press was taken from Legros. p. 150-51. and Etienne. 
p. 128-30 &p. 190. 
42Legros. p. 222 . 
62 
anti-fascist intellectuals, appearing from Apr. 1, 1936 to Nov. I, 1936).43 The already 
established L'Independence beIge (directed by the banker and big industrialist, J.-E. 
Solvay, from November 1936 on) took the lead in anti-fascist press after the elections. 
What was most unusual for Belgium was the violence involved in these anti-
Rexist attacks. ReI had not engaged in any violent acts so far -- the few scuffles 
occuring at meetings were not initiated by Rex and were not preplanned or organized 
-- so the response was surprising. As leader, Degrelle was the main target for these 
assaults. The most famous one occured on September IS, 1936 at Seraing, a mostly 
Socialist town on the left bank of the Meuse, near Liege. Because his meeting had been 
banned by the town, and because he knew that, if he tried to enter the town by usual 
routes, he would be stopped, the ReIlst leader (determined to speak and always full of 
ingenious ways to get around barriers to his actions) decided to make his entrance on a 
barge down the river and deliver his speech through a microphone! All went fine 
until shots were suddenUy fired from the banks, where Socialist and Communist grou ps 
had gathered to hold a counter-meeting to Degrelle's. Three Rexists were wounded, 
including the local chef of Rex-Liege, M. Willems. Degrelle, invincible, survived the 
attack unharmed.44 Such incidents repeated themselves frequently during the 
movement's lifetime, and Degrelle suffered a few injuries, though never serious ones. 
Rexists and historians have had different theories on why the movement 
' . '. 
succeeded. Degrelle himself gives credit to his own imagination and stamina (during 
- ~ 
the campaign he often gave up to six lectures per day!),'" as vell as to Rexist 
youthfulness. "En un an, sans appui de quiconque, a force d'acharnement, de sacrifices 
"3Etienne. p. 190. 
44Saint-Germain. p. 176 and Etienne, p. 128-29. One Government: minister considered 
the Seraing occurence serious enough to order his wife and children to take refuge in 
the house if DegreUe·vas killed. He apparently feared an ensuing street war. [Legros. 
p. 186-871. If Legros's claim is correct (he doesn't cite sources), the incident points to 
the growing tension evolving within the country around Rex. 
4,£· 2 Lienne. p. 6 . 
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et de foi, nous avions. a quelques mi1liers de jeunes gar~ons et de jeunes filles. 
revolutionne toute la Belgique."46 His formula for success included political flair, a 
sense of action. inventiveness. and fear of nothing.4? "La victoire est a ceux qui 
veulent et a ceux qui croient,"48 Legros associates Rex success not only with its 
innovative propaganda te~hniques, but also with the contemporary, politically vacuous 
situation. one in which the established parties concentrated so much on inner politics, 
on working together. that they ignored the national problems of social. religious and 
linguistic peace. With its call for unity above class. religious and language differences, 
Rex appeared "comme une delivrance.;'49 "Et, c'est ainsi que l'electeur degoute 
n' hesitait pas a donner a Rex la faveur de son vote. Pour lui. Rex apparassait comme un 
mouvement revolutionnaire anime d'un ideal, conforme aux aspirations du peuple ... "50 
Etienne notes that the resolution of the Segers case in favor of Degrelle. just two weeks 
before the elections. vas a big push for the movement (Rex vas doing good things for 
the society), as was the dicision by Parliament to increase its size from 187 to 202 
deputes (seen as a selfish move to keep itself very much in pover )51. Etienne focuses 
more on Rexist propaganda techniques acting in a favorable framevork of inner party 
disunity and loss of identity due to prolongue coalition policy-ma1ting.52 The Catholic 
party vas split by language. political leaning (conservatives versus Christian 
Democrats), and class differences. he vrites; it took on party qualities only in questions , 
\ 
of the Church. and acted as a unit only at election time. Liberals had to contend with 
"'\. 
• J 
in-fighting between anti-c1ericists. demanding a return to lay-controlled schools. and 
. . 
more moderate advocates of Church-controlled education. Even the Socialist party. of 
46Uon Degrelle. Hitler pour 1000 anS (Paris, La Table Ronde, 1%9), p. 45. 
4?Degrelle, Hitler. p. 41.-
48Degrelle. Hitler. p. 46. 
49Legr05, p. 164. 
'OLegr05, p. 165. 
51Etienne, p. 62. 
5ZEtienne, p.60-62. 
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all the parties, the strongest, was generationally split between the old guard, under 
Emile Vandervelde and Louis de Brouckere, and a new group of activists, lead by Henri 
de Man and Paul-Henri Spaak.53 In comparison, Rex was unified and young. It drew its 
forces from the nation's youth, and, in particular, from Catholic youth. To them, who 
had been brought up and educated in very religious institutions, and who had gone on 
to Catholic action, the disunified, disorganized and old Catholic party seemed to hold no 
openings for their activism.54 Rex's vitality and cohesiveness, therefore, could easily 
have appeared as the answer. 
As for economics, Etienne continues, Rex was a political movement, not an 
economic one. Therefore, economics piayed less of a role in its rise to power than it did 
with other fascist movements of the 1930s. Belgium QM suffer from the Depression, but, 
by 193', the economy was on the rise again, with higher production and lover 
unemployment figures recorded (see plate 6 for chart).55 Nevertheless, it is true that 
the recovery effected parts of the middle class -- retailers, in particular -- later than 
other classes. By 193'-36, these sections olthe economy were still strUggling and were, 
as a consequence, more likely to be resentful towards government policies. In addition, 
even if the standard of living was ameliorating, remnants of the psychological impact 
of the depression were still evident.56 Many we~e still searching for guarantees of _ 
economic stability. Rexist newness and promises of a better life (even without 
' -, 
programs ouUined) must have seemed hopeful. 
"'\ 
What to me seems even'more important, however, was the fact that Rex was the 
Opposition. In election years, when a society is disgrunUed with political processes and 
in need of a change, whatever the Opposition is offering always seems better. 24.67% of 
Belgians were obviously unsatisfied with things as they were before 1936. 6.06% found 
'3'£tienne, p. 60. 
,4Etienne, p. 60. 
"Etienne, p. 58-59. 
,6Etienne, p. 59. 
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an answer in Communism. 7.12~. in Flemish nationalism (VNV). 11.49%. in Rex.'? 1936 
saw the rise of extremist groups. in general. Rex happened to be at the top. It was at 
the top. I would argue, because it was the most all-encompassing. VNV, for obvious 
reasons. interested only Flemish Belgians. Communism. though it did not carry the 
ovedy negative overtones it did (and still does) in this country. was still Communism. 
an arm of the USSR. and not so appealing to devout Belgium. Rex. on the other hand. 
was for ill of Belgium and had Catholicism. or. at least. Christianity. as the very 
foundation of its philosophies . .Thus. though it seemed to be proffering new ideas. these 
were only a reinterpre.tation of old. familiar ones. To vote for Rex in 1936 was! to 
11,49% of the population. to vote for forgotten ideals. to vote for the return of a longed-
after vision of the good old days. 
Rex in Parliament: 
The election of 21 deputes and 12 senators was just as unexpected to RexistS as it 
was to the rest of the country. Rex had immersed itself so completely in the fierce 
campaign that it had lost sight of what was to come next. (This, ironically, was the 
accusation Legros and other sympathetic historians of Rex made about the three big 
parties.> Once it had got its representatives into government, it didn't really know what 
to do with them! As Pierre Daye, a Rexist leader, put it, "puis ce fut, pour nous, Ie dur 
" ~ ... 
travail d'organisation, en profonde~r ."'8 Degrel~e was e~en more frank: 
'. "'\. , , 
Us ignoraient tout de cette taverne [Parliamentl. Us n'y avaient 
meme jamais mis les pieds .... Pour nos vingt-et-un deputes reXistes 
c'ewent donc l'avance mystet'ieuse, doigt sur la gachette du fusil, 
parmi la brousse 0'0 i1 faut s'attendre a. tous les traquenards et a. tous 
les coups de canlilles.59 
57£tienne. p. 53. 
58Pierre Daye, Leon Degrelle et Ie Rexisme (Paris. A. Fayard etCie., 1937), p. 14. 
59Degrelle, "Rex au padement ou huit jours chez les betes [sic}," in Rex, July 3, 1936, 
no. 27, p. 1. 
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As a .result, Rexist tactics within Parliament were essentially no different from those 
without. They were based more on violent attacks than constructive programming. 
From the beginning, Rexist representatives acted as a block against the established 
parties. The old parties were Dourris and characterised, in typical Rexist fashion, by 
deformities of all kinds. Degrelle continues, in the article already cited above, this way: 
.. .Ie mastodontesque Brunfaut.la t!te convulsee, essayait de renver-
ser Ie service d'ordre, Ie vieux Vandervelde, avec son nez ignoble en 
flamme de bougie, brandissait son cornet acoustique .... Les Rexistes, 
Raphael Sindic en t!te, se defendirent comme des sangliers, a. coups 
de crocs.60 
Once in Parliament, Rex found every preteXt to find fault with the system as it now 
stood (they had not, as yet, rejected the institution of Parliamentarism itself). 
Nos Rexistes doivent s'attendre a tout: aux injures les plus basses, aux 
traquenards les plus odieux et m6me, un jour ou l'autre, a. des violences 
sanglantes. 11s doivent s'attendre, par dessus Ie marche, A PERDRE 
ROYALEMENT LEUR TEMPS dans cette baraque OU nul travail n'est 
possible au milieu des luttes actuelles des partis, seul element qui 
compte la-bas.61 . 
Rex-Parliament interaction was a race for who could keep ahead of whom. If 
Rex made accusations, Catholics, Liberals and Socialists would team up to devise some 
way of getting back at it. A good example is the Sindic case. In July 1936, Degrelle 
received a tip from ~ ex-Catholic minister about corruption within the ~ 
d'epargne. the national savings bank for les petites gens. (The bank apparently had 
under-the-desk contracts with big capitalist firms, an action which contradicted the 
original reason for its founding.) Degrelle chose his best speaker in Parliaine1:t. 
Raphael Sindic. to expose the scandal in the the next session. On July 10. at 2 pm. after 
the order of the day had been taken care of. the President of the Chamber. M. Camille 
Huysmans. turned the podium over to Sindic. But the scheduled Rexist speaker was not 
there. Neither was he there at 2:15 pm. and his Rexist compatriots were so stunned that 
60Degrel1e, "Rex au parlement ou huh jours chez les betes," in ~ July 3. 1936, no. 27. 
p.3. 
61 De grelle, "La sale bolte du Parlement." in Rex. no. 28-29, p. 3. 
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they did no even think to choose someone else to take the stand and stall for time. 
Huysmans closed the session. Barely ten minutes later, Sindic arrived; but it was too 
late.62 As expected, Rex reacted with fury. But even violent articles in Le Pays reel 
couldn't stop the country from pointing its finger at the movement in ridicule.63 This 
time, Parliament had won one over Rex. Unprepared to conform to Parliamentary 
politcy-making procedures, Rex in Parliament was more of an annoyance than a true 
and constructive opposition party. 
Rex makes political moves; 
This did not mean, however, that Degrelle did not mean to bring changes; on the 
contrary, change vas all 'he wanted. But he seemed to lead his movement into political 
moves more for the sake of getting attention and collecting supporters, than to create 
steps towards effective reform. Having learned the propaganda routine, he seemed 
, . 
unwilling, 01' unable, to find new ways. His and the movement's actions after May 1936, 
therefore, were not very different from before. They were carried out more for . 
tactical reasons (to improve Rex's,standing) than as means to fulfill some moral goal. 
An example was Rex's support of the strikers in June 1936. On the ,UI- 'of this 
month, strikes broke out on the docks of Antwerp. Rex denounced them as Socialist and 
Communist incited and rebuked the government for its passivity in the matter. On June 
" 
14, however, the strikes were taken up by miners in Liege and transformed into a 
. ' . ~ , 
general strike. To everybody's amazement, Le Pays reel of June.!' published an article 
in support of the strikers' demands for a forty-hour week, paid vacations, and a 
minimum salary of 32 FB per week.64 In following weeks, Rex organized soup kitchens 
for the strikers and vacations with Rexist families by the sea and in the country for 
62Etienne, p. 124-25; and Ladriere and Pfeiffer, p. 75-76. 
63Ladriere and Pfeiffer, p. 75-76. 
64Etienne, p . 117-18. 
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some 8,000 children of strikers.6, Degrelle and his wife were featured prominantly at 
these various charity events for the strikers. One must note that. if the Socialists had 
perhaps supported the Antwerp protests, neither they, nor the Catholics and Liberals 
concurred with a general strike. Rex's support of the strikers on June 15, was another 
way of opposing the three big parties. Furthermore, Antwerp was in Flanders and was 
not a base of Renst support. Liege, on the other hand, was a Renst stronghold, and Rex 
had to support the city's workers in order to keep its standing there. 
The next political move caused even more of a fuss within, as well as outside of 
the movement. Since the beginning, Rex had quietly avoided any confrontation with 
Flemish nationlist groups, especially those in Parliament, and had, in fact, worked 
towards a mutual agreement between the two sides. On October 8,1936, Rex announced 
an accord with VNV. Because negotiations had been kept secret until that date, the pact 
came as a great shock to the country. Rex avowed that Prime Minister Van Zeeland had 
been briefed on the talk and had given his approval to them.66 Rex-Flanders leader, 
Paul de Mont, had indeed informed Van Zeeland during the months of August and 
September about Rex-VNV discussion, and the Prime Minister may even have responded 
favorably to the attempt at linguistic unification,67 but from there to endorsing an 
official ReI-VNV alliance is a far step. For an accord of the tva strongest extremist 
organizations in power was a serious danger to the. Belgian Parliamentary system. Rex 
claimed the pact.was the beginning of a cultural fed~ralism which would settle the age-
~. 
old differences 'between F1and~rs and Wallonie.68 VNV defined.Rex as Walloon 
65Degrelle, Le Message de Rex , p. 10; and Legros, p. 167. 
66Le Pays reel, Apr. 9,1936, as quoted by Etienne, p. 99. 
6 . 
?Legros, p. 203. 
68Writing sometime between April and June, 1937, Pierre Daye seems truly optimistic 
about the prospect of unity. He claims that VNV has finally come around to the idea of 
"l'unite nationale beIge, qu'ils avaient souvent refetee jusqu'alors, et ont admis de ne 
plus mettre en cause la monarchie." He is confident that "ce probleme ... semble done 
resolu." [Daye, p . 180.1 One wonders how he could realty believe that VNVwould 
surrender its Flemish nationalism so easily. 
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nationalist (which it was not) and, therefore, compatible in the fight for nationalist 
autonomy.69 Rex, surprisingly, accepted to turn Rex-Flanders over to VNV in the near 
future; VNV accepted Rex's federalism, while affirming that,this did not negate the 
concept of a Dietsland. the GroBdeutschland of the Flemish (though the contradiction is 
blatant). 10 
In actuality, the purpose of the pact was more to keep mutual tabs on each other 
than to from a working partnership. VNV nationalism was simply contradictory in 
every way to Rexist nationalism, and neither party was willing to budge from its stance. 
Their only commonality was their ardent, violent anti-communism, anti-establishment 
and authoritarianism. Yet, within this context, they were vying for power. True, 
acting together, they could form more of a block against, both, the three traditional 
parties and the Communists in Parliament, but they had been voting the same way all 
along anyway,and 37 deputes against 17:5 was no better than 21 or16 against 17:5.11 But, 
if they were officially working together, then they could make sure the other did not 
get out of line; VNV, especially, could slowly recoup its sale control of rightist extremist 
opinion in Flanders. Fortunately, the agreement existed only in theory and lasted 
barely a year. On June 2', 1937; Star De Clercq, leader of VNV, wrote in his newspaper 
Volk en Staat that, though he still respected Rex and its leader, he had been misled by 
DegreUe's overtures, that Rex was not going to support Flemish political autonomy, and 
" , 
that, therefore, the agreement vas useleSs.?2 Rex's political ploy had once again failed. . . . ~ 
But Degrelle didn't giv~ up. Instead, he decided to assemble 250,000 RElxists in 
Brussels in a great propagandistic show of force. On October 22, however, three days 
69Etienne, p. 99-100. 
10Etienne, p. 100. 
11Etienne, p. 101. Daye stresses this aspect of the pact. Rex wanted an enforced, anti-
Marxist Right against a coalesced Left (Rex defined all non-Right parties as Left). With 
an alliance with VNV, it hoped to achieve that end. "De cette maniere, Ie pays serait 
rentre, par un detour assez inattendu, dans la vraie conception pariementaire: deux 
partis seulement, Ie Gouvernement etl'Opposition ... " (Daye, p. 187-881. 
?2As quoted in Etienne, p. 101. 
70 
before the appointed day, the meeting was forbidden by the government.?3 In his 
usual stubborn way, Degrelle simply ignored the decree and called for the meeting to 
take place, as planned. Only, now, he ordered all Rexists to calmly and quietly join the 
rest of the ceremo'ny at the tomb of the unknown soldier -- it being the day of 
commemoration for the WWI battle on the Yser river -- and to then attend the 
scheduled mass at the St. Gudule cathedral. It certainly was calm and quiet at first, for 
on October 25 only 3,000 to 5,000 showed up at the tomb.?4 At the end of the mass, 
however, some fighting broke out as Degrelle, perched out of a high-up window in a ' 
building opposite the cathedral (draped with a large Rexist flag, no less) encouraged 
his followers down in the street to resist police attempts to disperse them. Rexists and 
anti-Rexists blew the whole incident out of proportion. Le Pays reel wrote that the 
police had been brutal and that M. de Gronne had been "egorge," when he had only 
been slightly scratched. The other side nick-named the Rexist meeting the '~marche 
sur Btuxelles," an allusion to both Hitler's and Mussolini's marches.?; At any rate, the 
demonstration to end all demonstrations resulted only in Rex being mocked at, once 
again, by the entire country. At this point, the only way Rex could save face was by 
returning to the one tactic that was guaranteed to work: speech-making. 
?3Etienne, p. 119-21: and Legros, p. 189. , ~ 
14250,000 waS, in any case', a ~ta11y unrealistic number: perhaps, again. only a figment 
of DegreUe's over-zealous imagination. 
?5Etienne, p. 120. DegreUe claims that general Chardonne of the great Chasseur 
ardennais had written him a note a few days before the event and had offered his 
troops in support of a coup d'etat. Since, according to Degrelle, "presque tous les 
gendarmes etaient rexistes; quatre-vingt-dix pour cent au moins l'etaient. comme 
presque toute l'armee retait" (extremely doubtful. in light of the fact that the army was 
most loyal to the king and that the ling was in no way a supporter of Rex). success 
seemed possible. Yet, peace-loving as he claims he then was, Degrelle refused, for 
"c'etaint dans la legalite et Ie libre consentement du peuple que je voulais gagner. 
Jetais sOr de Ie convaincre et de me hisser au pouvoir porte par lui. Pourquoi recourir 
ala force materielle alors que je disposais de la force supreme, celle de la conviciton?" 
[Charlier, p. 1371. 
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Degrelle seemed to realize this -- at least for a while -- and started into 
marathons of speeches, such as Les Six lours de Rex,76 which were a tremendous 
success. But the thirst for greater things quickly drew him back to secret dealings and 
political moves. Degrelle claims that. once Rex was in Parliament. he had begun 
fostering a close relationship with the two leaders of the Right in Flanders and 
Wallonie, respectively. Gustave Sap was well respected among Flemish nationalist 
circles as director of the popular Flemish newspaper Sta.ndaard.77 And Comte 
d'Aspremont-Unden was. in Degrelle's words, "Ie grand chef morale de la Droite 
conservatrice" in Wallon'ie.78 Together with Degrelle, they apparently worked 0.0. 
preparing the country and Parliament for a smooth take-over by Rex. Though one 
must be wary of Degrelle's retrospective interpretations of events, it is obvious that by 
Spring 1937 he had gained enough confidence in his ability to conquer to put the legal 
putsch plan into action. 
- , 
0.0. March 7,1937, Le Pays reel announced that the Rexist depute from Brussels, 
M. Alfred Olivier, and all his seconds had resigned, and that Degrelle would run in their 
place.79 The Rexist chef wanted to use the elections asa referendum ofRex's 
popularity, or so he said (one might speculate on his personal intentions in putting 
h.imself up for elec~ons after having sworn off Parliamentary life):80 
C'est parce que'je sentais que je tenais les atouts en main, malgre la 
campagne feroce que menait 'con'tre moi Ie regime tout entier, que 
je decidai au printemps de 1937 de lo1cher mes chien.5, de braver Ie 
r.egi~e lui-m6me et de provoquer, par un 'coup de theatre une espece "'\. 
de rUerendum national. Referendum veut dire consultation popu-
16See below, chapter 0.0. Degrelle as orator. for details 0.0. this series of orations. 
11Charlier, p. 141. 
18Charlier, p. 142. 
19Wim D3.nnau, Ainsi Pacia Leon Degrelle (Strombeek-Bever, Editions Byblos s.p.r.l., 
1973),vol. V, p. 135. At the time, seconds were elected to the legislature at the same time 
as representatives, so that, if the depute should for some reason leave his post, his 
second would take his place. Frequent and troublesome elections could thus be avoided. 
80Dannau, vol. V, p. 135 . See discussion 0.0. this issue below, i;l1 the chapter on Degrelle. 
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laire. Done democratie. Done legalite.81 
DegreUe saw the capital as "Ie coeur. Ie pouls. la voix du pays;" whatever it thought. the 
country thought.82 How Rex could realistically think that it could win -- "nous etions 
convaincus de gagner," recollects Degrelle -- or even give a good showing is hard to 
understand.83 Several unexpected occurances did work against it, however. First of all. 
Degrelle had gone in expecting to be opposed by three different candidates, one from 
each of the three big parties. Yet, in a Parliamentary session at the end of February, 
the three parties, as well as the Communists (Degrelle claims they instigated the whole 
thing), all endorsed the same candidate, Prime Minister Van Zeeland, also a lively and 
competent speaker.84 Degrelle rode over this first blow and launched into one of the 
fiercest campaigns in Belgian history so far. For, since 1936. Rexlst tactics were no 
longer novel. andanti-Rexists knew that the only way to combat Rex was on equal 
footing; that is, by engaging in the same kinds of confrontational and. sometimes. 
violent campaign strategies that Rex used. Both sides, therefore, held meetings 
(Degrelle did another marathon of oratory with Les Huits jours de Rex. i.e. eight days of 
attacks on the government, from Apri14 to April I! ). distributed posters all over the 
city. and used the press to its utmost possibilities. Trying in vain to stay ahead in the 
propaganda part of it, Rex used mocking and joke-making as a tool-- a return to the 
pranks of L~uvain days. It even put up mock anti-Rexist poster~. with lines like. 
'~Camarades! Restez toujours fideles a votre programme ... La dictature du proletariat doit 
"'\. 
·6t.re instauree, tous a l'action.lriomphe de 1'Internationale communiste ... Contre Ie 
patriotard Degrelle, votez Van Zeel~nd."8' A further hindrance came on April 9. when. 
in response to DegreUe's statement on April 7 that if Malines (th.e seat of the cardinal) 
81 Charlier. p. 143. 
82Charlier, p.143. 
83Dannau. vol. V. p. 139. 
84Charlie:r. p. 144. 
8'Dannau. vol. V. p. 141. 
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was against Rex it wO.uld have already said so. Cardinal Van Roey forbad all Catholics 
from either voting for Rex 01' not voting at all.86 This was essentially the last turn of 
the sword for Degrelle. for. Catholic as it was. Belgium was not going to go against its 
cardinal's word. 
On April 11.1937. Van Zeeland won an overwhelming victory. carrying 275.880 
(75.89%) out of 363A40 votes cast. Degrelle came away with 69.242, 01' 19.0,% of the vote 
-- the figure including Rex and VNV supporters, who had formed a coalition for th~ 
election. In additio.n, 18.358 blank votes were' cast. As compared to 1936. when Rex had 
obtained 53,382 vo~es in Brussels. Rex actually gained in 1937. But now that VNV was . 
included in the count, we must make the comparison to Rex plus VNV in 1936. i.e. some 
75,000 votes. In that light, 1937 represented a loss of about 6,000 votes.81 This may not 
seem very much, as, in fact, it wasn't, but in the context of Rex's expectations. it was 
significant. Rex had not only not won. it had actually lost voices. The referendum had 
ended up being a referendum 1n favor of the traditional democratic parties. and not of 
Rex. 
The reasons for Rex's defeat included not only the single opposition candidate 
and the cardinal's declaration. but, also, Rex's new style of propaganda. Belgians did 
not appreciate the mocking and, instead. found the lack of seriousness valid 'proof that 
Rex was not Parliamentary material.88 The fiasco of the October 25 gathering, the 
\ 
discovery that Degrelle had secretly met with Hitler end of September 1936 (even 
. . ~ 
though nothing important ca.nle ou~ of the encounter)89, as well as the Rex-VNV pact 
which suddenly put two very authoritarian groups in alliance, alienated possible Rexist 
supporters. Degrelle alone had not suffered a blow. his whole movement had. 
86£tienne, p.137. 
81£tienne, p.137-38 & chart on p. 178. 
88£tienne, p.139. 
89£tienne, p. 111. 
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Rex, of courSe, tried to get beyond the defeat as soon as possible. An article by 
Degrelle in Le Pays reel was entitled "Le 'Moustique' n'a pas ete ecrase! REX, renforce 
par cette lutte titanesque, va repartir a l'assaut, plus ardent que jamais."90 Yet the 
situation could not be reversed. The failure of the staged elections marked the 
beginning of the fourth and final pre-war phase of Rex. Rex had been defeated a first 
time and, from then on, would lose more and more support. 
In November, 1936, after an appar~nt personal argument with Degrelle, Robert 
de Vroyla.nde du Bois, a past chief editor of Rex, left the movement. The ex-Rexist's 
rebuttle to Degrelle and to an anonymous article published in. the November 10, 1936 
issue of La Pays reel which made all sorts of outrageous accusations against him, was 
cruelly sarcastic.91 In a pamphlet appearing shortly after his resignation, he 
described Degrelle this way: 
On sait que ce glorieux individu ... ne se sent a l'aise que dans Ie purin 
qu'il deverse a. jet continu sur taus ceux qui ont commis l'impardon-
nable crime de ne pas Ie considerer comme un' comprime de toutes les 
perfections imaginables.92 
Similarly, Xavier de Grunne, a Rexist senator, separated himself from the movement on 
December 10,1937. His reasons for leaving, however, were more personal than anti-
Rexist. De Grunne had made declarations against Parliament which were not in line 
with Rexist doctrine, and Degrelle and he both decided that it would be better if he 
broke off from the movement.93 He did>however, continue to serve in Parliament as 
an ind~pe~dent senator (without party affiliation), and remained an outside s;)pporter 
. . 
afRex until the war. Raphael Sindic, on the other hand, left Rex in anger in 1939. In 
90As quoted in Dannau, vol. 5, p. 228-29. 
91Robert de Vroylande du Bois, Leon Degrelle Pourri (Louvain, Les Editions Lovanis. 
1936) 
92de Vroylande, p. 11. 
93Xavier de Grunne,Pourquoi je suis s6par6 de Rex? (Wesembeek-Ophem, X. De Grunne , 
1937) 
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his pamphlet stating the reasons for his resignation, he wrote about disorder ~d lies 
within the movement: 
I1 regne a Rex une atmosphere trouble, faite de mystere, de duplicite, 
d'intriges et de mensonges, atmosphere a laquelie on risque de s'habi-
tuer a la longue, mais qui est empoisollnante pour ceux dont les 
poumons manquent d'habitude.94 
Although in his introduction he did afrum that the tract 'Was not a personal attack 
against the Rexist leader.95 he did accuse Degrelie, especially, of usurping and wasting 
Rexist funds and Rexist supporters. wlio 'Went out on a limb to earn these funds; of 
inconsistency in his doctrines, or, rather" of having no real doctrines atali and only 
beliefs which fluctuated with public opinion; of entering avidly into politics, ~ter 
declaring that Rex 'Was apolitical; of ruining the movement's possibilities of achieving 
its original ideal; and, finally, of striving for personal dictatorship. "M. Degrelie veut 
une dictature persannelie, sans programme bien d6fini. capable de s'adapter au jour Ie 
jour aux circonstances qui se presenteront."96 
By 1939, then. Rex had been rejected. not only by enemies, but also by former 
friends. Degrelle had become too dictatorial, it seemed. and the origillal ideologies of 
the movement had disappeared under a storm of accusations against whoever came in 
the 'Way and under a fury of propaganda. By 1939, Rex seemed to act more for Rex as an 
end in i~lf. than for Rex as a means to'Ward moral reform and national unity. As a 
result, those 'Who had believed in Rex the,first time round. in 1936, and those 'Who had 
tried to believe in Rex again, i~ 1937, found that Rex 'Was not "follo'Wing its inte~tions 
after ali. In local elections on October 18. 1938, though the three big parties had lost 
votes as compared to 1932 elections, Rex, responsible for the losses, had nevertheless 
already received considerably fewer votes than in 1936 (a drop from 18.72% to 10.90% 
in Brussels, for instance) . In the Apri12, 19391egislative elections, Degrelle finally 
94Raphael Sindic, Pourguoi je Quitte REX (Bruxelles, Editions du Sanglier, 1939), p. 3. 
9'Sindic, p. 2. 
96S' d' 8 in lC, p .. 
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received a seat as d6put6 for Brussels, but Rex, in general, sunk into near invisibility. 
What few faithfuls remained returned 103,821 votes out of 2.338,437 cast, only 4,43 %, as 
compared to the 11,49 % of four years before. Parliament now held four Rexist d6putes ' 
and four Rexist senators (as opposed to 21 deput6s and 12 senators in 1936). 
As war became immjnent. Rex supported the king's reaffirmation of Belgian 
neutrality and constantly objected to seeming tendencies towards alliances with the 
allies against Germany. For Rex, neutralism was to be of the strictest kind, for only 
thus would invasion by either side be prevented. Neutralism, however, quickly 
- . 
changed to passivism after Reich troops enter Belgian territory on May 10, 1940 (an 
event which surprised Rexists greatly, for they had firmly believed that neutralism 
would keep the peace). During the entire eighteen-day military campaign against the 
Germans. Rex kept demanding surrender to the invading forces, which, it declared, 
could never be overcome anyway. By August 1940 when Degrelle. miraculously 
returned alive from imprisonment in France. got permission to start up Le Pays reel 
again, passivity, in turn, became collaboration. For the -next four years, Degrelle and 
Rex, though slowly drawing apart. would each in their own way work closer and closer 
with Nazi occupation forces . In 1944, DegreUe would be honored with the Ritterkreuz 
and would be complemented by Hitler with "Si j'avais un fils, je l'aurais aime tel que 
vous."9? 
" 
The story of this collaboration must be left to a separate work.98 
9?Etienne, p. 171. 
98M. Martin Conway of Oxford University, Oxford, England, is presently writi.ng a 




As I have discussed in the last chapter, phase four of the Rexist. movement 
began with the 1937 elections. Rex in this period was not only fading fast and far, but 
Degrelle was sepa.ra.ting himself more and more from the movement. There were 
specific reasons for this: his background, his character. his personal ambitions. It is 
necessary. therefore. to take a look at where the formost Rexist leader came from. what 
he was like. and what were his goals. This chapter is a brief window into Degrelle as a 
person, as a politician. an orator. and a writer. 
BiogGphical chronoloav: 
Leon Degrelle was born on June 15. 1906 to a middle-class family of comfortable 
means in the southern Belgian town of Bouillon. He was the fourth of eight children 
(the eldest son having died before Leon's birth) and was named after his paternal 
grandfather. The Degrelle family can be traced back to the 16th century Ardennes. 
bordering between France and Belgium. Leon's branch of the family had moved to 
Gonrieux. then to Solre-le-Chiteau. near Maubeuge, France. in the 1800s. before 
Edouard, his father, set up shop as a brewer to the chiteau of Bouillon and became a 
Belgian citizen -- the family had, until then, always been citizens of France. On June 12, 
1895; Edouard married Marie Boever, from Laroche, on the Luxembourg side of the 
Moselle river. Mme. Boever-Degrelle c~e from a long line of doctors -- respected 
citizens of the community -- and her own father had long been -involved in ~local 
I 
Catholic Party: at first, in campaigns against liberalism in the late 1870s, and then, as 
head of the local Party organization.1 His position would later on greatly influence the 
young Leon. Degrelle describes his father as a well-off, yet modest and honest man; 
like others, 
1 Usmard Legros, Un homme. un chef. Leon Degrelle (BruxeHes, Editions Rex, 1938), 
p.28. 
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Lm]on pere 6tait un bourgeois, et Ie notaire ou Ie m6decin etaient 
des bourgeois. Mais ils saluaient en passant devant leur porte Ie 
forgeron et Ie tanneur, parce que Ie forgeron et Ie taD.neur, comme 
eUI, gagnaient leur vie, et avaient beaucoup d'enfants, ils etaient 
honn~tes et travailleurs.2 
So the young L60n grew up in a stable environment, with, undoubtedly, a 
considerable amount of attention paid to him - since he vas the oldest son -- but 
attention limited by the rules of strict Catholic upbringing. Indeed, not only did he 
attend primary school at the CoUege diocesain de Bouillon, run by secular priests, but 
his mother brought all her children to mass every morning and held daily evening 
prayers at ~ome before the family statue of the Virgin Mary.S The boy's early 
education was only briefly interrupted by the Great War. In 1914, as the German 
armies were moving across Belgium, the Degrelle family (and most of the rest of 
Bouillon) fled across the border to Sedan, only to return to. their native town when the 
French city began to be attacked itself. Degrelle later recounted in rather elaborate 
(and, often, gruesome) detail his impressions of the flight south and the four year 
occupation.4 As a quiet and meditative eight-year-old boy, the experience was 
obviously quite shocking and memorable, though life soon returned to more normal 
conditions, as he continued the daily school routine.5 At twelve, he switched to the 
Institut Saint-Pierre, in Bouillon, and, at fifteen, was sent off to the Jesuit College de 
Notre-Dame-de- la-Paix at Namur, 91 kilometers ~o~th of Bouillon. Having always been 
, 
somewhat. unhappy at school. the young Degrelle soon found comfort in his literary 
. . ~ 
exploits at. the College. He read avidly -- even secreUy.late into the night, with the. 
help of a flashlight and a blanket, says Pierre Daye -- and excelled especially in 
2Leon Degrelle, as quoted by Brassillach. Leon Degrelle et l'avenir de Rex (Paris. 
Librairie Pion. 1936). p. 478. 
3Legros. p. 33-42 
4Pierre Daye mentions this unpublished work, written in Degrelle's adolescence, in his 
Leon Degrelle et Ie rexisme (Paris, A.Fayard et Cie., 1937), p. 35-46. 
'Legros, p. 33-42. 
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rhetoric. perhaps already a sign of his future career.6 His peers and teachers didn't 
think favorably of him. yet nevertheless stood in awe of him: "Ils raiment peu 
pourta.nt. car iIs sont deconcertes par son caractere si entier. Eleve espiegle, vif. 
spirituel. it agace parfois et fascine toujours par sa. facilite et son abondance 
litteraires."? Degrelle completed his second latine (roughly equivalent to our 
secondary school) and decided to stay an extra year in Namur. in order to get his 
candidature en ohilosoohie et lettres. Unfortunately. the end of the year did not bring 
him success. After failing his candidature exam. he opted for a drastic move and 
enrolled himself at Louvain university to prepare for a doctorate in law . He 
successfully finished his first three years of study there. passing exams for philosophy 
and letters, art and archeology. and philosophy according to Saint Thomas. 8 After this 
initial sucess. however. he nevertheless failed to complete his degree. though this time 
because of extra-curricular activities. 
No matter how applied a student Degrelle was. his efforts were usually diverted 
to some sort of journalism. Writing had been one of his favored pastime from early on . 
As an adolescent. he had had several pieces published in various journals. including a 
reflective one about All Souls' Day in L'Avenir du Luxembourg. a conservative journal 
begun parUy under the auspices of his mate~nal grandfather.9 It is at Louvain. 
however. that his writing career really took off. Soon after entering the university. he 
'\ 
had joined Nouvelle '£guipe. a writer's group directed by Yvan Lenain, and had become 
~. 
6 . Daye, p. -49. 
i'Legros.p. -43. Rexist biographers of Degrelle disagree on the leader's psychological 
state while in Namur. Daye writes that the Bouillon student was prone to frequent and 
severe depreSSions. Legros. on the other had. refutes these and says that they were 
only usual. adolescent crises. out of which. and with the help of his strong religious 
faith. Degrelle always managed to lift himself: " .. .les traits dominants de sa nature 
etaient la joie et la volonte," [Legros. p. 16.1 One wonders why neither of them ever 
ventured to· ask Degrelle himself; after all. he was alive at the writings. At any rate. 
both authors characterize the student as a loner in his thoughts. however happy or 
melancholic they may have been. 
SDaye. p. 50-51. 
9Legros. p .50. 
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its secretary. Around 1927, Degre11e also began supporting himself by writing at n'trIe 
Sieele, a we11-known Catholic journal with offices in Brussels. (He would continue to do 
so until he became head of his own publishing house at the AClBJ More importanUy, 
in 1927, he became director of the student newspaper, L'Avant-Garde, and launched his 
career not only as a prolific and regularly-published journalist, but also as a leader -- a 
career which would continue to develop, first, at the Cahiers de la Ieunesse Catholique 
(Giovannni Hoyois, director). then, at Les Editions Rex (AClB) and Les Presses de Rex. 
Though a loner as a child, immersed in whatever books he could get his hands 
on, Degrelle had aJ.ways had visions of himself as a leader of social cha;nge. "En outre, 
la justice saciale vivait en moi parce que vivait en moi la passion de 1a justice tout court 
et l'eian vers la fraternite que Ie Christ a apportee aux hommes," 1 0 Indeed, he had 
developed his ideas on how to bring about such changes from early on, and he waited 
only for the right moment to declare them to the world around him and to put them into 
action, An opportunity for the first arose when he began writing for the journal n'-
Sieele and, specifically, when they publishe.d his series of articles on "Les Taudis" in 
1929. While exposing the sometimes horrendous conditions of worker slums in several 
prominent Belgian towns, he also articulated some of his theories on social change,l1 
Established political parties weren't paying attention to the workers, he argued, and the 
Catholic Church was too closely tied to political and capitalist powers -- especially those 
'\ 
in the Catholic Party, even if technically distinct from the Church -- to be trusted by 
- , 
the workers, ' It was no wonde~, therefore, that most of them lived "en dehors de toute 
vie spirituelle,"12 Yet, if anything, it was religion which would make the difference, It 
was up to Christianity to turn the situation around. to bring back the faith in a mystical 
10 Jean-Michel Charlier, Leon Degrelle: Persiste et signe: interviews recueillies pour la 
television francaise par Jean-Michel CharHer (Paris, Jean Picollec, 1985). p . 65. 
11 Because I was unable to get hold of a copy of "Les Taudis," I am relying on my other 
readings for information as to its contents, 
12Leon Degrel1e. as quoted in Charlier. p, 58 . 
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and awe-inspiring religion to the Belgian people; though, a Christianity emanating not 
directly from the Church, but, rather, from her lay activists: 
La religion devait redevenir pure,' se liberer de ses compromissions, 
ramener tout a sa mission strictement divine. C'etalt aux lalcs chre-
tiens a retrousser leurs manches pour petrir la p4te temporelle.13 
Degrelle's strong Christian upbringing and education undoubtedly steared him 
towards this goal, but it was Mgr. Picard and the AClB which transformed a vague 
intent into real action. · In a relationship of student-teacher with the chaplain, he was 
~ght that social change through Christianity and lay action meant Catholic action, 
- , 
His months at the Cahiers de la Ieunesse Catholigue gave him the opportunity to refine 
his rhetoric of social change under close pedagogic supervision. Yet the supervision 
did not prevent him from pursuing his own visions at the same time. By 1928-1929, his 
purely apostolic career had acq~ired more and more political characteristics. As he 
himself declared, 
Avingt ans, je voulais, je 1'ai dit, je Ie repete, me vou'er totaieinent 
a une vie d'apOtre.l Mais ma situation etalt deja, quand meme, assez 
compliquee parce que ma vie apostolique etait melee aussi -- que je 
Ie voulusse ou non -- a un certain nombre de positions extra-
religieuses.14 . 
This may be so, but however much the infringement of politics on his religious mission 
seemed inevitable, DegreJIe atso deliberately 'brought on politization of his actions. His 
attacks on politicians in "Les Taudis" -verecertainly intentional, as were those on the 
" 
Mexican leftist regime. The story of the latter is interesting as a case study. 
"'\. 
• • I 
In 1929, a year after President Obreg6n had been assassinated, Degrelle wrote an 
article for ~ Siec1e denouncing the cruel treatment ofCatholic5 by the Mexican 
government and praising the act of the assassin: "A chaque nouveau Torral, nous nOU5 
ecrierons de tout notre coeur: bravo!"15 This, of course, caused a scandal among leftist 
13Charlier, p. ')0. 
14Charlier, p. 6"1. 
1 'Jean-Michel Etienne, Le Mouvement rexiste jusgy'en 1910 (Paris, Librairie Armand 
Colin, 1968), p. 13. 
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circles in Belgium and Degrelle was challenged to go see for himself. Unexpectedly. 
perhaps, but with determination. Degrelle did set out at the end of the year for Central 
America (using a pseudonym for safety, Paul Nanson, a 28 year old doctor).16 One may 
well ask just what his actual motives were in acknowledging the challenge. Was it 
adventure that sent him on his way? VI as it his Christian faith? Was it a political" move? 
All three seemed to have played a role, though the first two served as base for the third. 
Degrelle yearned for the new, for the exciting; and, as a strong believer, he felt a bond 
of brotherhood with the oppressed Mexican Catholics. But, most of all, he had visions of 
himself saving the world. 
, 
Nous serions bien tOt, nous, jeunes revolutionnnaires de 1'Europe 
qui naissait, les porteurs du veritable socialisme, recon citian t l' ordre 
indispensable de 1'Etat et la justice sociale, dans la collaboration des 
c.lasses a.rtificiellement et criminellement dressees l'une contre 
l'autre par Ie marxisme et, tout autant, par l'hypercapitalisme.17 
Degrelle probably saw himself as the new conqueror of Marxist evils. An investigatory 
trip to Mexico, commissioned by a leading Catholic newspaper -- u'rrw Siecle (the 
Italian newspaper, L'Avenire d'Italia, also paid him in advance for articles) -- could 
only enhance his chances at making a name for himself within the Catholic world. 
Thus, with a f~ade of active faith (a f~ade which, granted. had its genuine 
counterparts on the inside) and with a longing for thrilling adventure. Degrelle's 
16Etienne,. p. 13. Legros, p. 95. He is the~ supposed to have received two grants fQr 
translation of his no"tes on Me~ico in English and Spanish, respectively. The llJnds he 
collected he used for a speedy sight-seeing trip north through the United States and 
into Canada. [Degrelle, Mes Aventures au Mexigue (Louvain, Editions Rex. 1933), p. 80-
811 Though most historians of Rex note this trip, Martin Conway, a present-day 
historian of the movement, doubts it ever took place. His argument is supported by th!, 
fact that no specific references to the journals who published the articles have ever 
been found. [Letter from Martin Conway to me, dated 17 Feb .. 1987]. 
17Charlier. p. 48. One must be careful not to assign Degrelle's later theories on these 
early events, for. no matter how much he has convinced himself that his ideas 
remained unchanged from day one. they did evolve over time. Thus, what he recalls 
may not actually have occured exactly as he thinks. Here, however, I think one can 
safely assume that his dreams of a youthful world-changing revolution had. at least 
vaguely. already emerged at an early age. These would later become more refined. as 
they became more specific and inflammatory. 
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hopes for recognition could become true. Apostolicism was certainly no longer the 
only purpose he had in lire. 
Back in Louvaill in early spring 1930, Degrelle's apostolic-political career 
received a big push from his appointment as director of Les Editions Rex (though his 
education suffered, since, after passing the first exam for his doctorate in law, he failed 
the second and never bothered to retake it>.iS Here, finally, was the chance he had 
been waiting for to let the world know about his theories for social change. The 
relationship with Mgr. Picard now transformed itself into a true partnership, with 
Picard as director of the entire ACjB organization and Degrelle as director of its branch 
of propaganda. Equipped with refined theories and rhetoric, as well as a founding base 
of co-workers and co-believers (drawn from L'Avant-Garde days and Cahiers writers), 
Degrelle vas ready to become a leader of social change.19 As head of his ovn 
institution, he certainly exercized much control. yet this control was still qualified by 
ACjB rules; that is, the purpose of propaganda was apostolic. Involvement in politics 
was alloved only for religious purposes. 
Ce qui importe, disait-illDegrellel. c'est de s'int6resser aux proble-
mes politiques de chez nous, d'etudier, d'assurer la penetration 
chr6tienne dans Ie pays et les mesures a. prendre pour assurer Ie 
redressement material et moral d'une Patrie que la Charite et la 
Justice nous imposent d'aimer et de servir.20 
This was not an alien phenomenon to Degrelle, and apostolicism remained an integral 
part of his theorization throughout the pre-var period. However, the weight,it carried 
~ 
in relation to 'politics in the miSsion for social transformation changed over time , 
Before 193<{, apostolicism held a higher position in Degrelle's mind than politization. 
The books he published were on rather subdued subjects, and, if political, not 
18Etienne limits Degrelle's trip to about one month, January-February 1930. In Mes 
Aventures au Mexique, however, Degrelle writes about three months in Mexico, 
folloved by unspecified weeks in the north American continent. [Degre11e, p. 80-81 J 
19Future Rexists already at the Cahiers included men like Albert Fasbender, Georges 
Buquet, Charles d'Ydewalle, and Jean Denis. [Legros, p. 80-811. 
20Degre11e, as quoted by Legros, p. 82-23. 
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outrighUy so. I.n 1930. for instance. he compiled a, short volume on his experiences at 
Louvain and at L'Avant-Garde in Les grandes farces de Louvain. Here. he continued his 
presentation, begun earlier in leunes plumes et vieilles barbes de Belgique, of the 
many pranks andjokes he and his companions engaged in as students.21 Though the 
anecdotes included attacks on various politicians. the intent and main body of the b?ok 
",as not expliciUy political. Even his travel analogue on Mexico avoided any thought-
out attacks on the goverment.22 It is more a romantization of "'hat must have been a 
not all too lu~rious trip than a political tre~se on the evils of Marxism and the glories 
of Catholicism. Degrelle also kept the journal Rfi. more apostolic than political. Before ' 
1934. the tiUes varied between Rex: Toute la Vie des Lettres and Rex: Toute la Vie des 
Catholigues. Rexist propagandists were emphatically reminded: 
N' oubliez pas non plus que votre premiere arme, votre grande 
arme, est Ii priere.! Chaque matin, Ie propagandiste de Rn doit 
demander a Dieu de benir son travail et tout notre mouvement.! 
Soyez tiers de votre mission. Vous collaborez a Une oeuvre qui ne 
veut que la rechristianisation de la Belgique. Vous etes les ouvriers 
de 1a premiere heure et des temps difficiles; vous etes, par excel-
lence, des apOtres modernes ... 23 
Whereas before 1934. Rex was a tool of the ACjB, after the split. it vas a tool for 
itself. Propagandists nov spread not only the Catholic Word, but also the Rexist Word. 
The message to the troops vas different: " ... Tout ancien militant de l' A.C.J;B. doit etre 
membre actif des organismes d' Action'Catholique existants. Mais EN MEME TEMPS [sic J it 
" 
doit etre 'de Rex'."24 Degrelle was nov h~ad not only of a publishing house, but also of 
"\ 
a nev movement -- for, as outlined 'above (chapter one), by 1934, Rex had become a 
movement. Once released from the confines of the ACjB; Degrelle freely politicized his 
movetitent until, at Courtrai, he openly declared it political. By 1935, the balance had 
21 Leon Degrelle. feunes olumes et vieiHes barbes de Belgigues <louvain.l'Avant-
Garde, 1928) 
22Leon Degrelle. Mes Aventures au Mexigue <Louvain. Editions Rex, 1933) 
23Amand Geradin. "Coin des propagandistes." in Rn. no. 22, Sept. 9.1933. p. 14. 
24ReneJurant, Jean Denis, Roger Saussus. "Aux anciens de l'A.C.J,B: Pourquoi. nous vos 
anciens dirigeants. no us sommes Rexistes," in Rn. no. 40, Oct. 12. 1934. p. 9. 
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most definitely been tipped. Cou.rtra.i marked the end of the supremacy of apostolicism 
and the beginning of the supremacy of politics in DegreUe's theories on social change. 
Politics was no longer limited to religious issues. Politics was engaged in for the sake of 
politics -- Rexist politics. 
In these early political stages, Degrelle saw himself primarily as leader of a 
movement, not as politician per ~ This is why he chose not to run for election in 1936. 
He wanted to direct the stage from above and remain outside the petty workings of the 
Parliamentary system. 
Pour Ie redressement total, il taut la mobilisation de l'opinion 
publique.! C'est la que REX [sic J veut faire la grande et salutaire 
besogne. C'est la qu'est la v6ritable offensive.! Et c'est pour cela 
que j'ai voulu rester moi-meme a ce poste capital et essen tiel du 
combat, laiSS3.11t sur Ie front partiel et momentane du Parlement 
un groupe de Rexistes sacrifies a l'avance. 25 
By 1937, however, he was willing to. thrown himself whole-heartedly into the political 
.scene. He wanted to direct from the inside. DegreUe had long been fascinated by the 
way Hitler "legally" came to power and secretly longed to do the s~e. He, too, thought 
he could get to the top by popular acclaim -- or, at least, make it appear so. The 1937 
election was certainly planned as a propaganda move for the Rexist party-movement in 
general, but it was also the next step for DegreUe. DegreUe was a tricky politician. He 
watched his career very closely, careful not to make too large steps too soon. As 
specific events occured~ he figured out exactly how they could serve his personal 
career. He wanted·to lead the' .q.ation. This was an extravagant goal, but one w~ch he 
seemed determined to reach. Looking back at this attempted "legal" coup, one might, at 
first, think that DegreUe had, once again, really played his cards right. AU odds 
pointed towards a close race, even when faced with one candidate, M. Van Zeeland, 
instead of the expected three, and it was only the Cardinal's -declaration ex cat11edra 
which ruined his chances, But. not only vas Van Zeeland an unusually charismatic 
2'Degrelle, as quoted by Jacques Saint-Germain, La BataiUe de Rex (Paris, __ , 1937). 
p.160-161. 
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politician. Degrelle.as £tienne so astutely points out, had also been too ambitious in his 
endeavor.26 He was not swept into power because he simply did not have the support. 
The ~any who had voted for his party in 1936 had believed in Rex's newness, in its 
promises. But. as the year went by. and Rexist rhetoric and propaganda contained only 
ridiculing of the establishment. -- "[pJolltiquement. Ie ridicule ~e toujours ... " -- only 
seditious attack after seditious attack. they lost faith. 21 Degrelle had miscalculated, 
had, indeed. made a fatal mistake. No matter how many thousands he might have 
attracted to his meetings. his personal popularity on these occasions could not win 
Brussels over to the Rex movement. Degrelle did not lose in 1937. his whole movement 
did. An.d though he was able to get a seat in Parliament in the 1939 general elections. 
this personal success did not imply a Rexist success. 
One might wonder just how much Rex ~ Degrelle. He did, of course, form the 
movement initially and did mold it, in its early years, according to his ideals. He made it 
political, Ja started it in Parliament, Jut tried to have it become the ru.ling party in 1937. 
Up to 1937, then, Degrelle was indeed Rex; his personal success m~ant the movement's 
success. Yet 1937 marked a turning point in the movement. For. I would argue, not 
only did it not collect the vote of confidence it had expected, but its leader, for the first 
time, put his own career before the movement's career. 1937 represented the point at 
which his personal ambition began taking over the movement's goals. Indeed, he had 
first wanted to reach ultimate power witiiin Parliament by getting himself elected to all 
- - ~ 
seats, one after the other (i.e. dnce elected, he would resign, and then run and get 
elected to the next seat, and resign. and so on until he could declare that he had the 
support of alD.28 Though this plan would never have worked -- and was just another 
example of Degrelle's "megalomanie," his lack of any sense of proportion -- it 
26£tienne. p.139. 
21Etienne, p. 139. 
28£tienne, p.133. 
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exemplifies his impatience for pet'Sonal power.29 In other words. after 1937. Degrelle 
was the leader of Rex. but Rex was Rex. the party-movement. and not synonymous vith 
Degrelle. Having reached a peak in its growth. the movement had developed an 
identity of its own. Its philosophies and rhetot'ic might still be those of its leader (as. in 
fact, they vere), but its life cout'Se would not puallel that of Degrelle's. 
The pattern of the movement's development was cyclic, and waS controlled by its 
leader only at the outset. Degrelle had created the movement in 1933-1934. Degrelle 
would recr~ate the movement after the plummetting of the 1939 elections and the 
turmoil of the outbreak of war. Then, once it had again reached a str~ngth of its own. it 
'Would branch off and evolve separately. unrelated to its founder's personal political 
developments. After 1941, Degrelle devoted all his energies to the Legion Wallonie and, 
purposely, it seems, ignored the movement back home. Having travelled the path from 
movement leader to political leader. he nov became military leader as well (or. rather, 
pt'imarily). At the end of the 'War, Degrelle and his movement vere condemned 
separately. He. as a collaborating military leader; it, that is, Rexist vartime leadet'S. as a 
collaborating movement. Both had run their cout'Se separately. The movement died out 
on its own. left 'Without support and leadet'Ship. 
(Degrelle lives a comfortable life in Spain. He owns a luxut'ious villa on a 




Degrel1e as orator: 
Everybody agrees that Degrelle vas a forceful speaker. In fact, it vas his 
speaking skills along vith his innovative propaganda techniques vhich really von 
him public recognition in 1935-36. Degrelle seems to have had the ability to entrance 
his audiences. Listening to the Rexist chef vas more like undergoing a religious 
29Etienne. p. 32. 
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conversion than attending an inteUectual or political lecture. In his introduction, 
Pierre Daye relates how he first met Leon DegreUe, when arranging a publishing 
contract with Les Presses de Rex in January 193'. The chief editor seemed like just 
another publisher. "Je Ie confesse, cette premiere rencontre avec Leon DegreUe n'a 
pas marque d'une f~on extraordlnaire dans ma memoire,"30 Three months later, 
however, Daye took his chances and went to hear the Rexist leader in his first big 
public meeting in Brussels, at the Cirque Royal (May 1. 193'). The results were 
astounding: "Cette fois, je m'en souviens, je me sentis impressionne. Quel feu dans la 
parole de ce jeune gar~on, queUe conviction, queUe force dans Ie raisonnement! Je 
sortis en chant6 ... " 31 Degrelle was an: actor and cerlainly had a way with words, though 
critics accused his speeches of having no worthwhile content. The New York Times 
made him out to be a kind of imcomprehensible nimcompoop: 
As he speaks, he gesticulates without any special relation to what 
he is saying, flinging his arms forward and backward and raising 
and lowering them in movements long practiced before mirrors .... 
He does not win his hearers by the soundness of what he says but 
captures their hearts with sentimentality.32 
Degrelle had obviously caught on to the importance of image-politics. 
The beginnings of Leon DegreUe's speaking career are almost synonymous with 
the beginnings of his political career. He ha~l. of course, often given stimulating _ 
speaches to his L'AYant-Garde colleagues, enticing them to their many farces. IDs first 
, 
public address, however, vas at Charleroi, in 1933, a rather minor speech in support of 
. '"\. 
several radio'stations whose air-time had suddenly been cut by the government. 3S In 
the ensuing months. Degrelle frequently stood before small groups of local Rexist 
supporters and educated them in a passionate voice about Christian morality and how 
SOnaye. p. 7-8. 
31naye, p. 8. 
32The Nev York Times, Jan . 25,1937, p. -4:6. Pierre Daye, of course, found perfect 
harmony with the speaker's gesticulations. "Quels gestes magnifiques, amples, facHes. 
justes! Eloquence l1aturel1e [sid avant tout." [Daye, p. 2-431. 
33Legros, p.117-118 . 
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Rex was going to rejuvinate it. In February 1934, he tried his luck in Brussels and spoke 
at a gathering of 1,000 at the "salle de la Madeleine" about a program of national 
reform.34 He planned the Charleroi meeting in October 1934 because he was 
encouraged by these small successes. What ended up in a fiasco was to have been the 
first meeting of a really magnanimous scale, where Degrelle's audience would suddenly 
have been enlarged from several hundred to several thousand listeners. This last event 
having failed, it was not until April 21, 193' that Rex managed to organize its own 
grand meeting -- at Namur, with F~ther Laffineur, on the theme "Catholiques, 
reveillez-vous," a phrase which appeared frequenUy in Rn before and after the 
meeting.35 On May 1, as Pierre Daye recounted (above), Degrelle moved into the capital 
once again, this time to rent the huge Cirque Royal and to speak, along- side Father 
Laffineur and the weU-known writer, Pierre Nothomb, on "Le salut du peuple."36 All 
4,000 places were sold. (Prices ranged from ,0 FB for reserved seats to 2 FB for aisle . 
seats or standing room.>3? The success of the event must have proven to Degrelle that 
he could now hold meetings on his own, without the crutch of such famous men like 
Nothomb, for, from then on, he was the only featured speaker at the great gatherings. 
From then on, also, as the meetings became more and more frequent and more and 
more elaborate, Degrelle's language became more and more flamboyant. Courtrai made 
him famous throughout the nation not only because of his clever engineering of 
manoeuvres (getting '300 followers infiltrated inot the hall) but also because of his 
"\ 
language. Huge crowds of Rexists and simply curious people now c~e to see and hear 
him. On November 11, 193', he rented Brussels' Palais des Sports, a building which 
34£tienne, p. 23. 
3'Usually, enclosed within a square of thick, dark lines, as, for instance. it appeared 
within an article by Mary Mace. 'Taction m~onnique," in Rex, no. 49. Dec . H. 1934, 
p.15. 
36£tienne. p. 27. 
31Legros, p. 142. 
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cquld hold at leaSt 12,000 people. As usual, Rex prepared for the great event with 
frequent advertisements, such as this one: 
Le 11 novembre aura lieu a. Bruxelles, au Palais des Sports, Ie plus 
formidable meeting que des catholiques auront jamais donne en 
Belgique. 11 groupera en effet 2'.000 auditeurs. Ce meeting geant 
sera signe: REX. Sujet: Debout, les vivantsl38 
The whole presentation was dramatic, as was the speaker's oratory. A military march 
served as prelude to his discourse. Then, when Socialist groups who had gotten in with 
false Rex cards (much as the Rexists had at Courtrai), began clamoring and playing 
their own "I.nternationale," he shouted o~t with vehemence but co~plete contz:-ol,. 
Si on croit nous empecher de parler ... on se trompe, un rexiste ne 
se 1aisse jamais vaincrel.."{And, after more disruption'] Je recom-
mencerai tant qu'll faudra. Nous resterons ici jusqu'au matin s'll 
Ie faut. Ceux qui veulent m'empecher de parler sont des hommes 
qui pretendent agir au nom de la liberte. Les perturbateurs qui 
veulent interrompre seront expulses 
(as, indeed. they were. by "gendarmes" and "service d'ordre).39 Following. came along 
eulogy to those dead Cor Belgiuoi.in the 1830 revolution. and a questioning of whether 
the ideals they had fought Cor had come true. 
Comment se Cait-il que Ie monde ne soit pas chretien. que la famille 
et la morale soient bafouees? [asked Degrelle. He concluded with] .... 
11 n 'y a aucune force au monde qui nous detournera de notre chemin 
parce que c'est pour la verite que no us luUons. Nous nous sommes 
juds de sauver notre peuple./ Nous sommas soutenus dans notre 
action dans tous les coins du pays. Rev~illez-vous si vous avez du 
sang d~s les veines.l Debout les vivantsr'0 
" 
It is undoubtedly this kind oC engaging' talk which attracted so many Belgians to 
, "'). 
I 
the new political Party in 1936 {and which. as the language became too violent, 
l8"Rex." no. 41. Oct. 11, 1935. p. 32 .. The 25.000 figure was obviously an exaggeration. 
The hall probably held from 12.000 to 15.000, and a few thousand more attempted to hear 
from outside. [Etienne. p. 123J. 
39 Jean Ladriere and Robert Pfeiffer, L'Aventure rexiste (Bruxelles, Pierre de Meyere, 
1966), p.36. The authors do not make c1earwhether the "gendarmes" and "service 
d'ordre" were the same thing. It appears that Rexist meetings were protected both by 
official police forces and by their own "troupes de choc." [Degrelle, as quoted by 
Ladriere and Pfeiffer, p. 371. 
40Ladriere and Pfeiffer, p. 38-39. 
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susequently sent many old or prospective Rexists away in 1937 and 1939). The Brussels 
meeting was followed by other such gatherings, until early 1937, when Degrelle found 
a new tactic, six meetings in a row! The Six lours de Rex. as they were named, took place 
again at the Palais des Sports and covered the expected, already iterated topics: "Les 
scan dales et la revolte des citoyens," "Rex reconstruira.l'Etat," "Justice sociale. Paix 
flamande," "La jeunesse. Les valeurs morales de l'Eglise," and "Au-dela des partis: la 
Patrie."41 As with the single meetings, these too filled the Patais and overflowed into 
the street outside.42 Whatever he did, Degrelle always seemed to manage to gather a 
crowd around him, whether of supporters or enemies. 
Theatrics characterized Rexist meetings. Audiences were seated in orderly rows 
of chairs, standing room was sectioned off so as not to block passageways. The hall was 
arrayed with large red, black and white Rexist flags and vas brightly illuminated by 
stage lamps. Banners carrying messages in French and Flemish strung the walls, e.g . 
. "Les parties, c'est la haine ..... or " ... Rex Vaincra'" Aisles vere kept clear by blue-
uniformed order-keeping forces, especially the central one, to allow the procession of 
the ~ a grand approach. Degrelle vould deliver his speeches from a podium several 
feet above the crOWd, standing, vith groups of his young supporters behind him. in 
order, at attention, Renst style (women on one side, men on the other, arms crossed, 
listening intently to their mentor).4! The leadervouldspeak forcefully, 
enthusiastically, actively. He would have a microphone at his disposal, though his 
"\. 
voice seemed to carry without it. To borrow from Daye again.vho admired Degrelle's 
oratorical mannerisms so much: 
41Ladriere and Pfeiffer, p. 84. The sixth evening vas given over to "Un magnifique 
gala artistique." lLadriere and Pfeiffer, p. 841. 
42Etienne, p. 123. 
43Tb,is d~scription is my interpretation of several photographs ofRexist meetings 
found in Degrelle and Denis, Rex. Renaissance de la Patrie (no page numbers). Though 
the plates are not dated, I think one can assume the format was the one employed from 
early stages on. The description, in m of the 1934 Charleroi meeting which never 
took place mirrors these pictures almost exactly. (See plate 7) . . 
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Des mots a. tout Ie monde, mais des traits tpres, ironiques, lances 
d'un organe sonore, metallique, si puissant qu'un jour ou, devant 
douze mille ~uditeurs, les fils des haut-parleurs avaient eta sabotes 
et coupes, Degrelle put continuer a. parler durant une heure sans 
que ron perdU, aUl derniers rangs, une syllabe de ce qu'll disait.44 
No matter haw accurate the description, it still gives an impression of what Degrelle 
must have sounded like; strong and authoritarian to those who liked him, violent and 
dangerous to critics. The forcefulness still remains today. Even when having a normal 
conversation, he speaks loudly, gruffly, to the point where it is almost unbearable to 
hear.45 
Degrelle as writer: 
Besides being an orator, Degrelle was, of course, chiefly a writer. His early, pre-
1936 writings cover a wide variety of subjects, with Belgium as the only common 
denominator. In 1928, while still at L'Avant-Garde. he published both Les flam in gants 
and Ieunes plumes et vieiUes barbes de Belgique. The first stressed the need for mutual 
understanding between the historically antagonistic cultural communities of Belgium. 
The second, on the other hand, was a comical representation of the student journalists 
at Louvain and various Catholic leaders, here made out to be Turksj46 Being 
independent and young, Degrelle was able to seek out adventuresome topics for his 
articles. His journalism did, in fact, often bring him to far-off lands. In 1929, still a 
student, but ~ow also ~ewly-appointed associate eoitor at ~ Sit3cle, his seri~ of 
44Daye, p. 242. 
45De Wilde, "Au ban de la SS," pt. 8 of television-series L'Ordre Nouveau, RTB-Fran~ais, 
1983. P. de Vos, "Leon Degrelle, par Leon Degrelle," taped interview, 1976. 
46PierreDaye righUy notes that Degrelle will later use this love of laughter as a 
political tool. beginning with his farces at Louvain and continuing with his scandals as 
part of the Rex movement's tactics. But it is doubtful that the litUe book had any 
premonitory intents. !Daye, p. 52] Because I have not been able to get hold of these 
tracts, I am relying mosUy on Etienne' 5, as well as other historians', descriptions of 
them. [Etienne, p. 12. Daye, p. 521. 
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articles on "l'Opera Ferrari" took hi.m to ltaly.41 January 1930, 'as mentioned above, saw 
him off to Mexico for another set of articles for xxtmt~. Once settled as director of 
"Les Editions Rex," Degrelle's travels were restricted, though he didn't stop writing or 
publishing his works. -In 1930, he published both a collection of poems -- fIvers 
enflammes." as Etienne calls them -- entitled Les tristesses d'hiver.48 and Furore 
Teutonico. a commentative tract on a hot issue of the times. Louvain university-
Germany relations.49 Shortly therea.fter, Les Taudis was published in: book form (see 
above). In 1931. "Contre l'incineration; va-t-on, chez no us, rOtir les morts?" (a tract 
against cremation and its freemasson promoters), as well as Meditations sur Louis 
Boumal. an admiratory eulogy to one of Degrelle's fovorite authors. appea.red.'O 
Thus. even when head of the AC]B propaganda. wing and. then, of his own. 
evolving movement. Degrelle continued to turn out pamphlet after pamphlet. book 
after book. fAll this. in addition to his newspaper articles!)'1 After Rex had definitely 
turned to politics. however. Degrelle'swriti~gswere almost solely political. They 
consisted either of attacks on parties or party members. such as Taccuse M. Segers. 
I'accuse Ie ministre Segers d'!tre un cumulard. un bankster, un pillard d'epargne et un 
4?This first trip to the Italian state deeply influenced him.. He encountered fascism for 
the first time and began speCUlating on the different uses ,of Catholic action . [Etienne, 
p.131. 
48£tienne, p. 12. 
49The university's rector, Mgr. Ladeuze,':Was bei~g accused of dangerous ~ro-German 
tendancies because he refused to authorize the installation of a new, Ariglo-fa~ring 
portal-tablet inscription, "furore teutonico diruta. dono americano restituta." Degrelle 
sided with the rector.against the anti-clerical accusers. [Etienne, p. 121 ' 
50Louis Boumal was a young Walloon poet who wrote mostly on Wallonie, and whose 
romantic and sentimental style Degrel1e admired and imitated. Boumal died at an early 
age in the First World War. . 
51 Degrelle may have been a prolific writer, but he had no qualms about reusing 
material. Many of the supposedly original articles by "great authors" which appeared 
in Rexist newspapers were actually a patchwork of bits and pieces from other articles 
or works by the author (the patchworking being done by Degrelle himself). Degrelle 
even reused his own writings. The beginning of Le Message de Rex. for instance, is 
repeated word for word in the chapter entitled "Champs" of Revolution des ames. (See 
quote for note 55.) No wonder he was able to turn out so much writing: half of it was 
c'ut and paste! 
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l!.che (sic) (1936). or of handbooks to his movement. his Le Message de Rex. for 
instance. written in September 1936 as an explanatory pamphlet on his new political 
movement-party. 
Degrelle's writing style has not really changed over time. It only got more 
extreme as the movement entered the political realm. Degrelle uses essentially the 
same style for his books as for his journalism. He writes very fluidly. often. as in Mes 
Aventures au Mepgue. almost stream-of-consciousness-li.ke. IUs not the language of a 
great intellectual, and the grandiloquent phrases followed by many suspension points 
are mostly for effect. Though he would undoubtedly deny it. it seems that his concern 
is more with the sound and appearance of the text, than with content.52 Legros. an 
admirer, describes it so: 
L60n Degrelle ecrit d'un jet, spontan6ment, sans se corriger. Ses 
oeuvres refletent l'harmonie de la nature qui !'inspire profond6ment. 
Toutes les ressources de son talent viennent de ses ascendances et . 
des puissants paysages ardennais qui vivent dans son ime.53 
Usten. for instance, to his description of Belgium in his opening paragraph of Rex. 
- . 
Renaissance de la Patrie: 
Un fleuve qui descend entre les coUines blanches ou les lins vers 
la mer; des quais endormis sous des g6raniums a Bruges; les ardoises 
d'une vieille abbaye du Brabant; des chevaux de maraichers pres 
d'une borne patinee par les hivers: une femme. sa denteUe ou sa 
hotte: les on des maisons d'une grand' place. tout nous rappelle , 
-- berge, pierJ;'es. visages, eaux que convient les mers du Nord -
Ie passe magnifique et d6bordand,de notre peuple ... On ne nous a 
pas improvises ·hier. 54 
His ardent patriotism ~ come through very well. and the language is very 'lyrical. 
But, once one has read severa! examples ~f his writing, one has read them all. After a 
while, it gets boring. 
52Such a statement could be used to describe not only his oratory, but the whole 
movement itself! 
53Legros, p. 76. 
"'Leon DegreUe and Jean Denis, Rex. Renaissance de 1a Patrie (Brux .. Editions Rex, 
1940), no page numbers. 
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Degrelle doesn't differentiate betveen political and non-political language. 
This is because Rex is primarily a movement -- it entered politics only because it was 
the only available route towards recognition -- and, specifically, a mouvement des 
&mn. Therefore, wherever he can, Degrelle includes a paragraph or tvo of sentimental 
phrases in his political pieces, serving as reminder that emotion, sentiment, ~ must 
govern all other aspects of life and social action. Le Message de Rex was written in 
September 1936 for old and new Rexists as an explanation of the new Rex party-
movement. The bulk of the thirty-o'ne page pamphlet covers Rex attitudes on the usual 
questions, Rex finances, workers, the people's rights, Belgium as a nation, Communism. 
dictatorship (a denial of its merits). The first tvo chapters, however. introduce the ame 
part of the movement. "Calme et douleur du soir" describes two idyllic lovers watching 
and listening to the sounds of a summer evening, and compares this pastoral scene to 
..... la route OU les autos arrachent Ie sol avec un crepitement de pluie tenace ... des 
lumieres brutales. des visages vides, des yeux sans tOle ..... 'which inhabit the real 
vorld." In 'Tame rexiste" (chapter two), Degtelle begins with a narrative of a recent 
Rex meeting at Liege and uses it to move into a discussion of .lin. "Mais ce qui emanait 
'par-dessus tout et qui fait vraiment la valeur des assemblees rexistes, c'etait celle 
qualite de ftOle, celle vibration, ce don total d'une assistance, cette volonte de placer 
par dessus tout, un ideal dans son desinteressement Ie plus absolu."56 Degrelle also had 
" \ 
no qualms about mixing this kind of peaceful tone with loud, often vioJent outcries. 
The last chapte~ of Le Messye 'de Rex is filled with phrases like 
it faut agir et PRENDRE PART!. (sid.! Soit pour Ie redressement 
audac1eux et complet du pays par Ie programme, la mystique et les 
chefs de REX.! Soit pour la revolution du front commun, a la sauce 
des Soviets. (sic) Ce sera Rex ou ce sera Moscou.! L' heure brutale 
est arrivee OU it faut bien faire son chou.51 
"Leon Degrelle, Le Message de Rex (Brux., Editions Rex, 1936), p. 3. 
,6Degrelle, Le Messaje de Rex, p. j. 
,1Degrelle, La Message de Rex, p. 31. 
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"'\. 
In summary, then, DegreUe's writiJlgs are numerous aJld varied, especially in 
the early years. His laJlguage is both lyrical aJld extreme aJld, frequently, repetitive. It 
seems that he wrote each of his pieces in one fell swoop, without taking much time to 
revise, the aim being that it should all emaJlate directly from the soul, without 
hindrance. 
Degrelle continues to write today, apparently, though his works may not be 
published in Belgium.58 
58Telephone interview with John Darnton, correspondent for The New York Times, on 





If Degrelle was the Rexist movement only until 1937, Rexist press ~ the 
movement throughout the history of Rex. Degrelle himself declared at a meeting in 
January, 1939 that "[c)'est par 11. presse que nous devons retourner Ie pays."1 Indeed. 
Rex started out as a publishing house and the press was always an intergrai part, if not 
a definition, of the movement. It is out of the press that the movement evolved, 
through the press that it developed. and by the press that it was sustained. Its ups and 
downs were signals of movement well-being or setbacks. This final chapter is . . . . 
therefore devoted to the press as the most important unifying aspect of Rexism. 
Press History: 
Before 1930. Les Editions Rex had published the Cahiers de la Ieunesse 
Catholigue. various pamphlets on Catholic subjects and an occasional book or two. 
Their scope was too limited for Degrelle. He wanted to catch the attention of all Catholic 
youth. if not of all Catholics. Les Editions Rex ought to disseminate literature having to 
do with Catholic actuality as well as Catholic issues. he said. Soirees. a weekly guide to 
movies, radio and travel. appeared for the first time on October 10, 1931. It was 
sponsored by the Action Catholique. the Catholic cinema association. the Catholic radio 
association. the travel agency Dux and Les Editions Rex.2 Though tech.nically not 
owned by Rex editions -- and. therefore-",pot officially controlled by Degrelle -- Soirees 
was published by Les Editions Rex and was edited by a close friend of Degrelle'!.and a , ' 
future Rexist ieader. Jean Denis. In effect. Degrelle directed the operation. And in 
April. 1933. when Les Editions Rex bought out Soirees, Degrelle actually directed the 
magazine, though still with Jean Denis as chief editor. Soirees was geared towards the 
family -- the most important social unit in a Catholic society -- with articles on spiritual 
1Leon Degrelle. as quoted by Jacques Lacomblez, "Leon Degrelle chez les rexistes 
d'Etterbeek," in Le Pays reel. Jan. 12. 1939, p. 3. 
2Jean-Michel Etienne, Le Mouvement rexistes iusgu'en 1910 (Paris, Librairie Armand 
Colin. 1968), p. 15. 
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matters as well as information on entertainment events. 3 It averaged from 80 to 120 
pages, 32 of which were devoted to listings of and commentaries on the week's radio 
programs -- apparently a first in Europe.4 Propagandist and salesman that he was, 
Degrelle made sure every issue had a full-page picture of "une actrice magniflque" on 
its front page. As he told a questioning Cardinal Van Roey, "Eminencel si je mets votre 
visage en premiere page, je vendrai vingt mille exemplaires de moins que si je mets 
une jolie fille.'" The magazine was a hit. it seems, and collected some 10,000 FB to 12,000 
FB each week.6 
Proof that Degrelle was the true director, of the magazine is the fact that he was 
able to use Soirees to advertise Les Editions Rex, which was, after all, only one of the 
many sponsors of the journal. On September 30, 1932, the first issue of Rex appeared as 
a four-page monthly insert to Soirees. Subtitled "pour que les catholiques lisent." it was 
at first restricted to advertisements for Rex edition books 'and journals." Within a short 
time, however, it began adding b.ook excerpts, book revues and commentaries. Rex 
expanded so much that, on January 1. 1933. it detached itself from Soirees and was 
published as a full-fledged. sixteen-page, bi-monthly, literary review with the title 
"Rex: toute la vie des lettres." The new Rex had quite a following from the outset: its 
circulation increased rapidly fro~ 25,000 in January, 1933 to 37.500 in Decembe~. 1933.8 
In ~ubsequ.,nt months, the journal's various titles reflected the evolution of the 
' . '. 
move~ent. On March 22, 1934, as Rex was becoming more political and had se~rated 
, 
from. ilie ACJB, Degrelle fused Rn anc:( YWL a purely political newspaper, into a new,' 
32 page weekly. As mentioned earlier, there were also financial reasons for the fusion; 
3Jacques Saint-Germain, La BataiUe de Rex (Paris, __ ,1937), p. 69. 
4Jean-Michel Charlier, Leon Degrelle: Persiste et signe: interviews recuei11ies pour la 
television francaise par lean-Michel Charlier (Paris, j. Picollet, 1985). p. 68. 
'Charlier, p. 68. 
6Charlier, p. 68. This is equivalent to about $ 2,500 to $ 3,000 (1984 $) 
?Etienne, p. 16. 
8Etienne, p. 16. 
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publishing the two together was cheaper than each separately. The title "~ex: toute la 
vie des lettres" appeared on the front, "Vlan: toute la vie poHtique" on the back. Having 
a double front page, so to speak, was a simple way of catching not only the eye of the 
reader, but also that of the passer-by lookipg at the paper from behind! It also proved 
that Rex still saw literary and political issues as distinct and equal in importance. 
Though articles on each were intermingled with each other. one type did not 
necessarily draw more weight than the other. On October 12. 193~, the title of Degrelle's 
journal was again "Rex: toute la vie de~ lettres." on the front. and "Rex: toute la vie 
catholique." on the back. only to change once more to "Rex: l'apostolat: les lettres. la 
cite." on both front and back. by february 22.193'. Then. starting around October, 
193'. the title "Rex" alone appeared on front and back. 
Rex was obviously looking around f~r the rig.ht phrase with which to define 
itself. Although it did suddenly find itself independent after its expulsion from the 
ACjB in January, 193~. Rex nevertheless tried to stay on friendly terms with the 
Church. Omitting the political part of the title would perhaps somewhat soften the 
Church's heart. "Rex: l'apostolat.les lettres.la cite" encompassed most of the 
characteristics of the specific Rexist movement that was emerging. Still strongly 
apostolic. Rex was committed to apostolicism through the written word. and was 
developing an ideal of bringing reform to the body politic and to society as a whole. La 
, 
rut could refer to the ~o1ic Celestial city. to a people unified into a cite. 01' to the 
. --.. 
rights of citiZenship of one living in a cite. Although not ali aspects of cite may have 
been addressed at one time. the word's many implications were a decided advantage. 
Finally. "Rex" by itself identified the movement as a movement: one which cut across 
all lines of class. religion and cultural background. By this time. Rex was Rex, and the 
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single word was enough to define it.9 The movement had found its base, a very wide 
base which covered all facets of society, without having to differentiate between them. 
The word "Rex," at this point, took up a quarter of the front page, and, as the movement 
became more and more political, individual article tiUes became bolder and bolder, 
often filling up another half of the page, as every effort was made to catch the reader's 
attention, Chief editor of the paper dl,Jring this period of transformation was Amand 
Geradin, replaced in August, 1934 by Robert de Vroylande. Degrelle, of course, as 
director of the entire establishment, remained backbone of all operations. 
YliJL the political twin of an. was the realization of another of Degrelle's 
dreams. Like Ru., it began as a bi-monthly, appearing on alternate Saturdays with that 
publication. By early February, 1934, YlAn. was published as a weekly, but was never as 
successful as Rex, drawing a maximum of only 9,000 copies per week in December, 
1933.10 YlJ.n.followed ReX closely in format, so that fusion of the two papers in March 
simply meant binding two like elements together. Hubert d'Ydewalle was the official 
director, but Degrelle was in ultimate control. Robert de Vroylande! Camille Jordan and 
Raphael Sindic took turns at the job. as well.11 
There were other minor and short-lived early Rexist publications. Foyer. first 
.published in April. 1933. was. as the name suggests. an entertainment magazine for the 
family. A young Rexist by the name of Guido Eeckels was in charge. Unfortunately. his 
sometimes risque choice of serialized novels caused the newspaper some problems. so 
. . ~ 
that. when the movement hit financial hardship in 1934. fuvtt·was one of the first 
Rexist publications to go. ~ edited by Roger Saussus and also initiated in 1933. tried 
to make up for the not so apostolic leaning of other Rex publications. As with ~ its 
9Notice, too, that Degrelle chose an opportune moment to reduce the title; in less than a 
month he would make the first grand statement of Rexist politization at Courtrai. 
Identical copies of Rex were simultaneously published in Flemish, as Rex-Flamand. and 
in German, as ReX-Allemand. 
10!tienne, p. 16. 
l1!tienne, p. 16 . 
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life was brief and unsuccessful.12 Soirees itself was replaced on January 1. 1936 by 
Rex-Illustre. The illustrated magazine lasted only until May 6,1936. however. by which 
time the other major Rerist papers had become parUy illustres themselves. 
During election time, a number of new newspapers would start up. For the 
October 16, 1938 provincial elections, for instance, Rex-Audeuhem and Rex- Iette 
appeared monthly from July to October, and Chant-clair (later Chant-glorieux) 
appeared hi-monthly from June to October.13 Similarly, Le Salutdu peuple came out 
just for the 1939 campaign.14 It is the 1936 elections. however. which had the greatest 
impact 0.0. the Rexist press. For these elections. two new organs of the press were 
founded. L' Action rexiste was an educational monthly which lasted only from January 
to May. Le Pays reel. however. managed to last until May 1940. Hubert d' Y dewaLle was 
its chief editor until his resignation from the movement in June 1937; although.-as 
always. DegreUe made all the decisions. -As the first Renst daily. Le Pays reel was able 
to saturate the country with Rexist propaganda. giving the movement the final push 
necessary to win 11,49% of the vote on May 24, 1936. The paper started out with a 
morning and evening edition. as weH as severa110cal editions: beginning in 
September. 1936. a Flemish version. De Nieuye Staat. was also published under the 
direction of Paul De Mont, head of Rex in Flanders. 1 , As could be expec.ted, once the 
Remt movement began to decline, so did the var~ous editions of Le Pays .reel. If 
circulation for the -main French-language version was about 97,000 -in-Octobet 1936, it 
- - . ~ 
12Etienne. p.IS. 
13It is unclear how long other section newspapers lasted. The term mensuel or bi-
mensuel at the top of the front page might mean that they were issued only during 
election time. or that they came and went as local financial situations dictated (since 
each section was responsible for its own press and propaganda). Rex-helles. for 
instance was a four-page monthly whose October. 1938 issue was devoted solely to Rexist 
candidates for the upcoming elections -- with photographic portraits and biographical 
notes. but vhich must have continued to cover local events afterwards. since it vas 
advertised in Rex. Jan. 4.1939, p. 2. 
14Etienne. p. 6S. 
1'Etienne. p. 69. 
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had sunk down to no more than '0,000 by the end of 1937, and to barely 18,000 by 
1939.16 (Even less economically stable, local papers undoubtedly ceased publication 
completely when financial hardship set in.) Similarly, the number of pages fluctuated 
with the movement's rise and decline. In June, 1936 Le Pays reel was six pages long, in 
December twelve. The increase proves that Rex was thriving during that year. But by 
May, 1938 it was only four pages 10n8, although two more pages were added later that 
summer; by this time, the Rexist movement had lost much of its popularity and was 
searching for a new plateau of stability. It remained at six pages (eight on Sundays) 
throughout the first half of 1939 until, by late August, it was again reduced to four 
pages -- this time, apparenUy, due to the imminent war. The price per issue in 1936 was 
2, centimes; in 1939, it was ,0 centimes. (An issue of Rn. cost n centimes in 1933 and 1 . . 
FB in 1937,) Like Ru., Le Pays r$el offered deals on subscriptions for different periods 
of time, which saved the reader a few francs, though not many. 
Le Pays reel's format was much mote changeable and disorganized than Rex's. 
Articles were crammed together, especially as the number of pages decreased, and all 
sorts of topics were placed indiscriminately side by side. Degrelle himself described the 
difference between the two papers: the daily was "essentieUement de combat et destine 
a.la masse. tandis que Rex s'adresse aux intellectuels."l? Perhaps mixing all sorts of 
articles would expose this not-sa-differentiating audience to a wide variety of issues; or 
.'. 
vas the intent of variety tQ prevent boredom? A more plausible explanation seems to 
~ 
be simple inexperience, bad planning, and lack of seriousness on the part of bo~ 
writers and editors of Le Pays reel. It is true that articles on political issues were 
usually concentrated 'on the front and back pages, but they also appeared in the inner 
16Etienne, p. 69-70 . 
1? As quoted by Jacques Lacomblez, in "Uon Degrelle chez les rexistes d'Ette.rbeek," in 
Le Pays .reel. Jan. 12, 1939. p. 3. 
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pages. along with feature articles. articles on entertainment. serials. and radio 
programs.1S 
At the outset. Le Pays reel was less literary than Rex. although by 1936 they 
were quite similar in content. Both covered political issues. and both engaged in 
sensationalist and inflamatory language. while stressing a particular moral code. 
Topics varied from such heart-rending themes as "Une jeune fille. nee sans jambes. va 
apprendre a danser sur des jambes artificielles." to world events like "Des mesures 
americaines de represailles contre Tokio?"19 The front page articles of both papers 
were usually of a political nature and were most often written by Degrelle himself --
which means not only that he was quick with his pen. but that he felt confident about 
writing on most any subject. Both papers also had feature columns which appeared in 
every issue and which Degrelle left to other journalists. In the early ~tages of Rex. 
Pierre Nothomb wrote a weekly column on contemporarY political events. entiUed "La 
critique internationale." Similarly. in Januarr.1939 JoseStreel started writing an 
opinion column in Le Pays reel in which he commented on Rexist philosophy. 
contemporary events. and attacks made on Rex. Other regular columns were 
anonymous. Short-takes on local events. for instance. filled Le Pays reel's "Les faits 
divers." "Ces Messieurs et ces dames" was the Rex equivalent. with more emphasis on 
interesting (or funny) events in the lives of important personalities -- a kind of comic-
" 
strip in words. -In addition. Le Pays reel regularly published stock market figures and 
. .... 
also covered sporting events. And Rex always had one section devoted to literary and 
film criticism. neaUy organized according to what could and could not be read or seen. 
Finally. Rex. Le Pays reel. and even Rex-illustre all spiced up their issues with the nasty 
but hilarious caricatures of "Jam." (See examples on plate 8.> 
18 An example of articles on the second page of Le Pays reel of Jan: 1. 1939: "Une 
revolution presque faite" (continued from page one. on the new multiplicity of 
greeting cards!>. a serialized installment olThe Count of Monte Cristo. "La Vie a 
Bruxelles" (on local entertainment), "Des etudiants belges in Espagne nationale." etc. 
19Le Pays reel. Jan. 4, 1939, p. 3. 
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Advertisements in Rerist news PIpers: 
Both papers also ran many of the same kinds of advertisements. These were 
divided into two categories. those for the Rexlst movement and those for pro-Rexist 
businesses. The first consisted of slogans enclosed in thickly oulined boxes which let 
readers know about upcoming Rerist events or called on them to do something 
particular for the growth of the movement. Most were short. and to-the-point. "Lisez 
Foyerl"20 "Lire REX et VLAN c'est bien. S'Y ABONNER. c'est mieux,"21 or "Ouvriers! Lisez 
tous les lours 'Le Pays reel' Ie seul journal qui dise la verite ."22 Some'spoke directly to 
Rexist aims: "Justice d'abord/ Hn'y aura plus de desordres dans la ru.es, Ie jour OU it y 
aura de l'ordre dans 1a societe."as In general. calls for action were in some way 
sentimentalized. In the January 22, 1939 issue of Le Pays reel. for instance. Degrelle 
lauded the many sacrifices Liege Rexists had made in order to come up with donations 
for the movement (giving up food and clothing. apparently .. ,). If they could do it. why 
couldn't others? asked DegreUe. "Vous rendez-vous digne parvos efforts. de l'idoeal qui 
suscite des sacrifices complets comme ceux que nous venons de citer?" (p. 6) 
Sentimentality. then. was often reinforced by guilt. Editors and writers used every 
opportunity to advertise Rexist press and Rex editions. Coupons were frequently 
offered to promote a new book. e.g. the coupon with "Un livre gratuitl" on it in Rex of 
March 22. 193' (p. 9) would get one a free copy of H. Carton de Wiart's La Cite ardente 
" 
° (Brux .. Rex eds .. 193'). Rex-brandprodu~ts were especially advertised. There were Rex , 
"'\ 
insignia. "REXA" cigarettes. Rex "aperitifs." Rex camera films. even Rex sho~s -- "Une 
seule chaussure/ LA CHAUSSURE REX/ En vente partouotl"24 
2~ Mr. 3. 1934. no. 9. p. 13. 
21Rex-Vlan, Mr. 12. 1934. no. 12.p. 15. 
22Le Pays reeL lu. 6.1936. p. 4. 
2SLe Pays reel. lu. 6.1936. p. 2. 
24Hu. lu. 26.1936. p. 21. If these last really existed. they were probably shoes made by 
a Rexist shoemaker who simply replaced his name on the label with Rex's. The same 
must have applied to the other products. 
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Commercial advertisements came from Rexist supporters. These were small 
firms or artisans who were "amies de REX" and who. therefore. must be patronized 
(which meant buying their products. telling friends to buy their products. and always 
mentioning that they had found out about the store through Rex ).25 "Rexistes. rendez-
vous de preference dans les salles de nos annonciers" was a typical slogan.26 (This 
could be advantageous. since some businesses offered rebates for Rexist customers. 
"Pour vos lunettes. Henri Delhougne ... remise j% aux Rexistes.")2? The same businesses 
frequently advertised in both Rex and Le Pays reel. The distributors of "Chicoree 
Trappiste Vinc3.rt." for instance. advertised first in the weekly Rex. and hiter. once it 
came out. also in the daily Le Pays ree1.28 
There were. nevertheless. some differences between the advertisements in the 
two Rexist papers. Le Pays reel tended to have fewer commercial ads and more 
person·al/want ads. These were grouped together in one section. usually on the next-OO-
last page and suitably entitled "Nos petites annonces." Tlie cost ofplacing one depended 
on the kindof ad and the number of lines. Ads varied in size from one-liners to large. 
almost half-pagers -- as the ones for the cure-all powder "La Croix Blanche." Although 
the number of ads in Le Pays reel increased from barely three per issue in 1936 to 
about sixteen or more in 1939. they remained ads for small businesses or self-employed 
~sans. Only the 1939 issues varied slightly from the norm. in that they suddenly 
began carrying a multiplicity of tr~vel ~ertisements. Rexists had their own travel 
. "\. 
agency which organized trips within Belgium. "1. 2 ou 3 jours a L'EXPOSITION 
INTERNATIONALE DE L'EAU. LIEGE. 1939. organisation de visites et.voyages individuels 
ou par groupes. Pour renseignements. ecrivez sans tarder a: REX-LIEGE-TOURISME rue 
2'''Avis important." in Rex. Dec. 9.1933 . .00 . 30. p. 11. (See also example on plate 9) 
26Le Pays reel. Ap. 28.1939. p. 5. . 
2?Le Pays reel. Ju. 6.1936. p . 6. 
28e .g. Rex. Dec. 9.1933 . .00.30. p. 13; and Le Pays reel. Jan. 5.1939. p. 5. 
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Lambert-Ie-Begue. -f. a. Liege."29 In 1939. Rex favored travel within Belgium. or to 
Germany and Spain.30 They even seemed to have relations with Germany's and Spain's 
official tourist offices. This points to the fact that. while advocating strict neutrality. 
they nevertheless favored the Nazi and fascist powers. Interesting. too. is the fact that 
Le Pays r6el carried ads for "La Soci6tl! nationale des Chemins de fer belges." if not a 
government organization. certainly one greatly supported by it.31 Yet. in 1939. Rex 
was finding more and more pretexts to attack the government. One might conclude that 
there were some top officials of the "Societl!" who were Rexist sympathizers. and/or 
that Rex had secret dealings with big businesses. while openly denouncing their 
hyper-capitalisme. 
Advertisements in ~ too. were limited to the usual small businesses (with one 
noted exception. the Swiss tourist office). The same names often returned year after 
year. such as "Les Chocolats G. Lechien." Typical ads ran like this. "SPONTIN CITRON 
limonade parfaite."32 "EmployezELVEA Tomates."33 or "Un boo. cigare! Apres avoir 
goOtl! dif£6rentes marques plus recommend6es les unes que les autres. j'en suis tOujours 
revenu a. mon ... 'CARAIBE' ."34 Very common were ads for miracle cures. such as "Bague 
galvanique: Guerir radicalementRhumatismes musculaires et articulaires. 
Arthrite, ... "35 or the Daury tea "Qui vous evitera toUte maladie."36 or the faithful 
powder "La Croix Blanche." advertised continually. The number of advertisements in 
Rex averaged between twelve and fifteen per issue before 1936-. with a slight increase 
"\ 
29Le Pays r6e1. Ju. 8.1939. p. 3. 
30Germany: Le Pays reel. Ju . 20.1939. p. 3; Spain; Le Pays reel.]y. 1.1939, p. 3. It is 
unclear to me why Le Pays reel did not mention travel to Italy. since the movemencdid 
have ties with that country. 
31Le Pays reel. Jan. 5,1939. p. 3. 
32m Sept. 9,1933. no. 22. p . 2. 
33Rn, Mr. 3. 193-f, no . 9. p. 8. 
34m Dec. -f, 193-f. no . -f9, p . -f. 
35Rex, Sept. 9.1933. no . 22.p. 3. 
36Rn., Mr. 3. 193-f. 0.0 . 9, p. 3. 
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(sometimes as many as twenty) after the merger with Vlan. After the elections. 
however. the number of ads quadrupled. ranging between fifty and sixty per issue 
before falli1lg again to an average of twenty by lune 1937. The leap in advertising goes 
along with Rexist success. Right after the-elections. when Rex looked like the new. up-
and-coming group to belong to. many businesses might have decided to actually join 
the Rexists themselves 01'. at least. to advertise in its paper, which obviously reached 
lots of people. After the total failure ofDegrelle in the 1937 elections, and after the 
general loss of popularity of the movement. businesses pulled out their ads. either 
because they were no longer Rexists themselves. 01' because they were looking for a 
more profitable newspaper. 
The advertisements in the Rexist newspapers reveal a virtually self-sufficent 
Rexist community. Rex manufactured its own products. was supported by many 
friendly businesses. had its own press and even provided its own entertainment for its 
members,37 Rex was a cult of sorts. Its ups and downs were. therefore. as with most 
cults. quite drastic. People would throw themselves wholeheartedly into every aspect of 
the movement. only to become completely disillusioned when one aspect of it suddenly 
didn't please them. Before 1937. scandal- and joke-making seemed all part of the fun. 
and part of the great spring-cleaning of Parliament and its old. worn-out parties. After 
the 1937 election loss. and even 'already before it. Rexists began getting sick of the 
'. 
constant,name~calling and character-attacks, especially since these had yet to bring 
~ 
any significa.o.t changes. What had started out'as necessary and valuable soon turne~ 
sour. These kinds of tactics simply did no,t work in politics as it now functioned. This 
was one of the reasons why, by Spring 1937. the cult-movement suddenly dropped in 
popularity. And the quantitative factor of advertising in the Rexist papers is a good 
37Besides Degrelle's orations. Rex organized evenings with performances by the Rex 
drama group. In March 1934. for instance, this group put on Erckmann Chatrian's 
L'ami Fritz. And. since Degrelle was ever-present and. apparently. multi-skilled. 
audiences at this particular performance would be treated between acts to a "causerie" 
by their leader. [Rex, Mr. 3.1934. no. 9. p. 71. 
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measure of this failure. The decreasing number of advertisements after 1937 reflects 
loss of movement popularity. as more and more Rexists left the cult fold in 
disillusionment. 
Other Publications: 
As a publishing house, Rex of course also published books and pamphlets. When 
Degrelle started expanding Les Editions Rex, he initiated a Collection nation ale under 
the direction of Edouard Coppens. The purpose of the collection was to publish great 
books on great su~jects -- books by known Belgian authors on patriotic Belgian 
subjects. Rexist newspapers always carried ads for the most recent Collection nationale 
book. 
Radio-Rex: 
Rex was also on the radio. Starting in early 1933, Degrelle was allotted a slot of 
the Action Catholique's air-time. He vas supposed to narrate a" chronique du 
mouvement litteraire,"38 but it soon became apparent that the only books he talked . 
about were those published by Les Editions Rex. Once the Action Catholique took note of 
this, DegreUe's career as a radioman was cut off short. Never giving up, the Rexist chef 
tried for radio-time again in late summer, 1936. His program would be non~political, he 
" , 
wrote in anarticJe, and would only try to answer some of the accusations thrown at the 
. - ~ 
movement during the recent elections.39 In fact, Rex wanted politics out of radio in 
general. Radio, it said, must return to its original purpose, "Ie DIVERTISSEMENT et Ie 
DELASSEMENT des auditeurs [sicJ.".w When Degrelle was refused air-time on Belgian 
radio at the end of 1936, he simply turned to his friend Mussolini. Beginning on 
38Charlier, p. 68; and Etienne, p. 19. 
39"Rex et laRadio," in Rn.. Jy. 17.1936, p. 29. 
40"Rex et laRadio," in m Jy. 17,1936, p. 29 . 
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January 6,1937, half-hour broadcasts from Turin radioed Degrelle's and other Rexists' 
voices into Belgium.41 
Rex on the radio was not very different from Rex in the press. It continued the 
usual attacks through joke-making, for instance. Daye teUs of one Rexist meeting 
where the TuriJl program was broadcast over'the loudspeakers. The audience listened 
with amusement as a voice imitating Van Zeeland delivered a mock speech on Degrelle: 
"Et Ie public de s'amuser ... [sicJ."~ 
It is unclear how long Rexistradio survived, though one can assume that it 
declined as the movement did. 
From Propaganda to Organization: 
Besides the press, Rex had other forces dispensing propaganda for the 
movement. In the summer of 193', young Rexists in Liege formed loose organizations 
called Cadres actifs de propagande (CAP).43 Shortly thereafter, an official Front 
Populaire (fP) was formed, comprising Rexists of all ages and all ranks of lile. Degrelle 
was, naturally, director of the FP. CAPs were the more active of the bunch. They were 
the ones whom DegreUe sent out at all hours of day and night to put up posters, sell Rex 
insignia or newspapers outside churches or at busy crossings, sell tickets and advertise 
Rexist events, and create general fervor among their young school friends. Others met 
regularly at Rex houses or sometimes o~" monUl, .. Jong retreats to discuss Rexist 
principles, Rexist politics and Rexist corporative organizations.44 
"') 
41Etienne, p. 113. Daye claims that DegreUe's presence in Italy caused the Van Zeeland 
government to make political ovations towards Mussolini. who, in his defiant way, 
simply ignored them. And when Foreign Minister Spaak called in the Italian 
embassador to complain about Italian favoratism towards Degrelle, the ambassador 
retorted, "Et les sanctions a propos de la guerre d'Ethiopi~ n'etaient-elle pas 
regrettables et inamicales?" [Pierre Daye, Leon Degrelle et Ie rexisme (Paris, A. Fayard 
et Cie., 1937), p. 205 J. 
42Daye, p. 205-06. 
43Usmard Legros, Un homme, un chef. Leon Degrelle (Brux. Editions Rex, 1938), p. 119. 
44Etienne, p. 43; and Legros, p, 129, 
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It was out of these groups that Rexist political cadres rtrst developed. The Rexist 
FP for all of Belgium was first organized into fourteen separate geographical divisions. 
Each was headed by a propaganda chief, whose pay depended on how many newspapers 
he sold, and who was aided in his task by a number of volunteers -- many from the 
CAPs."" 1.0. August, 193' Degrelle transformed these groups into decidedly political 
organizations. The country was sectioned off into permanences d'arrondissement and 
sections 10cales."'6 Each section. 1.0. turn, had separate services for propaganda, women 
and security .. For the latter purpose, a service d'ordre et de protection (SOP) was 
founded, consisting of unarmed, uniformed men whose main task was to keep 
everybody in liJ1e at Rexist meetings; they were disbanded 1.0. January, 1937, under a 
State order banl1ing militias of any .kind."'? The political sections remained relatively 
autonomous from May, 1936 to May, 1937, after which they were gradually taken over 
by the propaganda groups, CAPs in particular, who became more and more militant. If 
not part of a CAP, or probably evel1 if they were part of such a group, Rexist youths 
were, by 1936, also organized into Ieunesses rexistes. Since they too were uniformed, 
however, they were disbanded along with the SOP in early 1937. ReI defied the ban 
soon afterwards whel1 it re-formed its youth il1tO a non-political Association de 
campement et de tourisme (ACT)."'8 Uniformed members organized outings, sporting 
events, rallies, camps, marches, etc. -- very reminiscent of the Hitler youth, of which 
the Rexists had certainly heard. 
"'\ 
Ove~al1 of this activity', DegreUe ruled with a firm and strict hand. He insisted 
on strict morality permeating all divisions and would strike down at anyone that 
seemed to step out of bounds. One occasion for such sharp scolding came up in January, 
1939, it seems. In an angry article in Le Pays reel on January 15, 1939, Degrelle 
4'Etienne, p. 43. 
46Etienne. p. 76. 
4?Etienne, p. 76 . 
48Etienne, p. 78 . 
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rebuked local Rex groups for spending too much time organizing parties and too little 
doing their duties. He therefore forbade all festivities until Easter, or until the section 
had sold its allotted amount of newspapers and subscriptions. 
Vous etiez venus pour vous amuser? tant pis! Ce n'est pas ~a Rex! 
Travaillez ou allez ailleurs .... II est tout de m6me autremel1t in.teres-
sant de vivre en propageant nos jourl1aux et 110tre doctrin.e qu'en 
dansant Ie Lambeth Walk et en contant fleurette a. de braves jeunes 
filles qui 011t plus besoin d'Ul1 mariidealiste et travailleur que d'un 
specialliste en tangos.49 
Otherwise, movement org~ization represented the ideal Rexist State. It was 
authoritative and decen~ized, with chefs appointed according to expertise (e.g .,all 
matters deatin.g with Flanders were relegated to Rex-Flanders chief, Paul de Mont, 
housed in. a separate building). Strict hierarchical order was based on deference to 
one's superior at all times.50 Degrelle, at the top, was accommodated with a "vaste 
bureau d'ul1e simplicite toute moderne," which did not prevent him from having a 
huge desk, emerald-colored velvet drapes and fresh flowers all over.51 Under him and 
assisting him were a secret.a.ry' general and a Cabinet du Chef (essentially the same), 
and, from November, 1936 until June H. 1937. a Conseil politigue de Rex. as well.52 
Members of this last body were already established Rexist leaders. Paul de Mont. Count 
Xavier de Grunne (also head of Rex in the Senate), Gustave Wyns, Usmard Legros, Prof. 
Mertens, Cados Leruitte (who had organized the first Rex sections in Liege), Hubert 
d'Ydewalle, Jose Streel, Jean Denis; Pierr~ Daye (leader of Rexists deputes) and, as 
presiding secretary,'Alfred Olivier.53 On June 21. 1937, this council was replaewd by a 
! • . j 
five-member Bureau executif de Rex, with fewer powers. -Degrelle appointed Jose 
Streel. Jean Denis. Jean de Lophem. Usmard Legros and Paul De Mont to the new body, 
49Quoted in Etienne. p. 79. 
,ODaye, p. 229. 
,1Daye. p.230. 
,2Etienne. p. 80 . 
'3Daye. p. 230. 
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and kept closely involved in all their proceedings.,4 The reduction was most probably 
part of DegreUe's whole scheme to gain more personal power, a scheme which started 
to develop shortly before the 1937 elections.55 
Rexist Leaders: 
Who were these leaders? Those who had star,ted out with Degrelle from the 
beginning were friends from Louvain. university and/or from the ACJB. They were all 
good Catholics, good writers, and bright and well-edllcated. Thus, they could all look 
forward to a promising career within the Catholic Party, if they wanted it. And the 
very fact that they decided, in the end, to leave the Party is a mark of their courage and 
of their willingness to fight for what they believed; after all, departing from the path 
that one .knew would lead to a sure and stable life is a rather daring feat. For this they 
must be credited. On the other hand, their enthusiasm and 'energy did not necessarily 
transla~ itself into maturity as the years went by. If a sense of fighting for their cause 
was a large part of the cohesiveness of the early Rexists, another factor was their wish 
to continue basking in the glories of gang play and the fun life in general. As a result. 
Rex never learned new ways and Rexist leaders never formed themselves into 
recognized and established leaders. (Non-Rexists thought of them more as big children 
than as mature political leaders') As the' 1936 elections, rolled around, Rex was forced to 
' . '. 
find older Rexist candidates, older not only in age, but also in character. The outcome ' 
~ 
was both a generational split after 1936, but also a philosophical split. Later adherents 
to Rex had not evolved within the prank-making atmosphere and therefore vere not 
part of the gang. Some wouldn't last long; others would stay on for the ride, trying to 
get whatever they could out of it for themselves. Degrelle would try to straddle the two , 
becoming a patriarch in every sense of the word: reprimanding like a father the 
,4Etienne, p. 80-81. 
"See chapter on Degrelle . 
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sometimes too unserious younger Rexists. but. essentially. paying more and more 
attention to his own personal career. The closely-knit group would begin to 
disintegrate soon after its first successes. 
The following short biographical histories of some of the most important of 
these leaders will h~lp bring the movement into focus.56 
joo6 STBEEL is known among Rex historians as the movement's philosopher. 
Born in jemeppe-Sur-Meuse in 1911. Streel went on to study for a ~octorate in Thomist 
philosophy at Louvain University. He was active in the ACJB. where he met Degrelle. 
His writings for the movement were profuse and well thought out (not just a collection 
of vague ideas) Les Ieunes Genset la Politigue (Louvain. Rex eds .. 1932). La Parole est 
aux Bourgeois: Lettre d'un Bourgeois Liberal a un Bourgeois Catholigue (Brux .. Rex eds .. 
1936). Positions Rexistes ( BTUx., Rex eds., 1936). and Ce Ou'il Faut Penser de Rex (BTUx .. 
Rex eds .. 1936).51 He vas shot by the partisans after the liberation.58 
j!AN DENIS is usually twinned with Streel as Rex's other philosopher: True. he 
did write several Rex "little red books," Principes Rexistes (Brux., Rex eds .. 1936); Bases 
Doctrinales de Rex (Brux., Rex eds., 1936), and La ligne Generale (Brux., Rex eds .. [1935-
. 377])59. but these vere more repetitions of Streel than anything new. He apparently 
liked to vrite and was willing to publish on any subject. "C'awt un polivalent qui 
ecriv~t aussi bien. sur une locomotive que sur Ie rexisme ou la philosophie hindoue." 60 
Denis was born in Chastre-Villeroux-Bl~mont on February 10. 1902 to a peasant 
. "\. 
- , . 
56As usual. biographical information is sometimes scanty .. I have tried to collect from 
as many appropriate sources as were available to me: unfortunately, much of this data 
is still confidential and not available to the public. Some of the biographies are 
therefore quite limited. 
51Etienne. p. 187. 
58Paul Legrain, Le Dictionnaire des Belges (BTUx., Paul Legrain. ed .. 1981) gives 1946 as 
his death date. (p. 473). 
59Etienne, p. 185. 
60Interview of M. Jean Vermeire by Jose Gotovitch 25 .3.71 in the CREHSGM. Brussels. as 
quoted in a letter to me from Mr. Martin Conway. PhD candidate. Oxford. England. 
116 
, family. He was educated by Jesuits and, after his fa~er died, became head of the family. 
He studied at Louvain in the Facu1t6 de Philosophie et Lettres. yet had difficulty in 
settling into anyone particular job. He became very involved in the ACjB and even 
ends up as Mgr. Picard's personal secretary for a while. He was also secretary of the 
Conseil g6n6ral et Comite' g6n6ral of the association, and, starting in 1927, member of 
the editing committee of the Cahiers de la jeunesse catholigue.61 He was then editor of 
50ir6es and, from there, followed DegreUe. His activities within the Rexist movement 
were limited and, though he has been called Degrelle's right hand man, 62 he actually 
had little intimate contact with the leader.63 Even when he served his four years in 
Parliament as a d6pute from Namur, he seems to have,been rather inactive in that role. 
Among his main interests were the Spanish Phalangists and their definition of a new 
Eu.ropean order. He stayed with Rex during the war, though without any truly heroic 
deeds for the movement. Captured as he was trying to escape after the war, he was set 
free -- so to speak -'- at the French border, on condition that he never return to 
Belgium. He apparently still lives in France.64 
VICTOll MATTHYS came to Rex first as an office worker. He soon movedup 
through the ranks to become chief of propaganda for the movement, at which he 
-seemed to have a real knack. Already before the war, he was an ardent admirer of 
everything. Hitlerian. In 1941, Degrelle appointed him. Chef de Rex ad interim while he 
, 
\ 
was on the eatern front. He was shotin 1946.65 
"'\. 
RAnAn SD1DIC, unlike' th~ others, was not part of the ACjB. He came to Rex in 
1933 only after he had submitted a man.uscript to be published and had been enticed by 
Degrelle into joining, leaving his job as a university professor. He changed posts fairly 
61 Etienne, p. 72. 
62Etienne, p. 72. 
63Mr. Martin Conway. 
64Mr. Martin Conway. 
65Etienne, p. 72. 
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frequently within the movement. Degrelle having hired him without really knowing 
his qualifications. In 1936. he was elected a depute for the movement and. as such. was 
the hero of the famous affaire Sindic. He seems to have been fairly clumsy, "le type 
meme de l'hurluberlu, du fantaisiste integra!, du farfelu impetinent"66 and, as such. 
contributed greatly to the view that Rex was but a bunch of irresponsible youths 
playing the game of politics. 
USl'lARD lEGBos was drawn to Rex by Degrelle's writ1.o.gs. As a student in Uege, 
he had been editor of the Catholic paper Vaillant and thus had first-hand press 
experience. He became an official member in February, 1936 and soon headed 
Degrelle's Cabinet du Chef.6? 
PIElmE DAH,-according to his own description, had a Rexist revelation when he 
heard Degrelle speak in Brussels in 193,.68 Perhaps. At any rate, he seems to have 
been an opportunist. Born in Scb,aerbeek in 1892. he had served in the Great War, had 
had ayear's stint in Washington, D.C. in 1918-19 as military attache, and had travelled 
all over the world as a journalist for Belgium's main paper; Le Soir. However,-his loose 
morals fared him ill among Brussels circles. Through Rex, he hoped to regain face. 
Elected as a Rexist depute for Brussels in 1936. he was given a minor post in the 
occupation government during the war. He was condemned to death in 1946, but 
escaped to Buenos Aires. He died there in 1960.69 
, 
Coum XAVIER DE HmBICOUllT DE GRUND also came to Rex just in time for its first 
~ 
elections. He'was born on June 11. 1894, in Rixensart to a noble family, and was 
educated in the history of sociology at the the Sorbonne. Well-known in Belgium. both 
as a confidant of King Albert I and as a great alpinist and explorer, he made a, point of 
following the developments of the various youth movements arising around him 
66£tienne, p. 73. 
67Legros, p. 16 . 
68Daye, introduction to his Leon Degrelle et Ie rexisme 
69£tienne, p. 73. 
118 
(without necessarily getting involved himself), so that, when Degrelle asked him to run 
as Rexist senator, he accepted with enthusiasm. He carried the Rexist banner until 
December. 1937 and then continued as a Senator without party affiliation. He was not 
an avowed resistant during the var. but he hated the Nazis as much as he did the 
English. He even tried to form a secret resistance army during the war. Unfortunately, 
his scheme vas found out by the Germans. and he was deported to a camp in Gross-
Strehlitz, Silesia. where he died in 19+f.70 
Finally, PAUL DE MONT joined Rex as Rexist senator and director of Rex-Flanders 
in 1936. Like Daye, he vas a WWI veteran (he lost both legs in the Battle of the Yser) 
and a recognized vriter in Flanders. In Rex. he became chief editor of De Nieuve Staat. 
as well. Otherwise, his imput into the movement was limited to Flemish affairs.71 
Conclusion: 
These men were leaders of a Rexist community which acted as if it vas self-
sufficient and separate from the rest of Belgium, while at the same time trying to -
incorporate its ideals into all of Belgian society. The contradiction would bring the 
movement down. for without knoving hov to incorporate their system into the rest of 
the country. they would never succeed. Rexist leaders believed so strongly in the 
power of their press. that they could not see past it to vhat was necessary for their 
, 
" 
survival. They did not reaJize that propaganda .alone would not satisfy the very 
~ 
concrete nee<ls of their adherents. 
10Etienne, p . 7~; Paul Van Molle, Le Parlement BeIge 189+ 1 %9 (Ledegerg-Gent, 
Imprimerie Erasme S.A., 1969), p. 78-79; and Legrain, p. 129-30. 
11E . 7 lienne, p. ~. 
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CONCLUSION 
Why did Rex fail? How is it possible that a movement be at the forefront of 
national and even international news one year and then suddenly disappear into 
oblivion the next? Because Rex was an impossibility in Belgium. The movement itself 
did not develop realistically. and the national climate was not suited to it as it Qi4 
develop. Much of the trouble lay in Rex's background. 
D~grelle was director first of a publishing house. then of a movement. There 
were advantages and disadvantages to having a political movement develop out of a 
publishing house: on the one hand; it taught Degrelle and other future Rexist leaders 
the indispensible techniques of propaganda; on the other hand. this concentration 
created the illusion that propaganda was all that was necessary. Once they actually 
entered traditional politics in the Parliamentary elections of 1936. the movement-party 
would be prepared neither for day-to-day nor for long-term political work: for 
propaganda: was a short-term project. bringing immediate, if limited. results. The 
concept of planning ahead. of devising programs for realistic change. was unknown to 
Rexists; it was unknown not only to the Rexist Parliamentarians themselves, but to the 
movement,which they represented as well. Propaganda had gotten the~ elected. but 
had not prepared them for political life, in anyway. The result was catastrophic. When 
the initial sUrge of enthusiasm quieted down, Rexists inside and outside of Parijament 
- I . 
did not know how· to change their tactics in order to keep a steady base of supporters, 
Instead, they resorted to what they knew best, making false accusations and generally 
continuing the games of Louvain days. 
In essence, Rex's problem was that it never grew up. Those Reust leaders de la 
premiere heure. who had started their careers with the movement while still 
university or lycee students. had gotten stuck in the rut of those first few years. They 
could not see beyond their initial successes and blindly hung on to the old means that 
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had brought those first triumphs. When 1937 and then 1939 ro11ed around, they were 
stunned -- though they certainly did not admit it. But the damage could not be 
. reversed. By the late 30s, most Belgians who had flirted with the idealistic new world 
that Rex was"offering had seen the light; they were sick of waiting around for Rex's 
attacks to bring about the changes they wanted. 
Much of Rex's trouble lay with Degre11e and with his visionary plans for 
himself as the savior of morality in Belgium. Had he not tried in 1937 to immitate 
Hitler's tactic of staging ~ "legal" coup, Rex might have had a longer life as a movement 
of its own definition, and might not have felt compelled to copy Nazi and Italian Fascist 
propaganda strategies. If Degrelle became more traditionally fascist after 1937, as 
Etienne argues (p. 141), it was because he and his movement had lost their power base 
not only at home, but also abroad. Degrelle turned to a more traditional form of fascism 
after' the 1937 elections not only because the Church broke entirely with the Rexist 
movement at this point, but because he thought that by emulating his two most 
poverfull allies -- Hitler and Mussolini -- he could win their favor again. They, of 
course, were politically more astute than he was, and understood that to support a 
movement which was losing popularity within its own country and which had no 
possibilities of even performing ~ putsch was pointless.1 If Hitler and Mussolini 
remained on frien.d1y terms with Degrelle after 1937, they did not offer his movement 
'\ 
the financial support he had received from them between 1936 and 1937~ Degrelle 
"\ 
nevertheless' c~ntinued his faScistization of Rex, and iLl the process alienated not only 
former Rexists but also, as an ironical consequence, the very allies he was trying to ' 
copy. 
Although it was beyond the scope of this thesis to delve deeply into the specific 
character of Rex's fascism, to define the movement only as very traditionally Catholic 
would obscure the real nature of Rex. Rex)!M fascist. It may have begun as a simply 
1 Degrelle never had the support of the military. 
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traditional Catholic movement working towards the establishment of an ideal Catholic 
State, as defined by Mgr. Picard (see chapter one), but by the end of its second phase, it 
had rejected the Catholic Party. By the end of its third phase, it had begun to attack the 
very concept of the party system, thereby confirming its movement away from 
traditional Catholic political methods in general. 
ReI certainly was fascist after 1937 and, I would argue, even as early. as 
November, 193'. But it was not the same as Hitlerian and Mussolinian fascism. ReI 
retained its own character, especially between 193' and 1937 when it was confident in 
its power, and did not need to look outside itself for political strategies. Even after the 
1937 electoral defeat. when it did look toward fascist Italy and Germany for inspiration, 
it still kept its narrow-minded political vision based solely in rhetoric. ReI was so 
caught up in the idea that words were enough to carry the movement and to bring 
about changes in society that it only borrowed what reaffirmed its own orientation: 
propaganda. Still convinced that this alone broug-ht power, ReIist leaders once again 
did not put words into action. Nazi and Italian fascist theory not put into practice had 
no more success than Rexist rhetoric without program. Only the unusual 
circumstances of the German occupation during the Second World War would enable 
Rex to rise again. 
So why study Rex before the war? Was it really that important if it never took 
" 
over power and if its fascism was ineffective? Yes, for fascism of any kind is a threat, 
. . ~ 
and the fascism5 of the 19305 were a prelude to the "last good war," the war which must 
not be forgotten. The disasters of the Second World-War and the doubts it raised about 
the existence of a basic goodness inherent in all human beings, impose upon present 
generations the duty to continue the study of its causes and of its actors. The threat of 
contemporary revisionist historians who deny the Holocaust must be fought down. For 
we, students of today, along with future generations, must not ignore our past. We must 
concentrate not, like the fascists themselves, solely 0.0 the times when history was 
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positive, but also on the times when it was negative. The 1920s and 30s were negative in 
the sense that they saw the rise of many fascist groups. We must learn from this 
history, because we must learn that fascism is not an answer and that the theory of 
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ELECTION RESULTS FOR REX IN 1936 AND 19391 
ID2. ill2 
Number Percentages Number Percentages 
of votes of Votes 
Am\1m 19,213 5.86 6,414 1.95 
Antwerp 6,531 7.76 2,284 2.75 
Malines 3,059 4A5 1.044 1.53 
Turnhout 2.343 4.24 459 .83 
BiABAm 68,685 14.22 30,501 6.32 
BruxeUes 53,582 15.77 24,823 7.26 
Louvain. 6,959 8.15 2,060 2.44 
Nivelles 8,144 14:09 3,618 6.46 
WESTEDl 
FLANDElIS 24,891 9.59 7,757 2.99 
Brugge 4,695 9.46 1.361 2.73 
Furnes, Dixmude, 
Ostende 3,413 6.73 1,375 2.69 
RouJers, Tielt 5,687 11.08 947 1.88 
Courtrai 8,146 10.99 3,402 4.59 
Ypres 2,950 8.72 672 1.99 
EASTEBlIl 
FL.AND!lIS 22,288 6.49 4,870 1.42 
Alost 4,243 6.42 1,830 2.75 
Audenarde 3.969 11.75 
Ghent, Eec.k1o 10,051 6.83 2.156 1.47 
Saint-Nicolas 2,495 4.87 341 .67 
Termonde 1,530 3.38 543 1.22 
HAlNAUT 33.961 8~72 14,830 3.95 
Charleroi 11,746 8.60 4.155 3.17 
Mons 6,215 7.45 2,850 3.55 
Soignie5 3,166 5.89 1.591 3.05 
Thuin 5,070 12.18 2,517 6.31 
Tournai, Ath 7,764 10,43 3.317 ).I5 
lJEOE 55.582 19.36 21.796 7.58 
Uege 33.145 19,42 -13,971 8.39 
Huy, 
, 
Waremme ·8,688 15.85 3,019 5.71 
Verviers 13,749 22.29 4,806 7.05 
LnmOUBG 5,738 5.89 3,015 3.14 
Hasselt 3.386 7.71 1,106 2.56 
Tongres, 
Maaseik 2,352 4.39 1,909 3.60 
LmmmotmG 19,146 29.06 8,026 12.74 
ArIon, Marche. 
Bastogne 10,457 28.60 4,899 13.99 
Neufchateau, 
Virton 8,689 29.65 3.127 11.19 
NAHUB 21.987 20.35 6,612 6.38 
Dinant, 
PhiHppeviUe 9,556 21.89 3,186 7.66 
Namur 12,431 19.29 3,426 5.53 
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